



Fragile States Index

Curaçao
Country Report
2024



Publication of
Think To DO Institute

We wish to thank the many persons in the Think To DO Institute and those from various institutions who assisted in the identification of data sources, contributed expertise and who offered helpful suggestions to this research initiative.

Copyright 2024, Think to DO Institute



The Think To DO Institute is an independent, apolitical think tank located in Curaçao, Dutch Caribbean. The T2DI has as its purpose to help Curaçao become a more resilient society by producing research that is based in best practice, and which delivers practical solutions to the barriers that hold the community back from becoming more resilient. Research evidence shows that Resilient Societies are created by attention to people, to organizations, to place, and to knowledge. Resilient Societies design, redesign organizations, institutions, and systems to better absorb disruption, operate under a wide variety of conditions, and shift more fluently from one circumstance to the next. For more information about the Think To DO Institute, visit the website: www.thinktodoinstitute.com

Readers' Guide

As with any scientific document, it is recommended that the reader follows some simple steps in reading the executive summary and the research document itself. These guidelines can result in getting more meaning from the research in the interest of time.

First, skim the document. It is suggested to read the introduction and the executive summary to learn about the major findings and why they matter. This will give a “big picture” perspective to the reader. There may be terms, concepts or techniques that were used that are unfamiliar and the reader can note those. The reader may want to look up the terms to better understand the methodology or findings. Care has been given to provide in the text descriptions of terms and methodology to assist in the reading. The reader may also find it useful to note any questions that come to mind while skimming.

After the skimming, it is helpful to examine the graphs, tables and diagrams and try to interpret the data. Read the explanations and then revisit the infographics to understand their contents. The reader can then reflect by asking the following questions before reading the entire document:

- What problems does the research address, and why is it important?
- Are the findings supported by evidence?
- Are the methods clear and understandable?
- Is the research devoid of bias?
- What factors might affect the outcome?

Before going further, it can enhance understanding by either mentally or physically summarizing the research in the reader's own words. This will help the reader distill the scientific essence of the research report: purpose, assumptions, major findings, conclusions. For example: What were surprises or unanswered questions? What conditions need to exist for the recommendations to be realized?

This internationally recognized research structure was created to assist nations in recognizing their vulnerabilities. In its quest to identify best practices for creating a more resilient country, the Think To DO Institute determined that the FSI and its supplement on Capacities of State could, if conducted, provide key information that could lead to best practice recommendations. As stated in the research document, “to know how resilient a country is, it can be said that one must first determine its vulnerabilities”. With this instrument, those vulnerabilities have been identified, and possible best practice resilience-building strategies have been pinpointed. If agreed-upon, these findings and recommendations can move Curaçao, as an autonomous state towards a more anchored, well-built resilient state.

It must be noted that the absence of data effected the scoring in the assessment, in that the absence of data resulted in a low score for some areas. The lack of data for Curaçao, therefore, made assessment scoring difficult.

Based on this country analysis, the degree of fragility was determined, and comparisons could be made. Knowing the degrees and areas of fragility made it possible to then offer best practice recommendations/interventions across the five areas of the Fragile States Index. The study also provided insight into possible factors that affect how and why this country is caught in the fragility cycle and allows the researchers to offer mitigating strategies. Further, the research serves as foundation for further research into how to escape the fragility cycle and develop resiliency.

Key words related to FSI: *resilience, resilient societies, fragile states, Fragile States Index, cohesion, economic, political, social, and cross cutting indicators, and state's capacities.* Other key words: *abundance/growth mindset, autonomous state, demographic pressures, economic decline and poverty, economic diversity, electoral processes, environmental protection, external intervention, factionalized elites, governance legitimacy, group grievance, human flight and brain drain, human rights and fundamental freedoms, human rights and rule of law, inclusion, institutional strength, macro/meso/micro level analysis, migration policy, nation-building, public services, refugees and internally displaced persons, rule of law, security apparatus, state legitimacy, statistical information systems, sustainability, tripartite consultation, uneven economic development*

Table of Contents

<i>Reader's Guide</i>	1
<i>Table of Contents</i>	2
<i>Background</i>	3
<i>Methodology</i>	4-6
<i>Preface</i>	7-9
<i>Challenge of Disinformation</i>	10-11
<i>Risk Analysis</i>	12
<i>Chapter 1: Cohesion Indicators</i>	13-22
<i>Chapter 2: Political Indicators</i>	23-35
<i>Chapter 3: Economic Indicators</i>	36-44
<i>Chapter 4: Social and Cross-cutting Indicators</i>	45-53
<i>Chapter 5: Capacities of State Indicators: Supplement to the Fragile States Index</i>	54-68
<i>Baseline Dashboards</i>	69-71
<i>Conclusions and Recommendations</i>	72-95
<i>Explanations and Recommendations</i>	72-76
<i>Recommendation/Interventions Table</i>	77-95
<i>References</i>	96-104
<i>Appendices</i>	105-137
1. <i>Recommendations/Interventions: Meso/Micro</i>	105-112
2. <i>Fragile States Index Indicators</i>	113-135
3. <i>State Resilience Index Indicators</i>	136
4. <i>Social Progress Index Indicators</i>	137

Background

As defined generally, a nation's resilience is its ability to respond to hazards. Resilience is measured by the nation's ability to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner.

Natural and human-induced disasters carry with them the potential for a myriad of possible consequences. From injuries and death, displacement of people, loss of property and land, disruptions in transportation, business interruption, job losses, and greater demands on government. Several examples of tests to Curaçao's resilience are its response to some of these consequences with the passing north of the island of Hurricane Thomas, and, more recently, the island's response to COVID threats and consequences involving lives, livelihoods. In addition to these external threats are the nation's internal factors such as an aging and maintenance backlog in infrastructure, poor public services, poor economic performance and disparities, an aging and declining population. Additional external factors that demand greater resilience strategies are the complex and interdependent global commerce and economic systems, the changing power relations in the world, the shifting speed of technological development because of the 4th Industrial Revolution, and climate change.

Resilience

How a state responds to these threats demands greater resilience of the nation's physical, social, cultural, economic, and environmental health. The extent to which these threats are addressed, moves a state in the direction of the capacities of a resilient nation. To accomplish this and to safeguard future generations requires an ability to anticipate, adapt and respond to the earlier mentioned factors, natural or man-made, short, or long-term, local, or global. To begin the process, the existing status quo must be determined before contemplating the necessary changes to accomplish this resiliency. The assessment of the countries vulnerabilities, or its fragility is the first order of business before policy interventions are contemplated.

State Fragility

State fragility takes many different forms and goes under a variety of different labels. State fragility can be seen as a continuum on which countries and their government are differentiated and defined by their capacity or willingness to deliver on these public goods. These states have weak institutions or systems of public administration; poor economic performance and distribution of its gains; experience poor social cohesion and experience tensions; suffer from corruption; and have inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure and poor-quality public services, just to name some of their characteristics. An example of a full-blown fragile state is Somalia. An example of a resilient state is Finland.

What are the fundamental causes of state fragility?

Every state has its own complex history of internal and external influences, and any generalized explanation of fragility will necessarily omit some factors that are relevant and important to an individual case. State-building is a lengthy and difficult process for today's developing states; it takes time to build a stable state. A historical perspective is required when considering the challenges facing newer states. As well, several other possible factors help to explain why some have been less effective than others. "Fragile states measurements" consider colonial legacy, geographical location, a lack of regional integration, border delineation conflicts, limited internal market because of size, and important barriers to effective development such as the policies pursued by the leaders and governments of fragile states. History is not destiny, and some states have made real development progress despite an unfavorable history and negative trends.

A ranking, in the end, is pretty meaningless — it is the underlying scores, and as far as they can be determined, the specific root causes and drivers of instability that must be recognized and addressed.

Methodology

Based on the international comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

These data sets were collected from international sources, local public and private sources and from structured interviews with the private and public sectors.

These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source is checked by the others. A panel review is then conducted by the research team of the final index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an international index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state’s resiliency.

The international comparison and local analyses of the FSI are determined through Content Analysis, Quantitative Data and Qualitative Review. The FSI for Curacao followed the exact analyses as prescribed for all countries.



Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure the condition of a state at any given moment. The indicators provide a snapshot in time that can be measured against other snapshots in a time series to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening. Below is the list of indicators used in the Fragile States Index.

Security Apparatus

State Legitimacy

Factionalized Elites

Public Services

Group Grievance

Human Flight and Brain Drain

Economic Decline and Poverty

Demographic Pressures

Uneven Economic Development

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Human Flight and Brain Drain

External Interventions

Content Analysis: Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.

Quantitative Data: Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for this specific country are then integrated with the results from the Content Analysis phase.

Qualitative Review: Separately, a research team reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

Since the 2023 report, the results of the Fragile States Index for Curaçao were triangulated with the results of two other indexes to further identify and validate the results and recommendations: the State Resilience Index and the Social Progress Index.

Different methodologies were used in each, but the purpose of the triangulation is to determine the comparability of the outcomes.

The **State Resilience Index (SRI)** stands alongside the Fragile States Index (FSI), as a new tool to identify capacities and capabilities in countries under stress. Resilience is the extent to which a country can prepare, manage, and recover from a crisis, relative to the severity of that crisis such as the global pandemic.

This index focuses on the dynamics between the pressures a country faces and its capacity to respond to the pressures and stressors. To understand the dynamics, we must define *pressure and capacity*. Pressure is an umbrella term for stresses faced by a given country. It is assumed to be highly variable in the short-term. This is borne out by observation where stresses, such as natural disasters or economic shocks, arise in a matter of weeks, if not days. Accordingly, pressure can be considered the driving force in the model as it evolves from an initial shock in a linear or potentially non-linear fashion.

Capacity is the resources able to be brought to bear in response to stress. In contrast to pressure, capacity is considered relatively static over the short term. Resources such as infrastructure, governance, and societal support mechanisms are not readily improved and often require years of consistent attention.

Pressure and capacity, together, determine the response of a country to an exogenous stressor. Periods of extreme pressure (relative to capacity) act to degrade capacity. Conversely, in more benign periods when capacity exceeds pressure sufficiently, capacity can be “repaired” or expanded.

This relationship is critical to identify vulnerabilities is the capacity of a country in order to address the vulnerabilities so that the country becomes a resilient state.

By conducting this additional analysis, the findings of the Fragile State Index are validated and strengthened.

The third analysis conducts what the **Social Progress Index**. **Social progress is the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential.**

Its methodology is as follows:

To evaluate country performance on each of these dimensions, this dimension must be broken down into specific actionable components. Each component of the framework is comprised of between three and five specific outcome indicators. The included indicators are selected because they are measured appropriately, with a consistent methodology, by the same organization, and across all (or essentially all) of the countries in the sample.

The overall Social Progress Index score is a simple average of the three dimensions. Each dimension, in turn, is the simple average of its four components. Each component is weighed equally. The aim this index is to measure social progress directly, rather than utilizing economic proxies. The Social Progress Index is the first measurement to do this. By excluding economic indicators, the index rigorously and systematically analyzes the relationship between economic development (measured for example by GDP per capita) and social development. Prior efforts to move “beyond GDP” have commingled social and economic indicators, making it difficult to disentangle cause and effect.

By way of this analysis the index assesses how well a country provides for its people's essential needs by measuring access to nutrition and basic medical care, if they have access to safe drinking water, if they have access to adequate housing with basic utilities, and if society is safe and secure.

This SPI framework was adopted as the third methodology to determine the impact of the country's resilience or fragility on its people's ability to thrive.

Based on the research and analyses over the course of ten months, using these methodologies, the Fragile States Index for Curacao has been created.

Preface

The IMPORTANCE of Why?

Why would this be important? Why publish such a report? The importance of WHY.

As researchers, our task is to flush out information, insights, and alternatives, revealing critical questions for our teams/workgroups to explore. These questions can help us tackle key issues that are easy to miss.

The purpose of the report is to identify specific areas of fragility that when addressed can break the country out of the fragility cycle that it is in. Breaking out of the fragility cycle requires leadership. Leadership requires two things: a vision of the world that does not yet exist and the ability to communicate it. WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE? Leaders achieve very little by themselves. They inspire people to come together for the good of the group. Leaders start with WHY. Why are we strong or why are we fragile? Why are other countries more globally competitive? Why are we falling behind? Why should the people come together around a vision for the future. Finding the answer to why requires data collection and a focus on data driven decisions. Finding strategies from other places that launch countries out of their fragility cycles is critical to long term resilience of a country's people.

Related to **Why**, is the speculative questions of What if? What else? How might we? And Now what? In the course of the research herein, the findings tease out the possible root causes and possible answers to these research questions as well.

At the country level, the value in repeating the index annually is to be able to focus on trends and rate-of-change, with attention paid to the individual country's indicator scores instead of only its total composite scores. Being informed and armed with powerful data to drive decision making of influencer and governments is why this think tank has made the index an annual task.

What is the Fragile States Index?

The Fragile States Index is an annual assessment of 179 countries based on a measurement of the social, economic, and political pressures that each country faces. The Index is unique, in that it is based on a platform of content analysis (using algorithms to analyze tens of millions of qualitative data points) that is then triangulated with quantitative data and qualitative research inputs. Now in its fifteenth year, the Index provides over a decade of trend analysis, including long-term trends for each country and the ability to disaggregate those trends to the specific social, economic, and political aspects of the challenges that each country faces.

Why is it important to define and measure fragility? In any discipline, it is important for policy objectives to be clear and grounded in solid metrics. For example, sound agricultural policy is based on metrics, such as crop yields, nutritional needs, or commodity prices. State fragility is no different. In formulating policy for development, metrics are important for understanding baselines and objectives. In that sense, data is critical, and where it is lacking, it needs to be generated. That is fundamentally the role that the Fragile States Index fulfills – it helps to inform understanding and response to issues of social, economic, and political fragility based on solid data. But even beyond this, the issue of state fragility is by its nature a sensitive topic. No country wishes to be known as a “fragile state” – but we cannot hope to address issues of fragility if we are not prepared to talk about it. In so doing, it is equally important that such discussions are based on fact and clear metrics, to avoid terms such as “fragile state” being thrown around casually. Conversations about state fragility need to be objective and most of all constructive, and a data-driven approach is critical to ensuring this.

How is the Fragile States Index used? The Fragile States Index is used extensively by foreign governments and aid agencies to measure their contributions toward development initiatives, and to focus their efforts in identifying further areas in need of development or support. Further, the private sector and financial institutions use the Fragile States Index to better understand risk – not necessarily to determine whether to invest or to operate in a certain

country, but how to do so in an informed manner that takes account of risk that it then appropriately mitigated. And most importantly of all, the Index is used by countries themselves – governments use the Index to better understand their own challenges and how to address them, whilst local civil society groups use the Index as a tool to advocate for reform. At The Fund for Peace, they are impressed by the diversity of stakeholders who use this data; ultimately, the data should be used to understand fragility, to inform policy, and to provide a platform for constructive dialogue on collective responses to countries’ challenges.

Does fragility only affect developing countries? A frequent criticism of any Index – whether it be the Fragile States Index or other organizations’ similar efforts on issues such as transparency or freedom – has been that they are somehow “Western-centric” efforts to undermine or defame developing countries. But the reality is that the Fragile States Index has been quite indiscriminate in its identification of fragility trends. For example, last year the Index ranked the United States as the most-worsened country on the Index’s three “Cohesion” indicators. During much of the past decade, the Index also charted the relative decline of countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain as they witnessed the fallout from economic shocks in the mid-2000s. What this demonstrates is that every country – developed or developing alike – experiences fragility to different degrees. What sets countries apart is their resilience, or their ability to withstand shocks, and their capacity to respond effectively to those pressures. Furthermore, in a globalized and interconnected world, fragility, wherever it may be, is everybody’s problem. Fragility ultimately affects everyone, one way or another.

Why are there changes in the content of the Fragile States Index Report beginning in 2024 report? In 2022, the Fund for Peace (FFP), a US-based non-profit educational and research institution and creator of the Fragile States Index, was motivated by unexpected outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic (where some countries fared poorer than expected, while others were not as affected as expected) to look for better ways to prepare various organizations, and countries themselves, to deal with future crises around the globe, and better understand which countries may be more heavily affected by crises in different sectors.

These findings, when documenting the strengths and weaknesses of a country, can help in further evaluating what makes a country resilient. As a result, in 2023 the Fund for Peace devised has two measures: the Fragile States Index (FSI), looking at the amount of pressure countries were under in different sectors (economic, political, social, cohesion, with 3 factors under each pillar), as well as the State Resilience Index (SRI), which examines the capacity each country has for managing these pressures in each sector.

These SRI pillars inform the Fragile States Index pressures by connecting to the ability of the country to manage these pressures. The pressures pillars are grouped to include data from the FSI in the areas of **Inclusion, Social Cohesion, State Capacity, Individual Capabilities, Environment and Ecology, Economy, and Civic Space.**

As a result of this change at the international level, the Think To DO Institute has transitioned to include these data pillars since the 2023 analysis of Curaçao. Each chapter of the FSI 2024 has a special section which notes the impact of the indicators of the SRI on the analysis of Curaçao’s resilience.

Further, the Think To DO Institute has taken note that another international measure, the Social Progress Index (SPI) also gives valuable insights through its indicators of the ability of a country to provide social progress for its people. **Social progress is the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential.**

The Social Progress Index framework focuses on three distinct (though related) questions:

1. Does a country provide for its people’s most essential needs?
2. Are the building blocks in place for individuals and communities to enhance and sustain wellbeing?

3. Is there opportunity for all individuals to reach their full potential?

Because these questions are critical to resilience and because these data are being collected in the FSI analysis, the Think To DO Institute has, since 2023, included in its analysis a section that indicates whether the data collected can answer these social progress questions, and additionally inform the question of the resilience of the people of Curaçao.

The Challenge of Disinformation

Disinformation is widely seen as a pressing challenge for democracies worldwide, but it has proven difficult to define, understand, and measure—let alone address. A new Carnegie report offers evidence-based assessments of ten major policy interventions, drawing on hundreds of academic papers and consultations with many leading scholars and practitioners.

In this 2024 Fragile States Index study, it has been observed by multiple researchers that there is an increase in both disinformation and the lack of transparency when finding and validating reports that should yield important information about the policies and institutions framing government work.











The Carnegie report has been used as another source to identify and measure disinformation. The Institute has utilized the resource list provided to answer three fundamental questions: How much is known about the intervention? How effective does it seem and How scalable is it?

What is known for sure is that there is no “one way” or “best policy option. However, fact-checking and bolstering local journalism and media literacy do deter disinformation. Institutions must declare what is true and false to validate their authority in and to prevent political blowback. Clear policies, regulations and monitoring of the use of Generative AI must be put into place to counter disinformation measures.

Another challenge of disinformation is the lack of production of status reports from various departments and institutions. When periodical reports are not produced, fertile ground for disinformation and emotional decision making exists. Such decision making creates mistakes by distorting and creating bias. The best decisions are those that are made because of reliance on reliable data and data trends over time. Consequently, the concern for a developing country such as Curaçao is that disinformation is decreased and data-driven, fact-based decisions are evidenced in the review of the country’s fragility or resilience.

Below is the chart of the Carnegie evidence-based assessments and their effectiveness, use and scalability. Within the chapters of this Fragile State Index 2024 Curaçao Country Report, there will be comment and conclusions made about disinformation and transparency based on these assessments.

Assessing Ten Policy Interventions to Counter Disinformation

Type	Intervention	How much is known?	How effective does it seem?	How easily does it scale?
	1. Supporting local journalism	Modest	Significant	Difficult
	2. Media literacy education	Significant	Significant	Difficult
	3. Fact-checking	Significant	Modest	Modest
	4. Labeling social media content	Modest	Modest	Easy
	5. Counter-messaging strategies	Modest	Modest	Difficult
	6. Cybersecurity for elections and campaigns	Modest	Modest	Modest
	7. Statecraft, deterrence, and disruption	Modest	Limited	Modest
	8. Removing inauthentic asset networks	Limited	Modest	Modest
	9. Reducing data collection and targeted ads	Modest	Limited	Difficult
	10. Changing recommendation algorithms	Limited	Significant	Modest



Public information



Government action



Platform action

The cells of this table are color coded: green suggests the most positive assessment for each factor, while red is the least positive and yellow is in between. These overall ratings are a combination of various subfactors, which may be in tension: for example, an intervention can be highly effective but only for a short time or with high risk of second-order consequences.

A green cell means an intervention is well studied, likely to be effective, or easy to implement. For the first column, this means there is a large body of literature on the topic. While it may not conclusively answer every relevant question, it provides strong indicators of effectiveness, cost, and related factors. For the second column, a green cell suggests that an intervention can be highly effective at addressing the problem in a lasting way at a relatively low level of risk. For the third column, a green cell means that the intervention can quickly make a large impact at relatively low cost and without major obstacles to successful implementation.

A yellow cell indicates an intervention is less well studied (there is relevant literature but major questions about efficacy are unanswered or significantly underexplored), less efficacious (its impact is noteworthy but limited in size or duration, or it carries some risk of blowback), or faces nonnegligible hurdles to implementation, such as cost, technical barriers, or political opposition.

A red cell indicates that an intervention is poorly understood, with little literature offering guidance on key questions; that it is low impact, has only narrow use cases, or has significant second-order consequences; or that it requires an especially high investment of resources or political capital to implement or scale.

Jon Bateman is a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dean Jackson is principal of Public Circle Research & Consulting and a specialist in democracy, media, and technology.



CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE

© 2024 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.


Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Risk Analysis Current Risk Landscape

The World Economic Forum *Global Risks Perception Survey 2023-2024* highlights current crises that corrode resilience, as well as new and rapidly evolving sources of risk that will reshape the next decade (2023-2033). In addition, respondents were asked to select up to five risks that they felt are most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2024.¹

Two areas stand out for those countries that are most vulnerable to infrastructure weaknesses and also political polarization and high levels of disinformation. Those areas are **Extreme Weather (66%)** and **AI-Generated misinformation and disinformation(53%)**.

Below is the current risk landscape. Evidence would indicate that fragile states will face the highest risks across more than half of these risks and evidence in the chapters of the Curaçao report will highlight those results.



The risk rankings listed here were also considered as the State Resilience and Fragile State Indexes indicators were compared with local data sets.

¹ World Economic Forum *Global Risks Report: Global Risks Perception Survey 2023-2024*

Chapter 1: Cohesion Indicators



Introduction:

Cohesion indicators focus on three areas: security apparatus, factionalized elites, and group grievances within the population. Because violence disrupts social cohesion, these indicators look at serious criminal factors such as organized crime, and the perceived trust of citizens in domestic security such as organized attempts to disrupt governance or violent uprisings. When looking along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, the factionalized elites indicators look for dangerous policies that limit safety of all or gridlock between “ruling elites”. These sub-indicators measure power struggles, political competition, political transitions or their absence, and the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class. Lastly, the group grievance indicators focus on divisions, and “schisms” (splits or divisions between strongly opposed sections or parties in society, caused by differences in opinion or belief) between different groups in society.

The analyses of these indicators were completed via review of qualitative and quantitative external and internal documents (international and national) available for the period of 2023-2024. Through close analyses of the above-mentioned trends, the status of cohesion within the country Curaçao can be estimated. The degree of cohesion is a predictor of social and economic stability, sustainability, and resilience. In this chapter, comparison to specific characteristics measured in both the Social Progress Index and the State Resilience Index will be addressed.

Both the Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report of 2024 and the Latin American Trust: The Key to Social Cohesion and Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean report that trust is critical to social cohesion and improvement in participation in society.²

The six dimensions of social cohesion that are discussed there and which directly relate to citizen participation and trust of government are: inclusion-exclusion...

The Social Progress Index measures three vital areas of social cohesion without which people lose faith and confidence in their government: meeting their basic needs, providing for their well-being and providing opportunity to grow and participate in society. The absence of access to critical services such as health care, transportation and education erodes social cohesion.

Lessons Learned:

Social cohesion Issues reported in previous reports have not been addressed and continue to worsen.

- The overall status of cohesion in the community continues to deteriorate.
- The gap between the various socio-economic groups is still widening.
- Distrust amongst the factions of society is growing.
- Evidence of corruption without consequences is threatening safety and security.
- Police and government officials continue to be accused and/or found guilty of crimes at a higher rate than in the past

Security Apparatus The scope of the indicators related to the security apparatus include incidents of arms proliferation; use of force; presence of guerillas, militias; control of the military, presence of paramilitary; accusations of police brutality, professionalization of the police, political violence, private forces; government response to security threats.

² *Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report 2024*, Daniel J. Edelman Holdings, Inc, Chicago, Illinois.

Latin American Trust: The Key to Social Cohesion and Growth in Latin American and Caribbean Report, Interamerican Development Bank, 2024.

The current security dynamics, summarized from multiple longitudinal sources, that threaten the security apparatus are listed below and described in further detail in this chapter:

- Lack of knowledge and strategy over a long period by local government
- Local participation in organized crime, criminal activities at the island level
- Maritime and Air restrictions with Venezuela since 2019, conflict with the Kingdom
- Food and Water insecurity due to lack of preparedness related to Climate dynamics and to Cyber security
- The geopolitical interests of the US, Russia and China in the region
- Societal tensions, declining trust, disinformation and a radical undercurrent
- Lack of resilience in the rule of law and the weakness of institutions that sustain the democratic order

There was no documentation of *arms proliferation for this report nor for the reports since 2020*. However, international crime reports that were reviewed and referred to later in this section indicated that there is a direct correlation between organized crime and illegal stockpiling of weapons by private citizens outside of the legitimate use for national security. The Netherlands has a secret intelligence unit and provides military support to the island.

As for control of the military, presence of paramilitary, or presence of guerillas and/or militias, the military is under complete control of the government and, at the national level, is provided by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although by law the military only has international jurisdiction while domestic affairs are handled by the police, there is evidence that this boundary is being blurred in order to sustain domestic safety and security since the police do not have the necessary manpower to guarantee these. At the annual Carnival 2024 celebration, it was evidenced that weaponized military were present to keep order along the parade route in addition to local police presence.


There is no recorded or known presence of private militias. There is no recorded evidence of private armies to protect assets, however, there is recorded evidence of the influence of organized crime. There is also documentation in police reports of gang control and “rule-setting” of certain neighborhoods. The greatest threat to national security, according to numerous reports, and highlighted in the annual *Insight Crime Reports* related to the Netherlands, is the increased activities of organized crime. As reported in the 2023 FSI report, and since there has been no update to that report, the following remain security threats:¹³

1. The **scale of criminal earnings** has a destabilizing effect both in Curacao and in the Kingdom.
2. **Violence**. Cases of targeted assassinations and killings between criminal groups.
3. Use of corruption, where government officials are targeted by organized crime groups. There have been continuous corruption scandals reaching high into the government in multiple ministries which undermines state legitimacy and public confidence and hinders economic development.
4. **Terrorism**. Profits from drug trafficking through Curacao feed several South American terrorist organizations in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil. Criminal infrastructure has been known to move money, secure arms, move gold, and provide services to terrorist networks using the Netherlands and the Dutch Caribbean financial secrecy loopholes.
5. **Border integrity**. There is concern that the contested 2024 election in Venezuela will continue to contribute to the failure of democracy there. The collapse of Venezuela, where organized crime has not penetrated the highest echelons of government for several years, presents the Kingdom of the Netherlands with a direct national security threat. Venezuela is the biggest neighbor of the Dutch Caribbean, with Aruba and Curacao at particular risk from illegal immigration, money laundering, weapons, human trafficking, drug trafficking and gang movement. The island is ill-equipped to cope with such threats which grow daily Maduro’s tightening power, the shrinking Venezuelan economy, and with it, the collapse of its public services.
6. **Contamination of the economy**. The WODC (Research and Documentation Centre) of the Ministry of Justice and Security has conducted analysis of the criminal need for money laundering. Field research in the Dutch Caribbean shows a high level of vulnerability to money laundering. Evidence was found that


³ Latin America Organized Crime Study for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, InSight Crime, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024

money from Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is being laundered in the hospitality, banking, construction sectors as well as online gambling linked to the Italian and Russian mafia.

- 7. Reputational risk.** The expansion of international organized crime in the Netherlands, especially related to the drug trade and money laundering, is common knowledge which damages the good standing of the Netherlands and of the Dutch Caribbean as a gateway for these activities.



Within the kingdom of the Netherlands, the royal Netherlands navy plays a part in defense and security including from bases in Curacao and Aruba. In 2023 it intercepted over 38 tonnes of cocaine in the waters of its territories in the Caribbean. Cocaine shipments from Venezuela enter the European Dutch territories via go-fast boats. The distance between Aruba, Curaçao respectively and Venezuela is between 14.3 miles and 37 miles. From Aruba and Curacao, cocaine is shipped directly to the Netherlands via sea or air, or it continues its transshipment route to the eastern Caribbean. There is a marked increase in 2024 in the number of go-fast boats that have been intercepted.



CSIS (Center for Strategic International Studies) 2023 report on drug trafficking in the Dutch kingdomⁱⁱⁱ

In 2016 a former prime minister convicted of forgery, official bribery and money laundering, based on investigations that revealed how the Italian mafia bribed the Curaçaoan politician to gain access to confidential government information and to secure the appointment of his relatives and allies in critical positions at the Central Bank and the Gaming Board and within his cabinet. Since then, no action has been taken to change policy or

institutional structures to prevent these security weaknesses from reoccurring.⁴ International organized crime continues to be a security threat.

Overall, the military and the police maintain a proper *use of force*. There are references to *accusations of police brutality* in the Hof of Justice Annual Report of 2019 and *the Veiligheid en rechtsorde in het Caribisch Gebied, September 2020*.⁵ In each annual report since then, there has been documentation of accusations of police brutality, and there has been a deterioration in public trust of the police following events of police misbehavior.⁶ It is also noted in the Hof of Justice 2022 report that within the assessment of the police force by the community that it is perceived that the police force does not address corruption. In 2022 it was reported that the Law Enforcement Council did research and their findings were that the police force does not have its own integrity monitoring system to address the reported concerns about police misbehavior.⁷ The Council's 2024 did not note either the implementation of a monitoring system or an improvement in police behavior. See Politics and Capacity of State Chapters for more detailed information)

In 2024, the needs identified in the 2021 report are still present, and there needs to be an active and involved role in the Caribbean region to fight the crime. As to the Curaçao/Aruba Forward Operating Location (FOL) status, nothing has changed since the 2020 report. FOL is the result of a 10-year access security and defense cooperation agreement the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed in March 2000 and renewed in 2010. The Curaçao/Aruba FOL supports operations of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) to detect, monitor, and track aircraft or vessels engaged in illicit drug trafficking that originate in South America and cross the Caribbean Sea to reach Mexico and the United States. In its report, the Minister of Defense reported to the Council of Ministers in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, supported the findings of the Inside Crime report shared in the FSI 2020 report. There is no evidence of the suggested deepened relationship with the US, CARICOM and South America because the countries of the kingdom feel the need for an urgent response to organized crime in the region. These are similar conclusions of the Kingdom report: *Veiligheid en rechtsorde in het Caribisch gebied*". No substantial measures have yet been introduced on the islands.

Climate and environmental policy concern national issues and must be a part of the national political priorities. On September 28, 2023, the Second Session of the Curaçao Climate Change Platform (CCCP) took place hosted by the Ministry of Economic Development. Presentations were given on different topics such as climate risk in the financial sector, food security, and waste management. Furthermore, technical committees (TCs) were established with the aim to gather all experts that can give their support to climate action and push forward the work of the CCCP. These TCs will develop recommendations on climate adaptation and mitigation which will then be presented to the government for further decision-making. An example for the need of such plans came in April 2024 when torrential rains in the western part of the island caused significant damage due to the lack of maintenance of the dams, man-made water channels and water reservoirs and illegal building practices.⁸ The Netherlands professes support for the Caribbean countries and SIDS during international (UN) meetings but sees no role for itself in the development and financing of concrete measures.

The Caribbean countries cannot claim specific (international) climate funds for which the status of developing country or a closer relationship with the EU is a condition. In its plans for the composition and equipping of the armed forces in the coming decades, the Netherlands will in any case have to consider more frequent and larger-scale (aid) deployment in the Caribbean, also outside the regular hurricane season. This may require expansion of the permanent maritime support capacity, but also better image compilation, search and rescue and the deployment of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee for border surveillance. Lagging efforts in the field of nature protection and diversification of the economy can have their repercussions in the longer term. The Netherlands

⁴ The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe, Insight Crime, February 2021

⁵ *Veiligheid en rechtsorde in het Caribisch Gebied, September 2020*

⁶ Hof of Justice Annual Report 2021, 2022

⁷ https://www.raadrechtshandhaving.com/nL_NL/beheer-bureau-interne-zaken-van-het-korps-politie-curacao/

⁸ <https://dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl/2024/05/05/noodweer-richt-ravage-aan-op-curacao/> article of May 5, 2024

will then have to make even greater (and more expensive) efforts to guarantee security and stability in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom.

In May 2023, the Refineria di Korsou (Curaçao refinery) presented a roadmap for sustainable redevelopment of the available sites around the refinery and Bullenbaai oil storage terminal, to the Dutch Minister of Climate and Energy. The goal of the redevelopment is to contribute to long-term socio-economic development and to the creation of a green industrial cluster in the port. Since then, there is no evidence that this roadmap has been implemented or actions from the roadmap have been initiated. However, in the summer of 2024, the current coalition government announced that it was seeking an agreement for an operator to re-open the refinery. At this writing, that has not yet been finalized which would be contrary to the sustainable redevelopment plan.

Political violence status remains unchanged since the 2020 report. There have been no further manifestations against the government since the one of June of 2020 which was detailed in the 2020 FSI report.

Social Progress Index

Considering that personal security is a basic human need, the rise of organized crime, the lack of trust in law enforcement and its lack of an integrity monitoring system, suggests that people are not feeling protected, and their sense of belonging is being jeopardized. Due to corruption of public entities, there is not equal opportunity.

FSI Assessment: Curaçao is vulnerable because of its weak or corrupt institutions and lack the capacity, resources, and political will to combat organized crime. Security is in the hands of the government, but cases of police misconduct are reported. There are examples of the weakening of and threats to the security apparatus. Transnational organized crime is able to operate with some success due to the low state resilience and resistance to its operations and influence in many countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Because of its ideal conditions for money laundering in its various, different guises, Curaçao, and the Netherlands, now has a vested interest in allowing its presence. The necessary “criminality fighting” policies have not been given the necessary priorities to address the impact on the economy; other topics such as climate, education and medical care have been given higher priority. There is evidence of a growing threat of violence and control of portions of the island by gangs. The military is the responsibility of the Kingdom, and therefore the impact of the corrupt institutions and loss of security are less evident to the community.

Score: 6

State Resilience Index

When comparing the FSI indicators to the State Resilience Index pillars, most of the cohesion concerns are tied to the other FSI indicators in this chapter.

Group Grievance

As noted in the introduction, *group grievances* indicators focus on divisions and “schisms” between different groups in society, especially those divisions based on social or political characteristics and their role in “ACCESS”. This reference is to access to services or resources, and to inclusion in the political process.

The history component in this section of cohesion indicators is important to note as it relates where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, going back centuries, that influence and shape that group’s role and relationships with other groups in the community. This history is important because it may be shaped by real or perceived “crimes” committed against the group(s) without consequence. Some examples are denied autonomy, persecution or repression, public scapegoating, and stereotyping.

Group Grievance indicators include *distribution of resources; group hatred or tolerance; group oppression; reintegration; history; intergroup relations; vigilante justice; war criminals; mass violence; religious persecution or tolerance; reconstruction, compensation for victims; truth and reconciliation; amnesty.*

Again, it must be noted that there is an absence of up-to-date data that measures many of these indicators. There is no conclusive data to support the inadequate *distribution of resources* since the government's budget has been under scrutiny and financial supervision of external entities for many years. It can be debated as to whether the austerity measures that the government has chosen to take have been designed in such a way as to preserve resources so that the most vulnerable *are* protected from further inequities and inequalities. The reality is that distribution of resources is not equitable. Both socially and economically, there are complaints that the gender, social and economic gaps continue to widen. This was a pattern before, during and after the Covid19 pandemic.

One example is the concern of government spending for travel. In May 2024, all factions in the Parliament of Curaçao signed a motion aimed at bringing more transparency to the expenses incurred by parliamentarians with the so-called 'pocket money and clearly and strictly justifying future travel expenses. The motion emphasizes that the Parliament has reserved an amount of 600,000 guilders for travel expenses for the year 2025. With this, the Parliament aims to set an example to the community on how public funds should be used in a transparent, honest, accountable, and controlled manner.⁹

Group hatred or tolerance; group oppression; reintegration has a historical context.

Being a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Curaçao has a *history* of slave trade. This aggrieved history has permeated the culture at an individual, group, institutional, government, regional and international level. Neo-colonialist fears are a constant presence and shape the relationship of "autonomy" with its Kingdom. The Kingdom of the Netherlands established a committee to investigate the effects of colonialism in the kingdom. The independent Advisory Board for Dialogue on the History of Slavery was established in July 2020 by the Minister of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations in the Netherlands. In 2023 and 2024 more events have been planned to commemorate the role of slavery both in Curacao and the Netherlands as a kingdom-wide acknowledgement of the importance of righting colonial history.

An example of group oppression is the continuous fight by both religious and political figures against the legalization of gay marriage. Same-sex partners in Aruba and Curaçao must be allowed to marry each other according to rulings in two appellate cases delivered in December of 2022 by the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. The court concluded that the exclusion of same-sex marriage is in violation of the prohibition of discrimination and is incompatible with the constitution. A lower court previously ruled that there is no justification for refusing same-sex couples a civil marriage, and instructed the legislature to take measures to eliminate the unlawful discrimination. The Civil Code of Curaçao stipulates that a marriage can only be entered into between a man and a woman. According to the judge, this provision is contrary to the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination as stated in Curaçao's constitution.¹⁰

Recent *intergroup relations* are not documented whereby there are attempts to build relationships between the individual, their own group, and other groups, and that provide a range of psychological approaches for preventing prejudice, intolerance, and conflict, and for promoting more positive *intergroup relations*. From 2002 to 2020 there was a national social dialogue platform that was designed to provide a structural tripartite platform for decision-making regarding the most important social and economic topics for the country. The formal national dialogue structure was dismantled in 2014 and has not been revived since. It was eliminated in 2020. Most other efforts have been ad-hoc and have not been sustained. In August 2022 and again in 2023, the central unions and the Association of Business and Industry (VBC) began talks to draft a new protocol to reinstate the tripartite national dialogue platform.¹¹ In 2024, not having succeeded with the reinstatement of the platform, the private sector continues to work toward some kind of bi-partite platform.

⁹ <https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/main/parliament-curacao-takes-steps-towards-more-transparency-in-travel-expenses/>

¹⁰ <https://nltimes.nl/2022/12/06/court-rules-favor-sex-marriage-aruba-curacao>

¹¹ Plataforma tripartit concept LB 2022

Vigilante justice describes the actions of a single person or group of people who claim to enforce the law but lack the legal authority to do so. The term can also describe a general state of disarray or lawlessness, in which competing groups of people all claim to enforce the law in given areas. For example, organized gangs controlling neighborhoods with their own justice system. Vigilantism is the act of enforcement, investigation, or punishment of perceived offenses without legal authority. In the past eight years there has been at least one documented assassination of a politician in a public place by an organized gang acting at the request for vigilante justice. There might be others, but they may not be proven by documentation.

Adhering to the textbook definition of mass violence, review results in the conclusion that there has been no documentation of *mass violence* or acts related to war crimes or *war criminals*.

There is no documentation that acts of violence have been related to *religious persecution*. On the contrary, there is a level of *religious tolerance*. However, there is, as stated above, because of the history of the country, evidence of real or perceived “crimes” related to denied autonomy, persecution or repression, public scapegoating, and stereotyping. With the migration of Venezuelans across the Caribbean, they are seen as a social and economic threat as well as a source of criminal behavior.¹²

In 2023 the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as a result of the committee that was initiated in 2021 to discuss *reconstruction, compensation for victims; truth and reconciliation; amnesty* related to the slave history of the island, the King and mayors of several large municipalities have offered apologies and dedicated monuments to commemorate the abolishment of slavery.^{13 14} Although the Dutch government wants to spend 200 million euros on projects that raise awareness of the legacies of slavery, there will be no fund for recovery. There still remains a concern that full recovery will not be reached until reparations have been made.¹⁵

In 2024, according to the Court in Willemstad, the government discriminates by legally including the exclusivity of heterosexual marriage in the Civil Code, as determined in the Constitution, the Constitution of Curaçao. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that ruling. The first same sex marriage was performed and was followed by protests from several of the organizations representing evangelical Christians. The leading political party has stated that it does not support same-sex marriage and regretted that the court, as the party puts it, 'has imposed such a fundamental decision on the people of Curaçao'. Civil society organizations declare that this ruling must be accepted as it represents the clear distinction between

Social Progress Index

Of the three dimensions of the Social Progress Index, the one most affected by this FSI indicator is the *Foundations of Wellbeing*. There is evidence that due to the “schisms” between social groups and political parties, citizens do not have information and may not communicate freely which contributes to divisiveness. The trust among individuals in the community, the need for reciprocal loyalty and solidarity, the strength of social relations and shared values all contribute to wellbeing and are disrupted by the actions within the population to create divisions socially and economically.

FSI Assessment: Group grievance is not being addressed and sporadic outbursts of group grievance still occur. There is concern that the media through its biased reporting inspires scapegoating and group-based hostilities. Disinformation and irresponsible use of social media channels contribute to social polarization.

Numerous reports show patterns of specific types of actions that lead to escalation of group dynamics that cause group hatred, group inequities, and “schisms” between different groups in society, especially

¹² <http://www.transparency.org/en/gbc/global/global-corruption-barometer-2017>, 2023

¹³ [adviescollegeplusdialooggroeppluslavernijverledenplusketenenplusvanplushetplusverledenplus1plusjuliplus2021plusdef\(10\).pdf](adviescollegeplusdialooggroeppluslavernijverledenplusketenenplusvanplushetplusverledenplus1plusjuliplus2021plusdef(10).pdf)

¹⁴ <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2022/12/19/toespraak-minister-president-rutte-over-het-slavernijverleden>

¹⁵ Ester Standford-Xosel, 'Reparations are not about money', June 30, 2023, <https://www.oneworld.nl/mensenrechten/jurist-over-slavernij-excuses-herstelbetalingen-gaan-niet-over-geld/>

those divisions based on social or political characteristics and their role in “ACCESS”. Left unresolved this has led to increased vigilantism and the consequences of organized crime.

Score: 7

State Resilience Index

The country is not managing the pressures that contribute to the reduction of group grievances. The documentation supports the lack of capacity in the pressure pillars of *inclusion, social cohesion, state capacity, individual capacities, and civic space*. Because of social, economic and political divisions within the society, risks arise. Because of the divisions, there is not a sense of solidarity, generosity and collaboration. Trust and confidence in the government is lacking and vulnerable individuals are not receiving basic social services and protections. Institutions and structures for open and inclusive dialogue have been weakened and there is no evidence of a national strategy or social contract between the citizens and the government.

Factionalized elites

The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry.

The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions, and where elections occur will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class). During the assessment of this indicator, researchers considered if there is *representative leadership*, if there is a common sense of *national identity*, is there a fair *resource distribution* and are *equality and equity* protected by law.

Although Curaçao has a democratic election process, there have been frequent changes in government since the early 90’s which has accelerated after Curaçao became an autonomous country within the Dutch Kingdom, in 2010. Since then, citizens have seen 10 governments, the shortest being 4 months in 2017. Although the last 2 governments have completed or will complete their 4-year which could indicate increasing stability, the long-term effects of the political instability are still affecting social and economic progress of the country. Currently, only politically motivated, ad hoc, consultations are held, and the outcomes of those consultations may or may not impact political decisions. These ad hoc committees are not trusted. As of June 2024, there is no documented evidence of progress on the institutional strengthening exercises that have been outlined in each Island Packet revision since 2018.¹⁶

There is some documentation regarding *representative leadership* whereby the representation of different organizational constituencies, by a wide range of individuals, were consulted about social, economic concerns. For decades the country’s government has not reflected the ethnic composition of the community. Cultural groups that have been on the island for generations are also not represented in the current elected government. As we are preparing for the upcoming elections (March 2025) it remains to be seen if this pattern will continue. During the 2021 elections where 25 different parties participated, the power struggles and political competition revealed the fragmentation of the country, which is also evidence of a seriously divided community. Between 2021-2024, the government has further consolidated its power through ministerial decrees to increase the use of political advisors to advise ministers and further remove decision making from the civil service.

Looking at *resource distribution*, Curacao has now emerged as a single-sector economy. It is observed that the Curaçao economy depends largely on tourism since the “offshore finance” has moved away due to changes in

¹⁶ Curaçao Island Packet, January to March 2024

international regulations, and the local refinery has not been operational since 2018. Tourism, however, requires mostly unskilled labor, and these workers, in large part, are paid minimum wage which allows them to barely survive. This in turn creates a skewed distribution of wealth to the lower middle class. There is no evidence of policies and vision statements to diversify the economy.¹⁷ Apart from the economy, unequal distribution of resources is also caused by unfair tax burden on businesses¹⁸ and by continuous defunding of social programs which is demonstrated in the financial plans of the different ministries.¹⁹

There are strong indications that the community itself is seriously divided. There does not appear to be a common sense of *national identity* amongst the different levels of society. Lack of cross-cultural respect can be found in police reports which show elevated crimes against certain cultural groups. The data, however, is too fragmented to serve as a reference for this statement and as such cannot be used.

Although *equality and equity* are based in the Curaçao constitution, there are many media examples of stereotyping in advertising, discussions on radio and television, and social media. For example, the use of the derogatory word “Makamba” to indicate a person from the Netherlands, has become normalized to the extent that many people don’t even realize its original intent. There is a pattern that openly anti-Dutch rhetoric is the order of the day.

The benefits of economic growth need to be available for all, and currently this is not the case. Inclusion is, therefore, important as the CBCS states. An inclusive economic policy framework is needed to support the ability for citizens to thrive economically and socially. A positive action noted is the consideration of a draft law for improving access to basic banking services which is still in the decision-making chain of the government. This inclusive policy framework is needed for all citizens to have equal access to banking services. Such a law is also important for economic growth and civilian protection against crime.

Social Progress Index

Of the three areas of the Social Progress Index, the one area that is most relevant to this FSI Cohesion Indicator is opportunity. Although the country’s population can make their own choices and pursue higher education, the fact that the economy has become a single sector economy, has consequences in the areas of personal freedom and choice, inclusiveness, access to advanced education, retrenchment and retraining and labor force diversity. All of these characteristics contribute to the level of opportunity within a given society. This dimension of the Social Progress Index is perhaps the most controversial and most difficult to measure. Curacao struggles to meet the moral imperative to guarantee the equality of opportunity for all citizens.

FSI Assessment

The country’s leadership, though elected through a fair election process, does not represent all or even most factions in the community. Social programming has been systematically defunded, and a large portion of the community can barely make ends meet. Add to this a lack of a common national identity and cross-cultural respect. The Curaçao people are a divided people that is reflected in a weak, and fractious political class trying to overcome deep divisions with the ruling elites, with no lasting success. Frequent collapse of the governing coalitions and alliances are the result.

Score: 8

State Resilience Index

Since the State Resilience Index (SRI) examines the capacity, each country has for managing specific pressures in each sector, it is important to note that the limiting of economic sectors has weakened the

¹⁷ IMF Curaçao and Sint Maarten Report, all Quarter reports 2022, 2023,2024

¹⁸ Curaçao and Sint Maarten-Findings of an IMF Virtual Visit-20210318 NA page 5 point 11

¹⁹ IMF Curaçao and Sint Maarten Report, 2nd Quarter, 2022, 1st, 2nd, Quarters, 2023, Quarter 1, 2024.

country's ability to manage the *economy, civic space and state capacity*. For longer term economic resilience, infrastructure and high-quality economic management are necessary to compete in a changing global economy. This is lacking. A healthy public square (civil space) enables robust consultation, debate, dialogue, and consensus-building so that the needs and grievances of individuals and communities can be addressed constructively. There is no evidence that Curaçao has a stable social contract that generates accountability for leaders and buy-in by the general population to a national strategy, and there is not a consistent, long-term national strategy. The government does not utilize effective systems to build the trust and confidence of the population, nor does it transparently act in the interest of the public good.

Chapter 2: Economic Indicators



Introduction

Economic indicators are important temperature gauges to measure a nation's wellbeing, resiliency, and global competitiveness. These indicators also have a direct correlation with the social aspects and the population's ability to adapt to the ever-changing markets on the global level where the labor force should be flexible in catering to the demands of these ever-flexing markets. The indicators measure *economic decline*, *uneven economic development*, and *human flight and brain drain*.

Lessons Learned

- Private investment in tourism is driving economic growth, while the single sector economy does not provide sustainable employment for low-, middle- and high-income earners.
- Compliance issues have caused blacklisting by the FATF
- Because of the rising costs of living and general economic decline, there is a lack of access by the total population which causes basic human needs, well-being and opportunity not to be met.
- A more flexible immigration policy with more focus on foreign skilled laborers will address the labor market shortage and will eventually contribute towards economic growth
- A clear match between vocational skills and the needs of the individual sectors is important in order to fulfill the labor force and avoid more potential skilled workers to leave the island.

Economic Decline

Numerous factors continue to plague the economy of Curaçao and contribute to delays in its full recovery to pre-pandemic levels, once estimated to be reached by 2025-26.

There are the lingering effects from the closure of the refinery. The continued decline of seaport industries such as Damen Shipyards Group, the compliance issues the island is facing to avoid being blacklisted by the FATF, the declining birthrates and increased brain-drain rates, lack of diversification of the economic sector, pending problems with online gaming laws, lack of attention to old economic and social policies that directly affect sustainable economic growth, to name a few. These persistent problems require much preparation from government, and so far, there is no indication of such.

Inflation pressures stemming from surging global prices create headwinds. As mentioned in previous FSI reports, an inclusive economic policy framework is needed to support the ability for citizens to thrive economically and socially. The outlook is subject to significant uncertainty and risks especially when Curaçao is now heavily dependent on only one economic pillar.

Curaçao has been fortunate to receive financial Covid support from the Netherlands which has alleviated the sudden financial needs of the low-income households and unemployed.²⁰ This is set to expire in 2025 and the local government funds which are based on economic successes and tax collection will be required to sustain any growth and programming which has been created. There is little evidence that these sustainable development measure and necessary financial restraint has been implemented to prevent a financially dire situation from re-occurring.

However, as will be described later in this chapter, there are present dangers of a single sector economy that is focused on the hospitality industry. Combined with low wage earners, declining population and a declining birth rate which can have a negative impact on the social cohesion within the community.

²⁰ Central Bank of Curacao and St. Maarten, 4th Quarter Estimates, GDP by sector, 2022.

Table 1. Curaçao: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2019–24
(Percent change unless otherwise indicated)


	2019 Prel.	2020 Prel.	2021 Prel.	2022 Prel.	2023 Proj.	2024 Proj.
Real Economy						
Real GDP	-3.2	-18.0	4.2	7.9	3.0	3.0
CPI (12-month average)	2.6	2.2	3.8	7.4	3.8	3.0
CPI (end of period)	2.3	2.2	4.8	8.4	3.2	2.3
GDP deflator	2.6	2.2	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.0
Unemployment rate (percent)	17.4	19.1	19.7	13.1	12.8	12.6
Memorandum Items						
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	3,026	2,534	2,740	3,075	3,287	3,486
Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)	19,371	16,492	18,135	20,648	21,955	23,165

Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

GDP is a backward-looking scorecard of economic health. Although it may provide the most comprehensive picture of the state of the economy, it's not the most forward-looking of economic indicators. Furthermore, the best way to read GDP is in its relation to past GDP figures. Only then can an economy's direction (toward growth or decline) be assessed. In other words, GDP may not help anticipate future economic trends, but it can help confirm (or disprove) the data from other reports. It's important to combine GDP data with other economic indicators such as employment data, consumer sentiment and inflation figures.


IMF Country Report No. 23/285

Employment Indicators
(2019 = 100)



Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates.

Stayover Arrivals
(Percent of 2019 Levels)




Sources: The Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO), national authorities, and IMF staff estimates.

1/ Caribbean is defined as 14 destinations: AIA, ABW, ATG, BHS, BRB, BLZ, CUW, DMA, GRD, JAM, KNA, LCA, SXM, and VCT.

The above three charts and graphs give a gross view of the economic growth projections for the past five years.


Minimum Wage (Index, 2016=100)



Sources: National authorities, SVB, and IMF staff estimates.

The recuperation of employment has taken off after the Covid period where both stayover arrivals and increased employment are showing a positive trend. Even the stay over trend is above the general stayover arrival statistics for the Caribbean. Also, minimum wage has been corrected according to inflation. However, caution has to be taken where a wage-price spiral does not deteriorate the productivity. In addition, when spending power is considered in minimum wage levels, one needs to link the minimum wage with government old age pension and unemployment/disability benefits. These three welfare systems need to be harmonized.

Beginning in 2008, the governments of the Netherlands Antilles, and as most recently as November 2022, again the government of Curaçao was advised that minimum wages should be adjusted simultaneously with pension and unemployment/disability benefits according to both International Labor Organization(ILO) and International Monetary Funds (IMF) standards and formulas.²¹ As a consequence, the disparities amongst the three benefits has grown and the use of consultation with social partners has been denied.



Think To DO Institute


Research for VBC: Raising Minimum Wage 2022

Think Different. DO Change. 9

²¹ Issue Brief: Raising Minimum Wage 2022, Think To DO Institute, Curaçao, October 1, 2022

Considering government investments in the economy, in 2023 Curaçao is still lagging behind the Caribbean trend. Optimal GDP growth should be driven by both private and public spending. If not, cost of doing business becomes higher and will make Curaçao less competitive on the LT.

Public Investment, 2012-22
(Percent of GDP)



Sources: National authorities, WEO database, and IMF staff estimates.
1/ The average is based on 15 Caribbean countries excluding Curaçao.

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
World	-2.8	6.3	3.5	3.0	2.9
Advanced economies	-4.2	5.4	2.7	1.5	1.4
Emerging & developing economies	-1.8	6.9	4.0	4.0	4.0
Real GDP growth (%)					
Netherlands	-3.9	6.2	4.3	0.6	1.1


Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2023.




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of Curaçao.
*Forecast of the CBCS.

Curaçao GDP growth is expected to be in line with World GDP growth from 2023 till 2027. The main driver will be tourism, since that is now the only economic pillar that has proven itself. If no Covid like situation will present itself, growth could continue, as long as infrastructure and tourism facilities are upgraded according to this growth. However, there are present dangers of a single sector economy that is

focused on the hospitality industry. Combined with low wage earners (*meaning; low taxation, low spending power, low consumer investments in durable assets*), declining population (*higher educated people do not see a reason to come back to an inviting and challenging work environment*) and a declining birth rate (*a declining workforce means more immigration of foreign workers*), which can have a negative impact on the Social Progress Index (*a feeling of social exclusion within the community*).



Both the real GDP graph and inflation-GDP-employment graph can be realized by 2027 if tourism and investment in that same sector will continue to growth. However, unemployment will still remain relatively high. The absence of a second higher tech / higher income industry makes the economy fragile and with future calamities, unemployment will easily rise again into the double digits.




Source: Financiële Management Rapportage of 2020-2022 of the government of Curaçao. The current budget balance as percentage of GDP and the public debt-to-GDP ratio for 2023 to 2027 are based on estimates of the CBS.


Monetary union: development in the average import coverage 2001 – 2027*

The budget balance expectations towards 2027 show a positive trend and could result in more government spending in the economy and, at the same time, facilitate the paying off of its long-term debt. Whether this will become a structural routine has still to be seen in future years. Also, public debt as a ratio to GDP is expected to decrease over the next 4-5 years. For this to become structural, internal reforms must take place, on every level. For it to become structural and routine. At this time, there is no evidence of structure medium term and long-term reforms.

Developments in consumer prices^a (percentage)



For the last 15 years Curaçao import coverage of foreign exchange has been well over the 3-month minimum safety requirement. The extraordinary spike was contributed by the Covid liquidity assistance loaned by the Netherlands. Expectations are that the trend will taper off towards the 3 months level in 2027.



Development of consumer prices the last 5 years in Curaçao have fared reasonably well as compared to the USA and Netherlands.

Curaçao is purely an import focused nation and is dependent on goods importation. One can conclude that the Island is pretty much influenced by imported inflation (higher goods prices due to higher transport cost).

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Nederland, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

^aAnnual percentage change.

Especially during the Covid period, the consumer price inflation stayed on the low side on the graph compared to USA and Netherlands.

SUMMARY REALIZATION of REGULAR SERVICES (in millions of Nafl)					
	4e UR 2021	4e UR 2022	4e UR 2023	OBW 2023	Prognosis 2023
Income	1396	1715	1763	1773	1767
Taxes	1254	1545	1560	1613	1597
Subsidies and gifts	36	51	39	19	19
Other Income	107	119	163	141	151
Gamblig license fee	0	0	0	0	0
Expenses	1738	1573	1615	1732	1732
Payments employees	428	415	413	443	440
Goods and Services	162	159	193	233	229
Depreciation fixed assets	76	70	76	91	91
Interest	68	67	69	71	78
Subsidies & Transfers	437	368	368	386	386
Social security	576	495	497	503	503
Other expenses	0	0	0	5	5
Result	342	142	148	41	36


Source: 4th report 2021-2023, concept budgetplanning adjustment and prognosis 2023 of Curaçao.

Although the 2023 summary shows a prognosis of a budget surplus, which has not happened in previous years, the government has still to show a structural positive trend for the years ahead. Structural budget surpluses are needed to create sufficient reserves for future years in order to safeguard against calamities. Such creation of a reserve fund could have been served by past refining business, but this fund was exhausted to pay out sums of monies to ex-union-workers

and fruitless endeavors to find new operators. A structural solution is still warranted such as a sovereign wealth fund that would protect and isolate funds from the general fund to invest in assets to generate economic benefits for the citizens as a tool for economic policy.

Lack of financial discipline. According to some latest articles (AD 30 and 31 March and 11 April 2024) in one of the local newspapers, some subjective decision making and actions by the head of the local government tax collection agency, shows the lack of fiscal/financial discipline within the finance ministry. All this was investigated and concluded by SOAB (foundation for the government accounting agency). According to the newspaper articles,- tax

rebates – tax discounts or even nullified tax debts for certain individuals and/or entities - has put large question marks with regards to the transparency and integrity of the finance ministry and its responsible agencies. Apparently, there is unequal treatment of entities and individuals when it comes to tax payments. This issue was seriously taken up by the Dutch State Secretary van Huffelen (responsible for the Dutch islands) who requested a drastic reform within the department of finance to be implemented



not later than end of 2024. The abuse of power and subjective actions by the head of the government collection agency has tainted the minister of finance who carries final responsibility. The strong question remains, whether these integrity issues are also taking place across the board in other ministries. Not only the finance ministry will need to show accountability but it also casts doubt on the reliability of multi-year budget planning, if expected revenues and/or expenditures are deemed unreliable due to arbitrary actions by government agencies. An extra financial burden for the coming 30 years on the government budget is the Nafl. 30 million contribution towards the solvency of the Ennia pension fund. This, also casts doubt on the integrity of the Central Bank as the Central Bank's contribution towards this same pension fund seems in conflict with the bank's role as the primary supervisory responsibility over Ennia.

Tourist sector: major GDP growth contributor and a major challenge.

The tourism sector has become the largest important segment of our economy and GDP growth. The pie chart showing both the 2000 and 2022 statistics, one can easily observe the impact on other industries that have been important GDP contributors in the past. Tourism has grown from a 14% to almost 50% contributor and has become a sole economic powerhouse, but has also become a real concern regarding its sustainability, degree of needed infrastructure investments, and required workforce capacity. The question is, if sufficient regulations on sustainable, environmental and infrastructural development have kept up with the growth in the industry. Tourism is just one sector but in order to become more resilient, focus must be given to new industry such as renewable energy (wind, solar, tidal), IT services, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, aquaculture and marine technology, creative industries, education and training services. These will collectively attract highly educated workers with high income and a relative high spending behavior. The spin off effect will also require and demand a higher level of education among the local population. This means a better equipped workforce, specific new industry policies and investment regulations that are all supported by the community as a whole. For this, Curaçao needs a Labor Force Development Plan to guide its future workforce in the right direction. Tripartism and an economic long-term vision are prerequisites in such developments. This plan has been missing since the early 2000s. The skills gap continues to grow.

INCREASED CONTRIBUTION TO GDP


<i>Economic impact of tourism (in NAf. millions)</i>			
	<u>2005</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2022</u>
Direct tourism spending	437	1,087	1,768
Direct impact of tourism	182	453	743
Indirect impact of tourism	147	365	599
Total economic footprint of tourism	329	818	1,342
Impact on government revenues*	n.a.	175	330

This statistical chart dating from 2005 up to 2022, shows a dramatic increase in the impact and contribution of tourism to GDP. In contrast to tourism, oil refining and related activities declined from 18%-3% and International Financial Services declined from 17%-5% of GDP. This resulted in a decline in both highly educated and high-income workers. Therefore, there is an urgent necessity to bring education up to par with present and future industry requirements.

*taxes on goods and services and import duties

Calculation CBCS
Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten


Limited growth in Caribbean market share




Source: Caribbean Tourism Organization and Curaçao Tourist Board
Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten

Although the country has experienced remarkable growth in stay over tourists, it is still not fully capitalizing on the Caribbean growth trend, hence the 2% market share.

Tourism specialization and economic performance




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, ECCB and CBCS
Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, ECCB and CBCS


This chart portrays the weak position Curaçao takes in 'openness'. Curaçao is low on the scale of tourism specialization as a contributor to GDP. If Curaçao is able to increase this statistic it could very well trigger an average positive real GDP growth, although that is not an automatic given. So far, the increased dependence on tourism did not coincide with a much higher average GDP growth as compared to other Caribbean nations.

The high dependency on one economic sector, while other sectors have vanished from the statistical data during the last 15-20 years, have made Curaçao less resilient. For the last decade the government has focused too much on trying to revive a refinery that has long become outdated and less interesting for new investors. This unrealistic focus was due to union and political pressures to keep paying their technical workers on the island for more than a year, all this without a functioning refinery. These efforts were fruitless and many of these technically skilled laborers left the island. Rather than looking for developing other technical industries as mentioned before, government kept spending money from the oil refining fund. This fund was created as an economic recovery development fund for eventually financing the transitioning into new industry, after the contract with PDVSA would expire. Meanwhile many of the so-called potential operators after the expiration of the PDVSA contract, were not interested in the refining business but more in the oil storage business (at Bullenbaai), or were financially unfit to operate and also upgrade the present refinery. One could state that some of the potential investor's goals were not in sync with the original goals of the Curaçao government but were partially successful in manipulating politics and sector specific unions, during the course of 20 years. These lost efforts have drained the petro-refining fund, and studying what possible other sectors could have been developed to generate a better skilled and high-income workforce have been lost by the years of delay. Overall, despite the growing tourism sector, Curaçao has become even more fragile over time due to its sole dependency on this one industry.



Since 2001 Curaçao has been confronted with a productivity decline, mostly driven by the decline in the International Financial Sector and Oil Refining industry. Although the authorities are designing a National Recovery Plan, this NRP needs to be supported and carried by all stakeholders in the community. Multiple initiatives in the areas of climate change and alternative energies need to be part of this multi-year planning, after all tourism needs to be environmentally sustainable. Major stakeholders in education, commerce and a strong labor development plan is needed to drive up productivity. In the past four years, there has been a weakening of the commercial sector, the central unions and the civil service,

and in the input of stakeholders in the decision-making process as well as consensus building regarding policy development.



Source: Curaçao's Central Bureau of Statistics (2023).

Figure 4: Curaçao's Net Migration, 2011 – 2022.

return and this has been happening year after year. Unless the job opportunities for higher educated workers are offered, this down trend will continue and possibly become worse. Also with double digit unemployment, at a certain moment there will not be a sufficient income generating workforce to maintain and finance all the basic services and facilities that are expected for a reasonable standard of living population on Curaçao, within the Kingdom. Educational opportunities, both formal and informal, that should cater to balanced skill development in a new National Recovery Plan have not been adapted and the skill levels have been falling behind for many years. A clear mismatch between graduates and private sector requirements is now prevalent.

Tax and social premium burden

Attention is needed for a tax policy that is more conducive to economic growth. The current cost of doing business related to taxes and social premiums is one of the highest in the world, and can hinder investment, innovation, and overall economic activity.²² Parameters that should be seriously looked at

Migration:

Since 2017 the population has shrunk. Due to the demise of the oil refining sector and the International Financial sector an outflow of highly skilled /educated workers has resulted. The tourism industry has created more lower skilled and lower income jobs. Many students that went abroad for pursuing a higher education, did not

²² Kingdom of the Netherlands-Curaçao: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission, Kingdom of the Netherlands, June 25, 2024

include but are not exclusive to: high tax and social premium rates, complexity of the tax system, distortive tax preferences, and further broadening of the tax base.

Social Progress Index

It is the moral imperative the country to guarantee the equality of opportunity for ALL citizens. Some positive elements in the economic gauge have improved, for instance the decrease in unemployment (although still high compared to the Caribbean standards), lower inflation, GDP growth, a (slightly) positive budget and a better tax collection routine. On the other hand, a risky financial commitment regarding the solvability of Ennia Insurance Company for the next 30 years with a yearly 30 million financial injection by government, lower productivity due to “less skilled-less educated lower income workforce”, and a decrease in educational quality and opportunity. The negative and longer-term risky elements tend to out way the short-term positive ones, making the economy of Curaçao still very fragile, especially if nothing is done to reverse the short-term positive elements into long term goals, including a policy for creating new industries. Financial integrity within the Ministry of Finance must be also part of this long-term formula.

Also, a non-sustainable and costly healthcare system is one more detriment to creating a balanced working environment for locals and expats. How outsiders perceive the functioning of the local authorities will determine the investment climate.

FSI Assessment

The one pillar economy has become stronger since last year and has made the island ever more dependent on tourism. If education started matching the hospitality industry accordingly this would create a vertically integrated sector but that is not the case. More need for importation of temporary workers is hindering the training of local workers. Although local workers are put in place these are mainly low skilled level workers rather than managerial level workers. Local students that have graduated abroad expect higher paying jobs and such job opportunities are not inherent to the hospitality industry. The consequences are intensified by low birth rates, aging population, higher brain drain and higher unemployment. The overall situation has therefore not changed and is trending towards a more fragile state.

Score: 8

State Resilience Index

As first reported in 2023, the pillars of resilience that are weak in this indicator’s comparisons are *inclusion, state capacity, individual capabilities, economy and civic space*. First and foremost, there is not robust consultation, debate and dialogue with consensus about the national strategy and vision for the total population. People with the community do not have a sense of belonging, socially, economically or politically. Individual capabilities are not being developed through education and life-long learning opportunities to match the changing and necessary skills for current and future employment. There is not high-quality economic management necessary to compete in the changing global economy.

Uneven Economic Development

History repeats itself. As long as Curaçao remains a one pillar economy and focus is only on one type of worker, the workforce and its composition will not be diverse and will not create opportunity for different levels of educated workers. The two other sectors that previously contributed to economic diversification, oil refining and international financial services, have decreased to single digit GDP contributors. Unfortunately, this decrease does not show a slowdown, therefore making the workforce less diverse. Without a clear industrial policy, a single

sector workforce will create a low income, low spending population in general, thereby making the financially independent group of citizens a small minority. This means that fewer, mostly foreign investors and developers, a minute group that have most of the capital at their disposal, will be in charge rather than a more diverse income workforce that could elevate the average income in Curaçao.

Social Progress Index

The imperatives for social progress meant to help decision makers create inclusive and sustainable growth are not present. Even through the spectrum of economic development, it is clear that basic human needs, well-being of citizens and opportunity for self-actualization are not at the center of decision-making.

FSI Assessment

The increased dependency on a one economic pillar during the last few years, has created an even sharper economic inequality within the community. If Curaçao does not change course by creating other sustainable industries, the economic inequality will become a burden on the Social Progress Index where all social elements within society will be affected.

Score: 8

State Resilience Index

Curaçao continues to not be prepared to meet the pressures connected to state resilience. Because it is not a diverse and innovative economy with access to capital, and without a diverse and well-trained workforce, it is more vulnerable to price shocks and supply-chain disruptions, and it will not be able to recover quickly after an economic or environmental disaster. The necessary economic and physical infrastructure, and economic management are not sufficient to compete.

Human flight and Brain Drain:

The exodus of people from the Island is still taking place and will continue if no other sector than hospitality and/or vocational employment is offered. Although the growth of the tourism sector has created more employment, it has not created more opportunity for young adults that have graduated from higher education abroad. These locally born will not return back to Curaçao. These young professionals will find more appealing work conditions for better pay that matches their educational achievements outside of Curaçao. Since the hospitality/tourism sector has improved after the Covid period, all focus is on developing this economic sector even more. Since last year nothing has changed with respect to the oil refining industry.

Unfortunately, the young potential workforce that is left behind come from low-income households and lower educational standards. This group of potential workers are the ones that need to fill the vacancies in the hospitality industry that requires multilingual workers, something these workers do not have anymore. As compared to 20-25 years ago when all students had to learn Dutch, English and Spanish, current students are now taught in the local language and are not fluent in all languages which puts them at a disadvantage in the tourism sector.

The international financial services industry is continuing to decrease, especially when a worldwide corporate tax will most likely be implemented in January 2024, thereby taking away the advantage from tax havens. If new nomad workers laws come into effect, this segment may create a new digital economy where a self-employed workforce using Curaçao as a home base to live, work, consume and pay taxes. Notwithstanding the time zone differences, this could offset the disappearing income from either the refining and/or international financial services sectors.

Social Progress Index

All three dimensions of the Social Progress Index are impacted in this years' comparison. When there is not a well-planned and structure for economic reform, the people are not able to be gainfully

employed and, therefore, their *basic human needs* cannot be met, their *well-being* is unhealthily affected, and in the face of lack of *opportunity*, they leave.

Compared with last year's evaluation, Curacao still scores high but has deteriorated somewhat due to a larger gap between the rich and the poor. More families have fallen below the poverty line especially due to the lingering consequences of Covid. In contrast to the minimum wage levels, AOV and Onderstand have not kept up with inflation like the minimum wage did. Since many AOV recipients still do not have other pension income, their spending power has decreased and have fallen behind.

The well-being of the citizens is highly dependent upon their social and economic status. People are becoming more aware of alternative/ sustainable energy although the lack of resources does not allow equal opportunity to experience the benefits of this technology. A danger exists in the healthcare system where operational costs of the system and the emigration of medical specialists will eventually lead to a decrease in the healthcare quality (no access to specialists). Although government has the intention to import specialists from South America and/or Caribbean, this does not guarantee expected healthcare quality standards. (example: language barrier and questionable educational standards).

The opportunity component is something that has deteriorated due to the sole focus on the tourism industry where the majority of jobs are for low skilled workers, and which still shows continued growth but is not flanked by other high tech and skilled workers. This lowers the opportunity for higher educated and skilled students coming back for higher paid jobs. There are no diverse opportunities for young professional adults.

FSI Assessment

The continued focus, by both politics and the stakeholders themselves, on the tourism industry without creating other industries (economic pillars) causes the economy to remain very fragile. With only tourism, becoming a larger part of GDP, the economy hinges on the performance of tourism, which is influenced by world events, climate events, local safety and environmentally responsible actions of local authorities and stakeholders. The question remains, whether Curaçao will be considered a very low risk destination. If one of the elements (as mentioned above) fails or is seen as high risk, tourism will lose its growth potential.

Score: 8

State Resilience Index

As stated in the previous indicator, because there is not a clear economic vision and plan for economic growth, there is a lack of trust and respect in the civic space for the government. Further, because people's human rights and dignity are not honored and a focus of the government there is a weakening of the individuals growth capacity, the consequence of which is human flight and brain drain. The pillars of the SRI they are affected, therefore, are *individual capabilities, state capacity, economy, civic space*.

Chapter 3: Political Indicators



Introduction

Amongst the indicators of fragility and vulnerability that help define the countries considered as fragile, are the Political Indicators. They basically cover the potential of de-legitimization of the state by amongst others the rise of factionalized elites and intervention of other states or external factors, progressive deterioration of the public service, and widespread violation of human rights and its legal infrastructure. Availability of statistics (timeliness and quality-wise) is critical for an acceptable assessment of the above. In the case of the political indicators this has proven to be very difficult. For development interventions to be effective, the absence of data to assess what the real status of affairs is, makes it difficult to construct the right policy interventions to address any aspect of fragility.

Lessons learned

State legitimacy

- No indication of significant progress on issues pertaining to democratic erosion, electoral regulation and campaign financing
- More can be done on combating public corruption
- More must be done to put public financial governance on a sustainable path
- No attention, nor respect for the role of independent oversight institutions

Public services

- No indication of significant progress on issues identified in the previous FSI reports
- Poor progress of land package in general
- Whether delivered through government agencies, SOE's or subsidized NGO's, in general sustainable public services governance needs attention

Rule of law / Human rights

- No indication of significant progress on issues identified in the previous FSI reports
- Some progress identified with respect to capacity issues in the law enforcement chain, but in general, still a major issue
- Public order and safety are serious issues
- Lead times is a serious issue

State legitimacy

State legitimacy is the concept that a given state has moral responsibility for and authority within a society. It refers to the grounds on which citizens and rulers alike accept the legal and political legitimacy of a governing entity. A state is considered to be legitimate when it is recognized by the people and the citizens accept it as an authority, and not only blindly obey it. The concept of state legitimacy is important in today's world, as many countries face political upheaval or contentious governance. In order for a state to be recognized and recognized as legitimate, it must adhere to certain standards and principles.

In previous FSI reports, it was mentioned amongst other issues related to elections, integrity, revenue mobilization and oversight institutions, as pressure factors influencing state legitimacy. The reason for repeating some of these factors in the current period under review, has to do with the fact that nothing has changed, or matters are only

getting worse. It was explained that:

- **Election legitimacy** is essential for citizens to trust that their government is pursuing their best interests and holding its officials accountable. All modern democracies rightfully consider free, fair, and frequent elections as the key to ensuring that those in power are selected by the people. With the people selecting their representatives, their government is ever more likely to be seen as the legitimate one. Furthermore, ensuring that elections are not manipulated by any wealthy or influential figures or institutions must be an urgent priority for governments. Protecting the integrity of elections is of utmost importance for establishing public trust in government. In light of the foregoing, it was noticed the lack of information with regard to the need to revise the electoral regulation (as indicated by the electoral council directly after the last election) and lack of clarity on the reporting of campaign financing violations to the public prosecutor's office. The country is to embark on a new election, and the latest annual report of the Electoral Council hardly dedicates any attention to these two issues, especially the latter, considering the risks of undue influence and policy capturing.²³
- With respect to the **Integrity of governance** it is noted that it is also a matter important for state legitimacy. Demonstrating that government leaders and employees are committed to ethical governance by pursuing justice and equity through transparent and accountable systems is fundamental. Citizens should have the assurance that their government is utilizing public resources wisely and compassionately, striving to serve their needs. Trustworthy leaders and employees who prioritize public service and stay away from any efforts that could reduce public trust will be accepted as the rightful rulers by citizens. An earlier report of the Law Enforcement Council denounced both the delay in making the integrity bureau (including a corresponding policy and institutional framework) operational, and the lack of capacity of the investigative bureau (called "landsrecherche" in Dutch) to do its job with respect to combatting government corruption. In the current period under review, no information is publicly available indicating that any structural action has been taken thus far on this issue. Considering the conclusion of the Law Enforcement Council in the 2023 State of the Law Enforcement Report on Curaçao that all institutions in this sector continue to suffer from capacity constraints (notwithstanding efforts that are being undertaken), it is indicative that there is still a long way to go.²⁴
- The manner in which **tax revenue mobilization** is carried out plays a major role in how citizens view the legitimacy of their government. Such measures are often seen by people as intrusive, and is therefore, grounds for mistrust. However, government must be credited for using taxes in an efficient, responsible, and accountable manner with the ultimate goal of improving the welfare of citizens. But this is only possible if citizens are trusting of their government and accepting it as the legitimate ruler. Regardless of the specific status of the reforms related to this topic, all reforms are important to improving the resiliency of this country and therefore the sustainability of public finances. In this respect the report of the state secretary's most recent visit to the island is worrying.²⁵ What makes matters worse are the possible implications for trust and integrity, as a result the most recent reports on the functioning the Tax Collector's office.²⁶ And also, the recent withdrawal of a coalition partner support for government in light a parliamentary debate based on a report that concludes that the minister of finance had no authority to forgive overdue tax debts.²⁷ But in light of the imperative of guaranteeing sustainability of the governance of public finances longer term, attention to key areas, such as amongst others *Transparency and Accountability, Fiscal Responsibility, Long-term Planning, Efficient and Effective Use of Resources, and Risk Management* are warranted.

²³ Electorale Raad, Jaarverslag 2023, juni 2024

²⁴ Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de Rechtshandhaving rapport 2023, Mei 2024, page 22

²⁵ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Koninkrijksrelaties, Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, 19 april 2024, kenmerk 2024-0000206919, page 4-8

²⁶ Minister van Financiën, Brief Min Fin aan het parlement, Onderwerp: SOAB-rapporten inzake Ontvanger, datum 25 maart 2024, zaaknummer 2024/009551

²⁷ Social Economische Raad, Advies ref no 048/2024 SER, datum 19 juni 2024

The disapproval of the 2022 annual figures by the supreme audit institution ²⁸, and the latest letter of the Cft to government regarding the delays in dealing with the unsustainability of the social security system in general and of the state hospital CMC in particular²⁹, are just some of the many examples that are indicative that Curaçao has a long road ahead in terms of the sustainability of public finances. This observation does not include long outstanding issues such as the lack of a formal medium-term expenditure framework, and the lack of an official debt anchor.

- **Independent oversight authorities (also called ‘Fourth Branch Institutions), comprising of all the institutions and organizations established by the state** with an independent legal mandate to oversee certain functions of government, service provision, and public life, were also identified as areas concern. Independent oversight authorities typically conduct investigations based on complaints from the public and produce reports that pronounce on wrong-doing or service failures and make recommendations to government or the institution involved about how to avoid repeating their mistakes. Research indicated that government does not value sufficiently the work that these (many of the “Constitutional” in nature) oversight institutions, such as the *ombudsman*, *the supreme audit institution*, *the electoral council*, *the law enforcement council*, *policy advice council*, and *the fiscal council*. Regretfully, in light of the latest development surrounding the publication of the supreme audit institution’s evaluation of the 2022 government annual report ³⁰, and the delay in appointing a full board for the electoral council ³¹, it is obvious that, some improvements aside, not much has changed.

Apart from the fact that the researchers find themselves reiterating some of the same factors mentioned in earlier FSI reports, there is one other important pressure factor that needs light shed on it, that also influences state legitimacy, and that is the poor monitoring of government by parliament. There are hardly any parliament meetings called to monitor agency business plans as established by the law on government organization (the so called “LABO” law), if there are any; reform plans (such as the Landpackage); the national budget’s progress with respect to its execution (most important law of every year); and reports of the supreme audit institution (Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao).

Proof of this is an article reporting on a letter from a citizen, sent to the President of Parliament requesting to schedule a backlog of at least 31 petitioned meetings by members of Parliament.³² Democratic deficits are partly the result of our own actions. The latest letter from the State-Secretary indicating the lack of progress in the reform package ³³, should have been reason, at the very least, for calling a meeting of Parliament, in the absence of structural meetings to monitor this important matter. Instead, it completely left to the local executive branch of the Netherlands. It’s an abdication of a fundamental authority and responsibility, Finally, attention is also warranted for Open Government in general, and the following in particular:

- Public consultation. The consulting by government with societal actors such as trade unions, leading business associations/federations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups in policy development, is not structural but rather discretionary,
- Media freedom. Although government largely respects the independence of media, there are indications of actions that constrain their operation.

²⁸ Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Rapport Jaarrekening 2022 Land Curaçao, datum 7 mei 2024

²⁹ College Financieel Toezicht, brief aan Min Fin, datum 2 mei 2024

³⁰ Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Brief van de minister van Financiën “Reactie Ministerie van Financiën op het definitief rapport Jaarrekening Land 2022 door ARC” en onze reactie daarop, nummer 032-24, 23 mei 2024

³¹ Electorale Raad, Jaarverslag 2023, juni 2024, page 17

³² Amigoe, artikel “Martinus eist antwoord van Staten”, pagina 5, 18 september 2023

³³ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Koninkrijksrelaties, Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, 19 april 2024, kenmerk 2024-0000206919, page 4-8

- Media pluralism. Diversified ownership used to characterize both the electronic and print media market. However, the disappearance of some media outlets lately, is cause for concern.
- Access to government information. Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures.

Social Progress Index

Poor state legitimacy can have significant implications on social progress, impacting areas such as government accountability, social stability, and corruption. It is crucial for the state to prioritize building legitimacy with its citizens in order to effectively address social issues and improve overall well-being. By fostering trust and accountability, government can work towards improving its social progress, thereby creating a more equitable and prosperous society.

FSI Assessment

In this analysis, it is mentioned that the 2023 FSI report highlighted various issues such as elections, integrity, revenue mobilization, and oversight institutions are crucial factors affecting state legitimacy. It emphasized the importance of election legitimacy for citizen trust in government, as well as the need for free and fair elections to ensure government representation by the people. Additionally, it stressed the significance of maintaining the integrity of elections and transparent governance to establish public trust. The report also discussed the role of tax revenue mobilization in shaping government legitimacy and the importance of utilizing public resources responsibly. Furthermore, it addressed the necessity of independent oversight authorities to uphold government accountability and transparency. In the current evaluation period, it was noted that there has been a lack of progress in addressing key issues such as revising electoral regulations, combating government corruption, and ensuring sustainable public finances. The monitoring of government actions by parliament was highlighted as a crucial aspect influencing state legitimacy, emphasizing the need for parliamentary oversight to address democratic deficits effectively. The evaluation suggests that the lack of parliamentary meetings to monitor crucial government functions and reports reflects a democratic deficiency and calls for greater parliamentary involvement in overseeing government activities.

Score: 10

State Resiliency index

Poor state legitimacy can also have far-reaching implications for the resiliency and stability of a state, affecting social cohesion, political stability, economic development, governance, security, human rights, and social services. By addressing issues of state legitimacy and promoting inclusive and responsive governance, the state can enhance its resilience and better withstand internal and external challenges.

Public services

Public services are those services that exist to protect the public, in areas such as health, safety and the environment. These services are provided by government, and can also include non-governmental organizations (corporations or foundations) and voluntary bodies. Public services are important as they ensure the safety and well-being of all citizens, providing an essential support to the functioning of society. Public services can be categorized into two main types: essential services and additional services. Essential services are those that are considered necessary for the health and safety of the general population, such as water, electricity, waste disposal, fire and police services, education and health care. Additional services are those that are not essential, but are still important for social and economic development, such as transport, communications, recreation and culture. Public services are essential for the protection and well-being of citizens. It is the responsibility of the government to ensure that these services are maintained and funded to ensure that everyone can access them easily and without

financial burden. They ensure that certain standards and regulations are met in the delivery of goods and services to the public. For example, water and electricity provision is regulated to ensure that supplies remain safe and within environmental standards. Public services play a vital role in the development of any society, as they ensure that the public is provided with basic needs and services that are of a high standard. They provide economic stability and growth, as well as social cohesion. They help to reduce poverty and improve the living standards of citizens. Additionally, public services are responsible for providing essential services such as health care and emergency services, which protect the lives of citizens in times of crisis. One of the most important public services institutions is public education. Public education is essential to ensure a literate, informed population and provides the opportunities for citizens to reach their full potential.

In previous FSI reports, it was mentioned amongst other issues related to public education, public health care, public order and safety, public infrastructure and housing, and the need for assessment of the state-owned enterprises sector, as pressure factors influencing the state of public services. The reason for repeating some of these factors in the current period under review, has to do with the fact that nothing has changed, or matters are only getting worse. It is explained that:

- One of the most important public services institutions is **public education**. The research indicated that base-line assessments were needed to be the basis on which to elaborate and action plan as to what education this country needs. The current status is that in the meantime the baseline assessment is finalized, and a reform plan and implementation roadmap is in the making.³⁴ A plan that thus far to our knowledge is still pending certain investigation/consultation, before being finalized. A plan that also to our knowledge has not been “costed”, and therefore its financial feasibility questionable. This is important, because apart from the possibility of ill-conceived reforms, the past shows that an important factor influencing the success or not of reform efforts, is the traditional price tag. Fundamental reforms by definition are costly, which makes it difficult for government to finance on a sustainable basis.
- **Public healthcare** is another major public service institution. It is clear from previous reports that the delivery of healthcare in general is being seriously hampered by the financial challenges in the sector. These must be structurally addressed, but notwithstanding all efforts and taskforces, thus far all plans seem to have fallen short on delivering on the necessary savings. To the extent that the fiscal council recently once again had to call the attention of government to this critical issue.³⁵
- **Public order and safety institutions** are major public service institutions that exist to protect citizens from physical and emotional harm and maintain order in the community. Public safety institutions serve a vital role in society, and they often face unique challenges due to the nature of their work. Earlier research referred to the fact that reports of the law enforcement council, keeps pointing to the problem of capacity as being one of the biggest problems that inhibits the functioning of not only the police, but many other organizations in the law enforcement sector. And although not mentioned specifically in the report, it probably is also applicable to the fire department and others. The most recent State of Law Enforcement report concludes that although this matter has gotten attention, not much has changed with respect of the functioning of all actors in this sector (See State Capacity chapter (police and justice) for more info on findings).³⁶
- **Public infrastructure & housing** require immediate attention. Very little has changed since earlier FSI reports, with exception that European Union financing has been obtained for the necessary studies for renewal of the wastewater treatment plant, and the intention (nothing concrete yet) to introduce public transportation that is fueled by solar energy. Other than that, there is little progress with traditional big issues such as the restructuring of public transportation and attending to the backlog in social housing. Worth mention is also the existence now of a long-term plan for infrastructure (mainly road and water)

³⁴ Tijdelijke Werk Organisatie, Landspakket uitvoerings agenda 1ste kwartaal 2024

³⁵ College Financieel Toezicht, brief aan Min Fin, datum 2 mei 2024

³⁶ Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de Rechtshandhaving rapport 2023, Mei 2024, page 22

maintenance³⁷, while at the same time its sustainability in light of the latest supreme audit institution's report³⁸, should be cause of concern.

- The previous FSI report also indicated that the lack of progress on the action point in the Landpackage on the assessment of State-Owned Entities (SOE's)³⁹, is taking too long and is of much concern. This concern has become even more dire, and this has to do with the cost of consumption for society (especially in light of the exorbitant increase in cost of living/business as a result of this "inflation tax" as of late). Of importance is also the challenge of evaluating whether they still comply with public mandates that are supposed to add to public value also in terms of quality, and access.

While public services may be delivered through various means such as government agencies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or contracted through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the fundamental principles of governance remain the same. These principles include transparency, accountability, participation, rule of law, and efficiency and effectiveness.

Rather than reiterating all shortcomings with respect to public services, the assessment of the basic pillars of effective public service governance, is poor. There are significant shortcomings and failures in key areas, such as :

- **Transparency:** There is a lack of access to (reliable) information about decision-making processes, policies, and performance. Key information is either not (publicly)available, , nor timely or unreliable, leading to a lack of trust and accountability. Examples are:
 - the case of sudden resignation of the CEO of Aquallectra⁴⁰,
 - the case of dismissal of the CFO of FKP,
 - the case of Aquatel and the issue of "competitive neutrality", and
 - the recent announcement of Aquallectra financial needs to fund a new capital investment plan, without clarity on the concerns expressed by the outgoing Supervisory Board members.
- **Accountability:** There is a lack of effective oversight, weak enforcement of regulations, and a failure to hold public officials accountable for misconduct or poor performance. This only adds to a perceived culture of impunity and corruption. Examples are :
 - There are still articles of the corporate governance code not being complied with by government⁴¹, and no indication of any planned evaluation of the corporate governance law and code as prescribed by law (nothing has been done with the last evaluation).
 - The court case and its verdict of what has become popularly known as the "Professor Willems" report, serves as a reminder of everything that can go wrong,^{42 43}
 - The high level of vacancies on supervisory boards⁴⁴
- **Participation:** There is no proof or limited engagement of citizens (at least via the consumers bureau) and stakeholders in decision-making processes. Examples are:
 - There is no public knowledge of the state of affairs of BTP's efforts to enforce reduction of Aquallectra's energy and water losses, and consequent reflection of such in case of rate setting/adjustments.

³⁷ Ministerie van VVRP, Meerjaren onderhoud en instandhoudingsprogramma Wegen en Afwatering 2023-2029

³⁸ Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Rapport "Effectiviteit van het beheer en onderhoud van het openbaar wegennet, datum 20 maart 2024

³⁹ Chapter 3, Public Services Section, Page 39, Fragile States Index Report Curaçao 2023, Think To DO Institute, October, 2023

⁴⁰ IUH, letter from the Supervisory Board to The Executive Board, Subject: Eindresultaat forensisch onderzoek en bevindingen inzake CEO de heer D. Jonis

⁴¹ Code Corporate Governance, artikelen 4,2 en 4.3

⁴² Fundashon Akshon Sivil, Publicatie "Naar een effectieve corruptiebestrijding", 2024

⁴³ Hof van Justitie, Uitspraak rechtszaak op basis van rapport Willems, EJ80219-H273/16, EJ80236-H276/16 en EJ80219-H354/16, datum uitspraak 13 juni 2017

⁴⁴ SBTNO, <https://sbtno.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/overzicht-vacante-functies-bij-Stichtingen-en-NV-26062024.pdf>

- True public consultation on (spatial) development intentions in general is lacking. Lack of inclusivity can lead to policies and services that do not reflect the needs and preferences of the population.
- Efficiency & effectiveness: Ineffective public service governance may involve wasteful use of resources, inefficient service delivery, and a failure to achieve desired outcomes. Example is:
 - The new hospital construction project (HNO), which is cause for suboptimal service quality (elective surgery put on hold), causing dissatisfaction among service users.
- Ethics and integrity: Poor ethics and integrity in public service governance may involve widespread corruption, conflicts of interest, and unethical behavior among public officials. This erodes trust in government institutions and undermines the credibility of public services.
- Performance management: A poor assessment of performance may involve a lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, inadequate measurement of outcomes, and a failure to use data to inform decision-making. Examples are:
 - No business plans of agencies and the reporting on execution in order to monitor execution of policy, nor systematic policy evaluation. This can result in ineffective use of resources and an inability to improve service delivery.

Social Progress index

The implications of poor public services on social progress are vast and far-reaching. Addressing the root causes of poor public services, such as inadequate funding, lack of accountability, and corruption, is essential for improving the overall well-being and quality of life of individuals and communities. By investing in and improving public services, government can positively impact social progress and pave the way for a more equitable and prosperous society.

FSI Assessment

In this analysis we discussed various issues related to public services such as public education, public healthcare, public order and safety, and public infrastructure and housing based on the 2023 FSI report have been compared and discussed. It highlights the lack of structural changes in addressing these challenges and the need for detailed action plans with cost considerations to ensure financial feasibility. It also mentions the issues faced in public healthcare delivery due to financial challenges, and the capacity problems hindering law enforcement and public safety institutions. Moreover, it addresses the lack of progress in sustainable public infrastructure governance and housing development. In general, the evaluation period under review emphasizes significant shortcomings in transparency, accountability, participation, rule of law, efficiency and effectiveness, ethics and integrity, and performance management in public service governance that lead to various challenges and failures in delivering effective public services.

Score: 8

State resiliency index

Poor public services also have its implications for the state's resiliency. It requires strategic investments in infrastructure, human capital, governance systems, and social safety nets. By prioritizing the delivery of quality public services, enhancing institutional capacity, and promoting inclusive and sustainable development, governments can strengthen their resilience to internal and external shocks, build trust with their citizens, and ensure long-term stability and prosperity.

Rule of law / Human rights

Human rights and the rule of law are two fundamental components of a modern, equitable society, and are integral to the understanding of justice and equity. Human rights are a set of fundamental rights that all individuals enjoy simply as a result of being human; they are rights that are inherent and immutable, and are essential to human dignity. The rule of law, on the other hand, is the legal framework which governs the exercise and enforcement of these rights. Human rights are codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. This declaration states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and sets out thirty articles concerning different aspects of international law. These rights include the right to life, liberty, freedom of opinion and expression, and the right not to be subject to torture, slavery, and arbitrary arrest or detention. Furthermore, human rights assert the fundamental right to human dignity, which means that individuals should be treated with respect and dignity regardless of race, gender, religion, or social class. Civil society organizations are a key part of the rule of law. Such organizations provide for important checks and balances against government powers, and work to advocate for the rights of citizens.

In previous FSI reports, issues related to the rule of law institutions, and the state of some human rights as pressure factors influencing the state of the rule of law were highlighted. The reason for repeating some of these factors in the current period under review, has to do with the fact that nothing has changed, or matters are only getting worse. The research showed that:

- Rule of law institutions play a vital role in the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. These institutions include both governmental and non-governmental entities such as the judicial branch (courts and public prosecutor), legal profession, police, military, prison and detention facilities, and civil society organizations. Each of these institutions plays an important role in upholding the rule of law. The research showed that the sector has a serious capacity problem. This year’s state of the Law Enforcement Report, concludes that although considerable effort is being dedicated to this issue, little progress is visible.⁴⁵
- Previous reports of amongst others the Law Enforcement Council, and foreign organizations such as the US State Department, Amnesty International, and CPT, indicated that Curaçao is in violation of several international laws. This indicates that the country is not only fragile but faces international consequences for its non-compliant behaviors. In the absence of new information, one must conclude that not much has changed with respect to these aspects.

Apart from the fact that some of the same factors mentioned in the in previous FSI reports must be reiterated, there is two other pressure factors that must be highlighted that also influences the state of the rule of law. They are:

- Poor lead time management in the law enforcement sector institutions dealing with criminal cases. A recent report of the Law Enforcement Council indicates that this development is characterized by delays in the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of cases.⁴⁶ This can result in a lack of accountability and justice for victims of crimes. Delays in the legal process can lead to prolonged periods of uncertainty and insecurity, violating the rights of individuals to a fair and timely legal process.
- Poor public order maintenance. A recent report of the law enforcement council evaluating this aspect of the responsibilities of the police organization ⁴⁷, concludes that there is considerable room for improvement. Addressing the implications of poor public order and safety for the rule of law and human rights may require different interventions, besides the already identified capacity issue.

Only by identifying and prioritizing all issues and investing in effective policies and programs, government can work towards ensuring public safety, protecting human rights, and upholding the rule of law for all individuals and communities.

⁴⁵ Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de Rechtshandhaving rapport 2023, Mei 2024, page 22

⁴⁶ Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, Rapport “Doorlooptijd Strafzaken”, datum augustus 2023

⁴⁷ Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, Rapport “Openbare ordehandhaving”, datum februari 2024

Social Progress Index

The rule of law is a critical factor in determining a country's social progress and development. When the rule of law is weak or poorly enforced, it can have wide-ranging implications on a society's ability to provide for the well-being of its citizens, ensure equal opportunities for all, and foster economic growth. It is imperative for government to prioritize legal reforms, combat corruption, and strengthen institutions to uphold the rule of law and ultimately improve the Social Progress Index.

FSI Assessment


In the current analysis, the crucial role of rule of law institutions in upholding the rule of law, including governmental and non-governmental entities like the judicial branch, legal professionals, law enforcement, and civil society organizations, is emphasized. It discusses issues in Curaçao flagged by various international bodies, indicating non-compliance with international laws and potential fragility resulting in consequences. The report highlights a capacity problem within law enforcement institutions and poor lead time management affecting accountability and justice for crime victims. Delayed legal processes can lead to uncertainty and insecurity, violating individuals' rights to a fair and timely legal process.

Score: 7

State Resiliency Index

Poor rule of law and human rights violations can have far-reaching implications for the resilience and stability of the state, affecting political stability, social cohesion, economic development, governance, security, and international relations. By strengthening the rule of law, protecting human rights, and promoting accountability and transparency, the state can enhance its resilience and better withstand internal and external challenges.

Chapter 4: Social and Cross-Cutting Indicators



Introduction

The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities because of social, political, environmental, or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of Asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state, if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources.

The Indicator also measures the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state's population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, for example, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

Lessons Learned

- This analysis is reliant upon international data resources as little reliable local data could be found.
- Curaçao is considered as one of the worst violators of human rights. The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, and therefore remains at Tier 3 in anti-trafficking capacity.
- The local government set up refugee camps and incarcerate refugees in the local prison, with criminals, rather than integrating the refugees into the community which are deemed Inhuman conditions for those refugees.
- Migration initiatives were recommended by the OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ODIHR Good Practices in Migrant integration. These were offered to Curaçao in 2018. As reported in the FSI 2020 report, again in 2022, and again in 2023, none of the recommendations for migrant integration and OSCE commitments are evident in policy or practice.⁴⁸
- External interventions in the form of economic support from the Kingdom have, because of instability of local governance, the lack of institutional strength nor financial discipline at the local level, created economic dependency on the Kingdom as documented in annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports, College Financieel Toezicht (Cft) reports.
- The country is faltering in its responsibility to address and provide for the basic human needs of its people.

This analysis is reliant upon international data resources as little reliable local data could be found.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

In the case of Curaçao with a total population of 154,000, the influx of refugees from Venezuela, due to the ongoing political and economic crisis there, continues to put considerable pressure on public services, and has created humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state of Curaçao. That state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources to manage the influx. This crisis is complicated by the relationship between the autonomous island status of Curaçao within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the division of responsibilities which result from this relationship.

Nationality, defense, foreign affairs, human rights, maritime and air traffic, and good governance are Kingdom matters; all other matters are those of the local autonomous authority. Consequently, such matters as aid, security, development projects, ongoing budget support for certain Caribbean matters fall within the EU dominion, while others are controlled by the local sovereignty of Curaçao. For the purpose of this analysis, the use of the

⁴⁸ *Fragile States Index Curaçao Country Report, 2020*, Think To DO Institute, Curaçao.

terms *illegal persons, refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons* will follow international definitions. Illegal persons may or may not be refugees. Refugees may not wish to be migrants but are forced into migration because the political and economic crisis from which they fled may not resolve for years and, therefore, the refugee may migrate. Because of the size of the island of Curaçao, the concept of *internally displaced persons* does not exist.

Refugees

Influx of Refugees: TRAFFICKING PROFILE

As reported over the past six years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curaçao.⁴⁹ Curaçao is considered as one of the worst violators of human rights.⁵⁰ The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Curaçao remained on Tier 3. Undocumented migrants in Curaçao, especially the substantial population of Venezuelan nationals, are vulnerable to both sex and labor trafficking. In 2020, pandemic-related movement restrictions prevented migrants from departing Curaçao, creating new trafficking risks for migrants who lost work during the economic downturn associated with the pandemic; traffickers may have exploited some of these individuals, taking advantage of their vulnerable position. Officials reported traffickers' activity increased during the pandemic, especially individual traffickers acting independently. Traffickers exploit women and girls from Curaçao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex trafficking. Bar owners recruit women and girls to work as waitresses or "trago girls" and, subsequently, force them into commercial sex. Traffickers exploit migrant workers from other Caribbean countries, South America, China, and India in domestic servitude, as well as forced labor in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants. Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by Spanish-speakers purporting to offer employment assistance in Curaçao. Recent research suggests traffickers in Curaçao may exploit more domestic and more male victims than previously understood.

With persisting budget deficits, an abundance of socio-economic problems, and plummeting export rates, Curaçao has consistently argued, as reported in previous FSI reports, that it is unfit to cope with the Venezuelan influx. The response from Dutch government officials has been that the island has autonomy and must deal with the problem itself. Curaçao has not signed or ratified international agreements such as the 1951 Refugee Convention or the regional 1984 Cartagena Declaration. As an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, however, Curaçao is bound by Dutch and European legislation that forbid deportations to countries with noted human rights risks – *of which Venezuela is one.*

As reported in the June 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report of the United States Department of State, In 2021, the government reported allocating dedicated funds, 131,500 Antillean guilder (\$73,880), for anti-trafficking efforts in the national budget for the first time; however, due to government-wide austerity measures, it may not have disbursed all funds outlined in the budget.⁵¹ Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including providing shelter and other services to two trafficking victims, prosecuting two alleged traffickers, and adopting and funding a NAP to improve law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking. However, the new NAP did not include lines of effort to protect victims or prevent the crime, courts did not convict any traffickers, and the government continued to condition foreign victims' assistance, including residency, on cooperation with law enforcement in cases against traffickers. Lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to robust anti-trafficking efforts. Officials demonstrated limited familiarity with human trafficking and conflated the crime with migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts. The government's coordination with civil society organizations and internally, across agencies, was inadequate.⁵²

In 2022, the government assigned a policy advisor to support the national coordinator part-time. The national coordinator managed a dedicated anti-trafficking budget of 200,000 guilder (\$112,360), as well as additional financial

⁴⁹ Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State, June, 2022, 2023,

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch, 2020 report on Venezuelan-Netherlands Refugee Relations

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Curaçao

contributions from the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the government did not spend the full budget in 2022. The task force met two times in 2022 to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts across the government. Observers indicated neither the task force nor other government entities coordinated substantively with civil society organizations; they also noted the government’s interagency coordination on anti-trafficking efforts appeared inconsistent, despite the task force. The government finalized and adopted the 2022-2026 NAP to guide anti-trafficking efforts, replacing the 2017-2022 NAP. However, the new NAP was not comprehensive; it outlined efforts to hold traffickers criminally accountable but did not include objectives to protect victims or prevent the crime.⁵³

Increase in Refugee Camps/Violence against Refugees/Safety of Refugee Camps:

The local government set up refugee camps and incarcerate refugees in the local prison, with criminals, rather than integrating the refugees into the community. Local NGOs have taken the initiative to address the human rights issues. They acknowledge that there are 22,000 undocumented migrants of which 9,000 are refugees that are locally identified as “crises migrants”. These NGOs are working on solutions and in 2022 have identified 3 goals:

1. To work with ministries of Justice and Labor to identify categories of persons
2. To increase involvement of the private sector
3. To influence policy, such as Population & Migration

The goal is to give undocumented people a temporary legal status and to set the amount of time they can remain on the island, because their only alternative now is deportation or detention.

The United Nations Human Rights Commission, UNHCR, within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, has been offering its help in developing an asylum procedure and—subsequently—resettling refugees in other places to help ease the pressure on Curaçao. Officials in The Hague vouch for resettlement elsewhere, too; if Venezuelans were granted refugee status in Curaçao, their legal stay would eventually turn into Kingdom of the Netherlands—and thus EU—citizenship after five years. This is of great concern in the Netherlands and laws are being considered to control this flow.⁵⁴ Local NGO’s continue to work to convince the government to comply.

In its 2022 report, and again in the 2023 Monitoring Report, Amnesty International detailed alleged human rights abuses by the Curaçao authorities and reports that little improvement has been made in the protection of Venezuelans.⁵⁵ Amnesty reports that they are please that the Curaçao court has recognized that Curaçao is acting unlawfully and that the inhumane detention of Venezuelans who are seeking protection must end.⁵⁶ Amnesty International will monitor the refugee situation on Curaçao. According to Transparency International, the court sentence is an important step in improving the situation of the Venezuelan refugees/migrants and that the Curaçao government must offer these people protection and humane treatment. In its 2023 report, Amnesty International reported that the Curaçaoan authorities have not granted protection to a single person since they introduced the new Protection Procedure in 2019. For those seeking protection, access to information and legal assistance are not yet guaranteed. Curaçao continues to place adults and children in immigration detention automatically and without any judicial review. The inhuman conditions in which they are held, such as being imprisoned in a cell for most of the day and a lack of hygiene products and recreational activities, remain a deterrent to people initiating the Protection Procedure or following it through.⁵⁷

Dispute settlement procedures are missing and need to be instituted. Different stakeholders such as Human Rights Defense Curaçao, Venezolanos en el Exterior (Venex) and the Ombudsman have indicated that they are not engaged in constructive dialogue with the Curaçaoan authorities, despite having contacted them multiple times. HRDC’s relationship with the government varies depending on the circumstances. Transparency International has again made specific recommendations for the improvement of laws, procedures and stakeholder partnerships and

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Netherland’s Ministry of Justice and Security (Directorate for Migration Policy) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

⁵⁵ Amnesty International <http://manesty.org/ess/wp-content/uploads/2023/2/AMR0564042023ENGLISH.pdf>

⁵⁶ Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3589372018.ENGLISH.PDF>, and April, 2022 update

⁵⁷ Amnesty International <http://manesty.org/ess/wp-content/uploads/2023/2/AMR0564042023ENGLISH.pdf>

involvement to address the issue. Only the Roundtable on Inclusive Migration and Integration could be cited as an example of open dialogue. No formal or regular cooperation exists.⁵⁸

The authorities need to take many more steps to ensure that data is publicly accessible and that their policies and actions are transparent.

Internally displaced people

By definition Curaçao does not have Internally displaced people. **Internally displaced people (IDPs)** have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike **refugees**, they are on the run at home. **IDPs** stay within their own country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that government is the reason for their displacement.

Relief Efforts:

Access to additional resources from the international community for refugees mostly flows through the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Union as stated above. To restate this, if Venezuelans were granted refugee status in Curaçao, their legal stay would eventually turn into Kingdom of the Netherlands—and thus EU—citizenship after five years. This is of great concern in the Netherlands and laws are being considered to control this flow.

Relocation and Settlement:

According to European Resettlement Network, different countries interpret relocation and settlement differently. Resettlement to the Netherlands is not formally regulated by law. The 2000 Aliens Act provides the legal basis for refugee recognition, the identification of beneficiaries of international protection outside of the Netherlands, and the grounds for admission. Overall, policy and procedures for resettlement are laid out in the Minister of Justice's Decree (WBV 2010/10). The Policy Framework for Resettlement sets out priorities for the Dutch quota and is renewed for each four-year flexible quota period. Curaçao does not have a specific policy for Relocation and Settlement. There is no available evidence of any plans for relocation and settlement of current refugees.

Migration initiatives were recommended by the OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ODIHR Good Practices in Migrant integration. In their training manual for countries with migration initiatives, clear and concise strategies with benchmarks are recommended. These were offered to Curaçao in 2018. As reported in the FSI 2020 report, again in 2022, and again in 2023, none of the recommendations for migrant integration and OSCE commitments are evident in policy or practice.⁵⁹

- Migrant integration concepts and OSCE commitments
- Institutional, legal and policy frameworks for migrant integration
- Migrant status in relation to integration measures, including access to long-term residence and citizenship
- Facilitating the civic and linguistic integration of migrants
- Migrants' access to the labor market and migrant entrepreneurship
- Migrants' access to housing and social services
- Preventing and addressing racism, xenophobia, discrimination and hate crime against migrants
- Migrant education and the integration of children and youth
- Migrant healthcare
- Civic and political participation of migrants at the local and national levels

Social Progress Index

Of the three areas of the social progress index the one that is most connected to this cohesion indicator is that of building blocks in place for individuals and communities to enhance and sustain wellbeing. If the country is denying basic human rights to those seeking refuge and if the country does not have this as priority or provides adequate funding for it, then the entire community suffers. And the well-being of all

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *Fragile States Index Curacao Country Report, 2020*, Think To DO Institute, Curacao.

deteriorates. This thinking of “us/them” also causes social cohesion pressures and effects the human elements related to the sense of belonging of all citizens.

FSI Assessment

In the case of Curaçao with a total population of 154,000, the influx of refugees from South America and other Caribbean islands, due to the on-going political and economic crisis there, has put considerable pressure on public services, and has created humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state of Curaçao. Curaçao does not have the necessary laws and policies related to population, migration, and labor force distribution to absorb and manage the influx. This crisis is complicated by the relationship between the autonomous island status of Curaçao within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the division of responsibilities which result from this relationship.

Again, this year, International organizations have sited Curaçao as one of the worst violators of human rights by denying sufficient and safe refugee camps, and because of reports of violence against refugees. There has not been an adequate response to the displacement in the form of additional resources from the international community or through well designed relocation and settlement plans nor migration initiative proposed by international organizations. Because Curaçao has received tens of thousands of displaced persons fleeing, mostly from Venezuela, and has not addressed it, it falls into a critical fragile state score.

Score: 8

State Resilience Index

Of the seven pillars of the State Resilience Index, those most impacted by this cohesion indicator of the FSI are inclusion, *state capacity* and *individual capacity*. The laws and the mindset of the people of the island sees “others” as a threat to social cohesion and, although has caused the island to be seen as a human rights violator, little is done to mitigate and respond to the crisis of refugees. Further the state capacity is seen as weak by international human rights organizations because year after year, warnings and recommendations are made but the local government does not act to improve the situation, and it cites the lack of funds for this. Lastly, the individual capacity of people is affected, as this situation puts a strain on the education, health and social protection services.

External Interventions

The external interventions indicators look at the influence and impact of the “external actors” in the functioning of the state, especially in the functioning of security and economics. By this it is meant that it looks at the extent to which the external actors are engaged in security aspects such internal affairs of the state, intelligence services, and other entities that can affect the balance of power; and the extent to which external actors are focused on economic engagement through such things as a large-scale loans, development projects, foreign aid, on-going budget support, control of finances, or management of the state’s economic policy, creating economic dependency.

External interventions also refer to humanitarian interventions such as deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

As in the earlier section of cross cutting indicators, the autonomous status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands complicates the analysis. Here, too, it must be noted that nationality, defense, foreign affairs, human rights, maritime and air traffic, and good governance are Kingdom matters; all other matters are those of the local autonomous authority. Consequently, such matters as aid, security, development projects, ongoing budget support for certain Caribbean matters fall within the EU dominion, while others are controlled by the local sovereignty of Curaçao.

For clarity, interventions from the Kingdom in these matters of the Kingdom responsibilities mentioned above would be considered internal interventions. All other areas of interventions from the Kingdom would be considered external interventions.

Political Intervention

There is no documented evidence of direct political intervention from the Kingdom in political matters. However, there is evidence of local political parties with strong ties to the Kingdom's strategies for social and political philosophies and initiative. Because of the proximity and of past close relationships with Venezuela by previous local governments, unions and private sector entities, there is the influence of the Venezuelan system (the Chavez ideology) of government in local politics as well.

Force Intervention

There has been a long-term regional focus on drug trafficking. Based on a Kingdom responsibility for defense and foreign affairs, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has had a long-term agreement with the United States for hosting the Forward Operations Location (FOL) in Aruba and Curaçao for the purpose of surveillance of drug trafficking. The Curaçao/Aruba FOL is the result of a 10-year access security and defense cooperation agreement the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed in March 2000 and renewed in 2010. The Curaçao/Aruba FOL supports operations of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) to detect, monitor, and track aircraft or vessels engaged in illicit drug trafficking that originate in South America and cross the Caribbean Sea to reach Mexico and the United States. The U.S. Air Force manages the Curaçao/Aruba FOL day-to-day activities providing 24/7 operational and logistics support for interagency cooperation in drug missions. Because it falls under the kingdom responsibility, the FOL is an external intervention.⁶⁰ This agreement continues to be in effect in 2023.

Economic Intervention

Economic packages, consisting of various development assistance programs, that have been created to support the sustainable socio-economic development of the country through the local government by the kingdom can (considering how this assistance is structured) be considered external interventions because the areas supported in the packages are part of the country's autonomous responsibilities. For the past 15 years, at least, such development support packages have been offered starting with the debt relief package of 2010. Before that there were "development assistance like" packages for the islands of the Netherlands Antilles. Two economic interventions are ongoing and revised and monitored quarterly. They are the COHO of 2020.⁶¹ Second, is the Island Packet of 2021 with revisions of 2022.⁶² In last year's FSI it was reported that there were ongoing efforts by the governments to agree on a kingdom law proposal (COHO) to regulates the development assistance relationship. The ultimate outcome is that earlier this year the COHO was ultimately rejected, and replaced by a so-called Mutual agreement (in Dutch "Onderlinge Regeling), which as the name implies, is an agreement, which does not have the weight of a Kingdom law. This new agreement limits considerably the involvement of the Netherlands in the development assistance process.

Usually earmarked as development-assistance activities, these packages were/are in practice designed to achieve economic independence over time (usually a four-to-six-year period). In reality, because of instability of local governance, the lack of institutional strength nor financial discipline at the local level, these initiatives have created economic dependency on the Kingdom as documented in annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports, College Financieel Toezicht (Cft) reports.⁶³ The packages are also contributing to the ever-persistent feeling of "reverse sovereignty" because of the way this assistance is structured. In recent months, the Curaçao

⁶⁰Verdrag inzake samenwerking tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika betreffende toegang tot en gebruik van faciliteiten in de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba voor drugsbestrijding vanuit de lucht; Oranjestad, 2 maart 2000, zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/trb-2000.34/html; Forward Operating Location Agreement five-year renewal, 2015

⁶¹ Kingdom Act Caribbean Body for Reform and Development (COHO), 2021, 2022

⁶²Ibid, RMR, bijlage-3-landspakkettenCASlanden10jul2022.pdf

⁶³ CFT reports (2021,2022, 2023) cft.cw

Minister of Finance has reported increased revenue from short term strategies and stresses a reduced need for financing from the Kingdom. (see Economic Chapter for explanation)

Social Progress Index

The two areas of the Social Progress Index which support the fragility index score are *Foundations of Wellbeing* and *Opportunity*. These deserves equal attention. Because the country's lack of resolution on the COHO and Mutual Agreement (Onderlinge Regeling) areas of development, and because there has not yet been actualized any long term economic and social development plan which was to be the outcome of the cooperation agreement, the citizens have not experienced an improved basic education, do not obtain information and communicate freely due to the decline of the free press, do not benefit from a modern healthcare system due to funding and medical personnel shortages, and do not yet live in a healthy environment conducive to a long life. Whereas most all countries struggle with at least one of these aspects, Curaçao is struggling with all of these aspects.

Secondly, country's population have the freedom, and *opportunity* is being affected as stated in the narrative above. Personal rights, personal freedom and choice, inclusiveness, and access to advanced education all contribute to the level of opportunity within a given society. Because of the dependence of the country on external actors, it still struggles to meet the moral imperative to guarantee the equality of opportunity for all citizens.

FSI Assessment

The country is dependent on some assistance from external actors, but this assistance is requested. These external actors aid the country both economically and institutionally, but not politically. Due to the complex relationship and shared responsibilities between the Kingdom and the island's autonomous government, some interventions are external, and some are internal. Economic intervention by the UN, and other international organizations exist. Economic interventions by the Kingdom of the Netherlands include large-scale loans, development projects, aid, ongoing budget support, control of finances, and influence over the management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. Humanitarian interventions have been given to support strategic efforts to stem the influence of organized crime and large-scale immigration due to political unrest in countries of South America.

Score: 7

State Resilience Index

The pillars that are informing Curaçao most about its ability to manage these resilience pressures in this section of the Fragile States Index are the *Economy* and *State Capacity* pillars. The local economy is neither diverse or innovative and has not structured itself to withstand economic disruptions. Because of the reliance on external interventions and large-scale loans, neither long-term economic resilience, infrastructure and high-quality economic management can be realized or sustained.

Demographic Indicators

Broadly defined, demography is the study of the characteristics of populations. Demographics can include any statistical factors that influence population growth or decline, but several parameters are particularly important: population size, fertility (birth rates), and mortality (death rates as a function of age and health), just to name a few.

The Demographic Pressures Indicator specifically considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth rates or skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic,

and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also considers pressures stemming from extreme weather events (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Population

Curaçao's population (148,000 2023 estimate) has been declining for the last couple of years. (It must be noted that different reports site different numbers for the population.) This decline is the result of the declining fertility rate, increasing mortality figures and, lately, negative net migration figures. Data show a fertility rate of 1.7 children per woman for 2020 alone, which is on par with aging societies, and is below 2.1 considered by the UN to be the replacement-level fertility. In addition, the community is aging (constrictive pyramidal structure) with a high dependency ratio as a result, which is contributing to increasing fiscal pressure on the active population. This on top of the already existing pressure of a lower economy of scale because of the constitutional change of 10/10/10. It is also worth mentioning that multiple external and local studies by various organizations have indicated that a population twice the current size is needed for societal sustainability. Unfortunately, no studies on this topic can be found in the past five years.

Health

The earlier indicated aging population coupled with a relatively high longevity coupled with an increased incidence of circulatory systems and neoplasm diseases is not only affecting the productivity of the nation, but also putting increased pressure on the finances of public health, resulting in a continuing pressure on benefits from the general medical coverage system. The many problems that have arisen around the costs of the health care system, the building of an oversized hospital and the controversy between medical professionals and the Ministry of Health about the payment of specialists has further weakened the health care system since the last report. There is now more concern about the equal access to health care on the island.⁶⁴

Water is essential to good health as well as access to water being a basic human right. A 2022 report by Aquallectra indicates that the drinking water system will be separated from the grey water system. The Curaçao dams and collection canals known as “rooien” are in decay and cannot handle the tasks of reservoirs. It is estimated that 1100 households do not have a water connection. Since this was reported in 2022, there has been no change. Another two percent have no water because of the connection being closed (usually due to lack of ability to pay). In September 2022 the Foundation Hende-i-Medio-Ambiente (HiMA) filed a lawsuit against the Curaçao government because it does not make sufficient efforts to guarantee access to clean water, especially for socially disadvantaged groups on the island. (see also Public Services section of Political Indicators Chapter).⁶⁵

The electrical grid is vulnerable and within the first seven months of 2023, there have been regular interruption in the electricity grid of the island causing homes to be damaged by power surges and business to lose revenue and property loses. This outage has also caused concern about the digital communication grid. The community has lost trust in the power provider to have a redundant and reliable power grid. As seen in other countries, the loss of the power grid can be an intense threat due to climate change and in extreme weather events.⁶⁶

Environment

Both the health of the population and the sustainability of the economy are also being compromised by poor environmental management. The biggest culprits are the emissions from the local refinery, but also the environmental degradation as a result a poor solid waste and grey/polluted wastewater management are some of the more salient contributing factors. The former has had a direct impact on the health of the population, whereas the latter affects amongst other things the flora and fauna of the island's surrounding seas. This in turn is endangering longer term the livelihood of not only those working in the artisanal fishing industry, but also of those working in the tourism industry, of which sun/sand/sea is an important component. Dwindling groundwater level

⁶⁴ Annual Reports SVB 2021, 2022

⁶⁵ Stichting Hende-i-Medio Ambiente (HiMA), “Recht op drinkwater geborgd”, September, 2022

⁶⁶ Manage Interruptions-www.aquallectra.com

is also a major challenge. The factors contributing to such are many: the resulting salination is affecting the flora and making agriculture, in an environment devoid of other natural fresh water sources (other than rainwater) to contribute to its replenishment, ever more difficult. As of 2020, the refinery was closed awaiting a new operator. In the meantime, a plan to modernize and repair the damage around the refinery was created by the RDK, the Curaçao Refinery. Until this writing in August 2023, no change has occurred.

Considering the change in weather patterns as a result of climate change, the island runs a higher than usual risk of natural disasters, but also of ever more unusual heat waves and rainfalls. The recent effects of the passing of Hurricane Bonnie in 2022 north of the island, was indicative of the degree of disaster the island could experience in the event of a full-blown hit. It is also clear that the population and business activities located in the south coastal region will suffer in the event of a tsunami, and not to mention longer term because of sea level rise.⁶⁷ All of the above indicators add to the fragility of the state.

Social Progress Index

Social Program Framework focuses on how to meet one's own citizens basic human needs. The dimensions of *and Foundations of Wellbeing* show fragility in this indicator of the FSI. In this section, it has been documented that Curaçao's population's capacity to survive with adequate nourishment and basic medical care, clean water, sanitation, adequate shelter, and personal safety are at risk. The education system is not open to all and because of the demise of many media outlets due to financial issues, citizens do not obtain information freely. Because these needs are still not met, the score for this indicator must be noted as very fragile.

FSI Assessment

Demographics are of key importance to development, but this link to resilience is often ignored in Curaçao. Population—the study of people using the tool of demography—is now appearing across development discourse, with policy implications that reach far beyond family planning and reproductive health. Apart from the obvious, that is its implications for the sustainability of public finance, old age pension and healthcare schemes, the upcoming young population will have implications for political behavior and the education system. Both trends will profoundly affect workforce and employment models.

Across all areas of this indicator, there is evidence of policy failures and lack of strategic infrastructure planning. As mentioned in other chapters and earlier in this chapter, population, migration, labor force retrenchment and retraining, and economic development policies are key to breaking out of many of the fragility cycles identified.

Rating: 8

State Resilience Index

Again, in the context of this Fragile States Indicator, the data identifies the following as pressure pillars of Resilience that the country Curaçao is not have the capacity to manage *Inclusion, State Capacity, Economy, Environment and Ecology, and Civic Space*. The people are not included in the social and economic discourse of the country and access to public resources is limited to the weakening of social support institutions. The capacity of state is weak, and the public is not sure that the public good is the priority of the government. The Economy is not guided by long-term vision and public policy and environmental and ecological concerns are not addressed to ensure a stable water and electrical grid so that individuals and private sector can thrive.

⁶⁷ Curaçao Climate Change Policy Assessment, 2019

Chapter 5: Capacities of State Indicators: Supplement to the Fragile States Index



Introduction to the Use of the “Assessing Capacities of State” Metrix

The **Fragile States Index (FSI)** is an annual report list that aims to assess states' vulnerability to conflict or collapse, ranking all sovereign states with membership in the United Nations where there is enough data available for analysis. The Fund for Peace developed a set of companion indicators that can begin to provide a representation of the **capacity of states**. These pressure indicators look at specific aspects of a country: the competencies of government, specifically the branches of government and security services.

It is noted that other aspects of a state that are critical to a state's capacity, such as the media, communications, civil society are measured in the Fragile States Index (FSI) itself.

As with the previous chapters, beginning with the 2023 version of the Fragile States Index, the Capacities of State Matrix is being compared with the Social Progress Index and the State Resilience Index to show the relationships to how the competencies of the government are directly affecting the lives of local citizens.

In a democratic state, every citizen is supposed to know the laws. That being said, the laws should be easily accessible in order for them to abide by them. This lack of transparency of the government leads to misuse of power, the lack of citizens knowing their rights and the application of law.

The **Capacity indicators** are accessed on a **0-5 Likert Scale** and are graded on an **A to E** system for each aspect of professionalism, legitimacy, and representativeness. Each of the scales and systems have clear indicators and descriptors against which evaluators can measure and rank country data.

These measurements are important in the collection of data about the governance legitimacy of a country and, more importantly, the resilience of the country. As the Think To DO Institute is looking at resiliency factors and the relationship to governance legitimacy, the Curaçao Country Assessment has been undertaken. It is the hope that this analysis will give insight into what needs to be improved and what best practice looks like.

Lessons learned:

- Curaçao may be a small island nation but has the tasks and responsibilities of a full-blown country, with a large, deep harbor, international airport, health care system that needs to support itself, international borders (although this is done in cooperation with the Netherlands). In 2019, following a “size of government” study, there was a discussion for the government to redesign the government, keeping specific core tasks within its own organization and outsourcing other tactical or operational tasks, therefore, being slim and more focused on strategy/policy and laws and related tasks and, therefore, have fewer public servants, cost less and be more effective.
- The current government continues the transfer of power from the civil servants to political advisors through ministerial decrees and ministerial communiques, thus weakening rather than strengthening the civil service
- In terms of leadership in this country, the “moral hazard” must be mentioned. Due to the Kingdom's decisions to give “bail outs” every few years. The islands play the moral card; Holland succumbs over and over again under the pressure of the islands, creating a mindset at the island level that they can always get away with poor governance and its consequences. This creates a moral hazard.
- There are three areas of vulnerability noted in this year's local data regarding the Police Force.⁶⁸ First is the **instability of leadership**. The Chief of police has been assigned other duties since June of 2020 and the position has been filled in, it is occupied by a Chief of police, however, he is acting as *operational chief* of police which is a separate function. The position of Chief and other key leadership positions are now acting as *operational or acting* via a temporary approach making them vulnerable politically. This instability has also

⁶⁸ Jaarverstag 2021, 2022, Openbaar Ministerie Curaçao

influenced the necessary policing operational documentation in that key fundamental documents like a Service Regulations Document are *not* in place, thus cannot be enforced. Second, is the area of **integrity**. In 2022, Internal Affairs had approximately 60 to 70 open files, meaning that more than 10 percent of the force is subject of an ongoing (Integrity) investigation. Approximately, 12 officers were sentenced in penal law. This indicates a strong need for training and leadership guidance. IT depicts a chronic lack of professional knowledge and management.⁶⁹ *Quota-based policing* is still mandated. Finally, the force is fragile due to the **aging out of the force**. Recruitment, training and placement of young officers must be a priority.

- Lack of confidence in the system calls for Judiciary review: . An independent professional perception survey/study is much needed to address the trust level of this organization in society. And, third party (peer) reviews should be held on a periodic basis.
- Unbiases of judges is not guaranteed due to perceptions and concerns about the professional qualities of the prosecutors and judges.⁷⁰
- The capacity of the judiciary is a WEAK and is a threat to the rule of law and therefore to democracy.

The five areas of capacities of the state that are reported here are: **Leadership, Military, Police, Judiciary and Civil Service**.

Leadership (Executive & Legislative)

Curaçao has a one-chamber system, which has been modeled after the Dutch chamber system, although the Dutch have a two-chamber system, as do most of the old monarchies in Western Europe. In the Dutch system, there is a 2nd chamber (“Tweede Kamer”) consisting of the members of parliament (MP’s). As a general rule, these MP’s are elected in general elections, by the public every four years, based on established laws. The 2nd chamber is a legislative body, consisting of the representatives of the people, chosen in free and fair elections. Besides the 2nd chamber, there is also a 1st chamber in the Dutch system where proposals of laws, once they have been approved in the 2nd chamber, still must be approved, or rejected by the 1st chamber. Members of the 1st chamber are not elected by the people and very seldom reject a law proposal once it has passed the 2nd chamber.

As a rule, the political parties whose members are voted into parliament and can form a majority (coalition), also form the government, i.e., the executive leadership of the country.

Against this backdrop, the “leadership” system of Curaçao as a country was designed, not taking into consideration historical differences or in culture, values, beliefs, education, stage of development, environment, etc. The Curaçao system is embedded in our historical and cultural heritage. First subject to West Indies Company(WIC), the island and its people were a commodity of a company, and afterwards a Dutch colony when WIC went bankrupt. It is after WWII that the island gained some autonomy as a territory within the Dutch Kingdom, being the Netherlands Antilles, which also had a two-tier government layer (land and island) until 2010 when the island became a country within the Dutch Kingdom. Now, the island has one layer of government for Curaçao, with the Staten (parliament) and Ministerraad (council of ministers). Ministers are chosen out of the coalition. Since the autonomy within the kingdom was established at 10-10-10, the country has struggled with stability of governance, as indicated by the fact that in 13 years there have been 9 different governments with 9 different cabinets with changes of ministers within each cabinet. This, in itself, indicates that the system as a whole is fragile and not functioning effectively.

Again, in terms of leadership in this country, the “moral hazard” must be again mentioned. Due to the Kingdom’s decisions to give “bail outs” every few years. The islands play the moral card; Holland succumbs over and over again under the pressure of the islands, creating a mindset at the island level that they can always get away with poor governance and its consequences. This creates a moral hazard.

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Antwoorden Kamervragen over officieren van Justitie die in de fout zijn gegaan, 14.01.2020

Overall assessment: score 2

In trying to make an overall assessment of the key characteristics of the Leadership environment, it is difficult to fit the Curaçao environment into one specific category, since it has characteristics of different categories. In reviewing the internationally benchmarked scoring guide, the current leadership is demonstrating almost half of the characteristics listed for a ranking of 2, therefore, the overall score will be changed to a 2.

Local elections are widely considered to be free and fair, which would lead one to believe that it can be provided with a score 4. However, there is still evidence of a strong patronage system, whereby only party members of the same party will be appointed in positions like, for instance, a supervisory board member of a government-owned company. Strong patronage leads to corruption according to some experts. As reported in the political section of the report, there is a perception and documentation of increased corruption and patronage which is further undermining the trust of the society in its government.

Political opposition is weak, in the sense that opposition is often not based on hard empirical facts but based on emotions and playing to the sentiments of the general public. Just as the 2024 FSI report was being finalized, the coalition broke, a single party will sustain the government until the election or until other parties agree to form a government, and pass the screening to sit in government. This will be the twelfth time in fourteen years that a government has failed to sit for a complete turn.

Although the system is still respected, there is the need for greater oversight and stronger enforcement mechanisms. Since 2018, there have been multiple attempts a Kingdom-funding development programs, labeled by different names, designed to strengthen institutions. Until this writing, most of those initiative have not moved beyond the fact-finding stage. Further, due to the frequent change of governments, and political philosophies, the initiatives have not been agreed upon and do not function as long-term change initiatives. The current government continues the transfer of power from the civil servants to political advisors through ministerial decrees and ministerial communiques, thus weakening rather than strengthening the civil service. Since the Leadership environment shows more elements of category 2 as detailed on page 89, it should be provided with a **score 2**, while mentioning that the elections are not considered flawed but are widely considered free and fair.

Professional: score D

The leadership is not effective, not only when considering the different economic indicators, but also regarding education, environment, social problems, housing, infrastructure, etc. While stability and tenure may not be based on oppression as such, it is often based on patronage and nepotism.

Legitimate: score D

Public participation and stakeholder participation in all areas of policy development is lacking. The general public has very little trust in politicians and therefore in our political leaders (executive and legislative). The different scandals over the years since 10-10-10, whereby several politicians were the subject of criminal investigations and/or had to submit their resignation or even incarcerated was not conducive to an increase in the trust level. Finally, after two years, a previous political leader has been held accountable to aspects of his sentencing, however, the terms of his financial agreement to pay restitution are not disclosed leading to more distrust and fears of corruption in the capacities of government.⁷¹

As mentioned in other sections of this report, it must be reiterated that the impact of the general fear within the population also translates into the community's lack of serious appreciation for the watch dog institutions of government who are responsible for checks and balances. The statement, "if you see something, do something" is a cry from the community. When the community sees that the watchdog

⁷¹ Public Prosecution Service announcement, <https://curacao.nu/gerrit-schotte-en-om-hebben-akkoord-over-afbetaling-ontnemingszaak/>, August 29, 2022

institutions remain silent, they realize the system is not working. The community retracts in fear and/or apathy.

Representative: score E

In the local environment, the leadership is not so much comprised of one ethnic group, but more of otherwise related groups like political parties. In this respect there is a noticeable tendency to serve and/or favor mostly members of the same political party.

The Netherlands Antilles (NA) consisted initially of 6 islands, including Aruba. As of January 1986, Aruba obtained a separate status within the Dutch Kingdom, leaving the NA to consist of the remaining 5 islands (Bonaire, Curaçao, St Maarten, St Eustatia, Saba). Within this constellation, there might have been a better system of checks and balances. There was a governing body (Bestuurscollege) on island territory level, with a Lieutenant Governor (Gezaghebber) and the necessary checks and balances. Besides this, there was also a government on NA level, in charge of policymaking and with the required checks and balances and authority to make sure the functioning was effective and to a certain extent, also functioned as a watchdog. After 13 years of autonomy, the complete integration of all central level (policy related) tasks was never fully implemented at the island level. This gap has contributed to the increased fragility of institutions, ineffective execution of policy and lack of complete implementation of all institutions/structures laid down in the autonomous government formation.

Military

Curaçao does not have a military of its own. All matters pertaining to the defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands fall under the responsibility of the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Besides this, since inception of the NATO, the Netherlands has been part of this organization, whereby the different member countries are allied with each other with respect to the defense of their countries.

There is a Dutch armed forces base located in Curaçao, the Marinekazerne Suffisant. Until 2009, it was used by the infantry company 31 INFCIE of the Netherlands Marine Corps. Currently, the base is used for the conscription of Curaçaoan youth. However, rather than being purely military in nature, the conscription also serves a social purpose: conscripts can get an education and receive diplomas on the base. During the first six months the conscripts receive military training and in the remaining six months they study to obtain a diploma. The conscripts are called “miliciens”. Currently, the Royal Mareschaussee has a brigade stationed on the base as well.

They are performing more coast guard than military tasks because they have the capacity to do so, and has the mandate to do so.

Curaçao also has a para-military organization of volunteers, the VKC. Since 1929, the VKC played an important role during WWII, the Cuban American crisis in the early 1960s, during the big strike and subsequent looting in May 1969. The VKC also provided support to the Dutch Marines when the Hurricanes hit St. Maarten and also provides support to the local police when necessary.

Overall assessment: score 5

Since Curaçao does not have a military, it is dependent on the military of The Dutch Kingdom and whenever necessary supported by NATO forces. As such it can be stated that the military is under strong civilian and legal control and can defend Curaçao against external threats. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare.

Professional: score A

The Dutch military as well as the other NATO countries are professional militaries under strong civilian and legal control. Positions are merit based and issues regarding corruption or abuses occur rarely and are handled appropriately.

The military is requested to perform police duties which by law is not legal.

Legitimate: score A

The Dutch military is highly respected by the population and not politicized.

Representative: score A

The Dutch military is considered highly representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group. Because of the scale of the military presence on Curaçao, the proportion of high-ranking military representation may not be evident.

Police

Background

The scope of the analyses in this area is the prosecutor's office and the police force.

The police force, which can be regarded as the operational body of the Prosecutor's Office, has a very controversial background. The force is underfunded and has a negative reputation amongst the public. Although there are many conscientious officers that want to do the right thing, they often complain that the organization is politicized and ruled by force; and having too strong of an opinion might result in official or unofficial disciplinary measures.

The Prosecutor's Office is tasked with the coordination of criminal cases and give general instructions to the police.

There are three areas of vulnerability noted in this year's local data regarding the Police Force.⁷²

First is the **instability of leadership**. Since 2023, the operational chief of police position has been filled.

Positions, however, are being filled by the same temporary approach applies to several key positions, the officers in those positions are *acting* and, therefore, makes them vulnerable politically. This instability has also influenced the necessary policing operational documentation in that key fundamental documents like a Service Regulations Document are *not* in place, thus cannot be enforced.

Second, is the area of **integrity**. In 2022, Internal Affairs had approximately 60 to 70 open files, meaning that more than 10 percent of the force is subject of an ongoing (integrity) investigation. Approximately, 12 officers were sentenced in penal law. This indicates a strong need for training and leadership guidance. IT depicts a chronic lack of professional knowledge and management.⁷³ *Quota-based policing* is still mandated. According to the latest research of the Brennan Center For Justice, police quotas do not make communities safer—they prevent officers from focusing on larger public safety issues and damage civilian trust in law enforcement. (footnote: Brennan Center for Justice, 2022) The local quota-based policing has also proven to be a violation of constitutional human rights. Police officers, instead of focusing on larger crimes, turn into revenue collectors for the Prosecutors' Office. In 2022 the Prosecutors' Office had a target of collecting 1.5 million guilders in fines, and collected 1.8 million. The results for 2023 are not known. This is both an integrity and leadership concern. 2024 results are not yet available.


Finally, the force is fragile due to the **aging out of the force** and the last of recruitment and trainees. More experienced officers are leaving due to retirement age, than new officers are recruited. Since 2017 less than 30 new recruits have joined the force, while more than 70 of experienced officers have left. (age retirement scale depicted below)⁷⁴

⁷² Jaarverstag 2021, 2022, Openbaar Ministerie Curaçao

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/outlawing-police-quotas>

Uitstroom ivm pensioen per jaar (2017 t/m 2031)



Already in mid-2017, both the police leadership and the political administration of Willemstad knew that in the period from 2017 to 2024, 191 employees would reach the age of 60 and 65 employees would reach the age of 65. With the retirement age (65) reached and the Early Retirement (VUT) offer, a total of 256 experienced personnel have left the ranks of the police. In addition, a number of police officers, unknown to me, were dismissed at their own request or due to disciplinary offences. A number have also lost their lives. In the same period (2017 – 2024), barely 26 aspirants were trained as basic professionals. The result of recent recruitment and selection activities (in deviation from laws and regulations) is unclear. The capacity of the police training institute to deliver respectable numbers, without compromising quality, should also be questioned. In any case, in the next 3 years (duration of basic training), 95 police officers will reach the age of 60 and 89 will reach the age of 65. The organization is therefore heading full speed towards a low point in personnel shortages, which is already being felt in the community, despite the fact that the glaring shortages, without an identifiable legal basis, tend to be supplemented with the use of (para)military organizations. For the time being, there will be no question of a “high-quality, fully-fledged and professional police force” as prescribed by the Police Kingdom Act.⁷⁵

- As part of the “Landspaketten” some agreements have been made with regards to border protection (read: to reduce corruption). For that reason, there is a deployment of Koninklijke Marechaussee at the borders doing border control (immigration duties). However, legislation in order for them to have authority in doing so has not been adapted. The “Uitvoeringsbesluit LTU (PB 2012 no 7 GT) states that immigration duties can only be performed by “ontschepingsambtenaren” (disembarkation officer) who are defined as being: the police officer charged with checking admission or immigration officer. Since the Marechaussee are NOT police-officers in accordance with the “Rijkswet Politie 2010” they cannot obtain authority for immigration duties from the current legislation.
- The lack of qualified border control officers has led to the deployment of call takers and intakers of the police department. Again, no legislation has been adapted for them to obtain legal authority.
- The Koninklijke Marechaussee as well as other bodies of the military (Marines) are deployed into performing “civil” police duties. (investigations, event public order, roadblocks etc.) There is no legislation except in case of calamities to legalize such actions.
- There is no legal basis for the armed forces to carry weapons (in conflict with the Arms Ordinance 1931). Same goes for the Landsrecherche and Interpol as a result of separation from the police-organization.
- There is a misuse of public capacity in recording video’s showing “results” obtained by the minister.

⁷⁵ Article 7 sub 1 of the Police Kingdom Act <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0028079/2010-10-10>

- The poignant lack of police-capacity due to poor (human) resource management has led to overload of the active force leading to law enforcement fatigue, especially considering the lack of adequate equipment. Actual average officer age is 46, was 26 in the 80's.
- Violation of the Separation of Church and State: On request of the Adventist Church Association (letter dated March 3, 2024, signed by Charles Manuela and Sharrel Francisca), the Minister of Justice ordered police-units to perform roadblocks to allow members of the congregation to approach occupants of the stopped cars for religious purposes.

Overall Score: 1

Since the last report, more than fifty percent of the characteristics of the level 2 ratings have been evidenced. The police protect the citizens to some degree in some areas, but there are greater concerns regarding greater need for training, neutrality, and professionalism. There is a pattern of lack of respect for human rights and an increase in incidents of excessive force. Adjusted policy of the prosecutor to prosecute police officers in firearms use has rendered the police to be cautious in approaching an emergency situation. The lack of presence of the police have caused merchants to purchase service from private security firms to protect their properties. *This has further deteriorated due to the facts mentioned before.*⁷⁶

Professional: score D

Civilian control is weak and sporadic, but some systems are in place. Training, uniforms, pay, and weapons are not adequate. Corruption is a major problem, and human rights abuses are reported with regularity.

Civilian control takes place by means of recordings and pictures with smart phones. In some cases, the press is also present, albeit it from a distance.

The police generally receive training regarding i.e., pre-court procedures (warrants, arrests, custody, etc.). Payment is not competitive, nor does it create conditions to discourage corruption. It is common for officers to get promotions and more responsibilities, while maintaining the same level of salary.

Misuse of power is not uncommon. It is also generally accepted for an officer to make use of resources of the force for personal purpose (for example, check a plate number), or to intervene on behalf of friends and family while off-duty, though making use of the profession to influence private disputes.

Human rights abuses are reported frequently, specifically infringements of the right to an attorney during interrogations, right to privacy, fair trails (bad translation of police reports, prosecutor often inserts last-minute documents to lawyers, etc.).

Legitimate: score D

As stated above, three areas of vulnerability have put the police force at risk. The screening criteria has been altered to give less qualified candidates the opportunity to serve which has resulted in a lower quality of police service. The aging out of the force and the lack of new recruits created a force with less officers to do street work, which results in overtime and stress.

The system is perceived as biased, i.e., when prosecuting high-profile suspects. Often people that are or might be a threat to the established order will get prosecuted, while people belonging to the administration do not. The system is also ineffective and archaic in its design and service model.

Representative: score C

The police are representative of the population and do not largely favor one group(s). The police are representative of the population, consisting mostly of local men and women. The prosecutor's office is less

⁷⁶ Jaarverstag 2021, 2022, Openbaar Ministerie Curaçao

fairly represented. High-profile cases regarding former or present political figures are often led by a European-Dutch prosecutor, not a local, in order to safeguard against local bias in cases.

Judiciary

The scope of this section is the laws and regulations, and the system of law courts that administer justice and constitute the judicial branch of government.

Background

Curaçao has a civil law system, which entails that *codified laws* and statutes are regarded as the primary source of law, as opposed to common law systems which are present in the Commonwealth of Nations (former British Empire), in which case law is regarded as the primary source of law.

At the center of the civil law system of Curaçao is the Curaçao Civil Code (**CCC**), which contains the core civil laws and regulation. It is noteworthy to mention that the CCC resembles for the most part the Dutch Civil Code, as Curaçao forms part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and thus must make sure that there is a certain level of uniformity of laws amongst the other countries of the kingdom.

Curacao's judiciary knows 3 instances:

1. The Court of First Instance, which is an organizational part of the Joint Court of Justice Aruba, Curaçao, St. Maarten, and of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba;
2. The Joint Court of Justice, which functions primarily as a court of appeal;
3. The Supreme Court, which is established in the Netherlands.

When evaluating the judicial system, it is important to also consider that it consists of various legal areas, some of which are more dependent and/or intertwined with the government and/or governmental entities than others.

- **Civil law** cases, for example, pertains to legal relationships between (legal) persons and thus have little outside influence from the government in day-to-day activities. It is in this procedure that parties can claim damage repair, either due to a contract infringement or an unlawful act by another person or company. Examples of civil cases include contractual infringements, employment conflicts, unlawful acts, corporate disputes, family disputes and more.
- **Administrative law** procedures are procedures between the government or an organization with governing authority on the one hand, and a person or legal entity on the other hand. This procedure is often initiated as a result of legal disputes arising due to conflicts about, or non-compliance with, laws and regulations. Think for example of tax, immigration and permit issues.
- **Criminal law** concerns the rules is a procedure between the government – represented by the Public Prosecution's Office (Dutch: "*Openbaar Ministerie*") – and the suspect. Common examples are cases relating to fraud, theft, money laundering and forgery cases.

Overall Assessment Score: 3

The judicial system has established procedures and experienced judicial personnel, although the system needs strengthening. It is considered somewhat ineffective and sometimes perceived to lack independence. The rights to a speedy trial, fair legal representation, and access to evidence are generally protected. Punishment is commensurate with the crimes. Cases of corruption and nepotism are sporadic.

Professional: score C

The judicial system may not be considered to be completely independent or effective. It may lack resources or there may be excessive political interference. Corruption is sporadic.

- Certain groups in society often express the notion that the judicial system is not always considered to be completely independent. This ‘public opinion’ is often expressed in high-profile cases by citizens, particularly in the sphere of criminal law, and to a lesser extent also in administrative law cases. This question, however, is whether this is due to gaps in our legal systems. A judge is not allowed to decide in a manner that is not in conformity with laws. Therefore, ineffective laws can result in ineffective court decisions.
- Lack of resources: the court might need resources to equip itself with more judges and staff, which in turn would accelerate certain processes.
- Excessive political interference: There is no evidence that there is an excessive amount of political interference, therefore it would be reckless to conclude so.
- Corruption is sporadic. There is no evidence that there is an excessive amount of corruption, therefore it would be reckless to conclude so.
- Unbiases of judges is not guaranteed due to concerns about the professional qualities of the prosecutors and judges.⁷⁷
- The recent decision to introduce a “small claims court” is an additional good step in reducing lead times. There is not, however, transparency to the community as to how the court is perceived.

Legitimate: score C

The rule of law is somewhat established within the country. Individuals within the judicial system may be perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or biased but the system as a whole is in place.

- The traditional rule of law is well established within the country, although the development of new laws is stagnated, which seems to be due to the lack of priority given by law makers. There are also indications that certain people or groups of power, influence law and policy makers on what to do and what not to do. Therefore, it can be concluded that the rule of law is outdated.
- One must consider that the judiciary is bound to the rule of law (for example laws regarding the transportation of people). Therefore, outdated and/or incomplete laws can lead to ineffective court decisions (despite being legally correct). Judges are in principle not allowed to deviate from the rule of law.
- . A professional perception survey/study is much needed to address the trust level of this organization in society.

Representative: score C

The judicial system is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).

- The judiciary, specifically the judges, consists preliminary of Dutch natives (one ethnic group).
- High-profile criminal cases against individuals that might pose a threat to the established order, for example against former politicians that ran anti-Netherlands campaigns, are mostly preceded by Dutch judges
- There is no evidence that suggest that the judiciary favors its own group above the locals, but there is indication that decisions are sometimes based on Dutch norms instead of local norms and standards.

The Civil Service

Overall assessment: score 1

Based on the CAST Framework capacity indicators that assess the Civil Service, Curaçao scored 2 on a scale of 0 – 5. When analyzing the criteria for a professional civil service that is representative and which has the support of the people, the Curaçao government scores very low.

⁷⁷ Antwoorden Kamervragen over officieren van Justitie die in de fout zijn gegaan, 14.01.2020

There is evidence that those small island states that devolve into a more autonomous status, customize their government structure, and often enter shared services agreements within the Kingdom or Commonwealth or within the Region. This strategy reduces the size and cost of government and increases productivity of the autonomous government in its key role of fulfilling social and economic functions. Curaçao may be a small island nation but has the tasks and responsibilities of a full-blown country, with a large, deep harbor, international airport, health care system that needs to support itself, international borders (although this is done in cooperation with the Netherlands).

In 2019, following a “size of government” study, there was a discussion for the government to redesign the government, keeping specific core tasks within its own organization and outsourcing other tactical or operational tasks, therefore, being slim and more focused on strategy/policy and laws and related tasks and, therefore, have fewer public servants, cost less and be more effective. This plan was not executed. Instead, every minister increased the number of political advisors, and while continuing to offer early retirements to civil servants, consultants were hired, and the size of the civil service and cost of the civil service was not reduced as was planned. No plan was implemented to maintain institutional memory within the civil service. The consequences for the increase of ministerial decrees and ministerial communiques have not yet been fully felt. This way of work is a direct threat to the continuous of democratic governance.

The Covid 19 pandemic brought many challenges and recommendations for Curaçao, with the assistance of the Netherlands. Curaçao overcame some of those challenges but with the short-term win also came with Landpakket (2021).

Corruption continues to be a major concern on Curaçao. Smallness allows for a closer relationship between the state and its citizens. Easy access to key decision-makers allows for a more consultative policy process and, thereby, yields policies that are founded on broad-based consensus. However, with smallness there is a greater risk of conflict of interest, nepotism, and cronyism. The current government has, as stated in a previous part of this chapter, transferred aspects of independent civil services to its political advisors further weakening the service and creating a more fragile state. This further erodes public confidence in government and its capacity to serve its people.

Based on the CAST Framework capacity indicators that assess the Civil Service, Curaçao scored 1 on a scale of 0 – 5. When analyzing the criteria for a professional civil service that is representative and which has the support of the people, the Curaçao government scores very low. The progress report of Q1 2024 reports small improvements within the civil service yet to this date no major reforms has been executed. The civil servants of Curaçao are by law the main actors responsible to carry out the reforms, however, with no strategic direction, one must ask which direction the government is heading with the civil service.⁷⁸

Professional: score E

The civil service is largely ineffective, highly politicized, suffers from low level of skills, management, and funding, is perceived as corrupt and largely favors its own group (small community, political tribalism). Rather than ensuring that skilled people are in place to provide effective and efficient services, friends, family, and political supporters are rewarded with positions without merit. Overtime, this practice has eroded the representativeness of the community at large. Curaçao models its government structure after that of the Kingdom, the structure is large, costly and may not serve the small island nation as well as other more customized government structures may. The Landspakket’s main objective is to have structural reforms within the government, however, the key to success lays with having a clear strategic vision and mission which is lacking. In order to change there is an urgent need to improve the human resource management system within the whole body of the government.

One key aspect of modernization lies in developing a compensation system that is designed to attract and retain the necessary talent within the civil service. By aligning salaries and benefits with market standards, Curaçao can ensure it is able to attract skilled professionals who are essential for driving effective governance and service

⁷⁸ Landspakket Curaçao uitvoerings agenda 1 jan – 31 maart 2024

delivery. Additionally, implementing performance-based incentives can motivate civil servants to perform at their best, fostering a culture of excellence and continuous improvement.

The reforms envisioned in the Lands packet (country package) are aimed at improving the overall quality of the government organization. This includes enhancing the skill sets of civil servants, streamlining processes, and adopting modern technologies that enable efficient service delivery. By investing in training and capacity-building initiatives, Curaçao can equip its civil service with the necessary skills and tools to meet the evolving needs of its citizens.⁷⁹

The government needs to keep specific core tasks within its own organization and to outsource other tactical or operational tasks, therefore, being slim and more focused on strategy/policy and laws tasks, and needing fewer public servants, costing less and being more effective. There needs to be internal and external controls on the system to have checks and balances on the system's civil service neutrality and effectiveness.

Corruption continues to be a major concern on Curaçao as was first reported in the 2020 FSI report. Due to the transfer of power to political advisors and away from the Civil Service, the erosion of an independent civil service continues. Both the intake and exit of personnel is not according to legal procedures. The reduction in law revisions and new law development and the increase in ministerial decrees and ministerial communiqués, and the lack of collaborative and cooperative decision-making within the council of ministers indicate the lack of willingness of decision-makers allows for a more consultative policy process.⁸⁰ Policies that narrow input creating the greater risk of conflict of interest, nepotism, and cronyism.

The recent arrest and release of a member of the parliament on forgery charges and supreme court verdict on the term "convicted of a crime" as referred to in the National Ordinance on the Integrity of (Candidate) Ministers of the country of Curaçao weakens the already damaged public view on the civil servants.^{81 82}

There are no longer internal controls to check the quality of neither decisions nor the skill levels necessary to ensure a skilled civil service. Since the last FSI report there is no data showing that there has been drastic change of the quality assurance nor that there is a plan for the near future. This leads researchers to wonder what is being done to implement quality management systems to improve the working environment of the public servants.⁸³

Because of the lack of access to annual reports and state-owned enterprise-operating decisions, it is extremely difficult for civil society and stakeholders to perform its role as watchdog.

The example of the miscarriage of governance, and misinformation regarding the "travel with minors" laws, accompanied by a poor information campaign led to the unnecessary panic and distrust of government due to the Ministry of Justice changes to the travel with minors laws and regulations continues. Other examples of sudden changes actualized through ministerial decrees, communiqués and individual minister decisions without approval of Parliament, continue to erode the confidence of leadership.

Legitimate: score E

In the past 13 years there has been political and political party instability causing changes in government representation in parliament these uncertainties have caused difficulty in creating and execute policy in benefiting

⁷⁹ <https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/local/modernizing-curacaos-civil-service-to-enhance-efficiency-and-public-services/>

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ https://curacao.nu/parlements/rennox-calmes-aangehouden-voor-vasheid_in_geschrifte/

⁸² <https://www.hogeraad.nl/actueel/nieuwsoverzicht/2024/juni/hoge-raad-term-veroordeeld-wegens-misdrijf-bedoeld-landsverordening>

⁸³ RapportageProjectVerbetervoorstellenAmbtelijk20Topstructuur MD topkader en Bestuursdienst, versie 1.03.pdf

the nation. The decrease of financial investment in the human capital, training and development has resulted in a decrease of efficiency in the departments of the civil service.⁸⁴ The human resource department continuously overrides in its policies regarding the addition of new personnel, this resulting in signs of nepotism and cronyism.

It is noted that both the land package action list and the subsequent progress reports a need for a more efficient and effective civil service organization is mentioned but so far, no concrete design or tangible actions have been taken toward delivering a more effective civil organization.

Hiring and product delivery are not very representative of the country's population, and the needs of the citizens are often ignored or go unaddressed. There are not sufficient checks and balances procedures in place to correct institutional weaknesses. A recent report on the remarkable case of the former Aqualectra Director Mr. Jonis shows that the former CEO not only ignored his authority limit but exceeded his authority which gives the impression that there have been (or have been) unbusinesslike agreement with third parties.

The population cannot depend upon the civil service to serve it appropriately. Consequently, the civil service does not have the respect from the population. It is perceived as completely corrupt or biased.

Representative: score E

Since the last FSI assessment the policies have been further compromised and biased this to the disadvantage of the community. The civil service is largely ineffective, highly politicized, suffers from low level of skills, management, and funding, is perceived as corrupt and largely favors its own group (small community, political tribalism). Rather than ensuring that skilled people are in place to provide effective and efficient services, friends, family, and political supporters are rewarded with positions without merit. Overtime, this practice has eroded the representativeness of the community at large.

Compliance with policies, laws, and regulations is crucial for the effective functioning of civil service organizations. There is no publicly available info on what the civil service reforms mentioned in the land package are in terms of content, nor what the exact state of affairs is from a policy cycle perspective.

But regardless of the above, it goes without saying that compliance of the new reforms or initiatives to be introduced may not be sustainable or successful, without a strong compliance and enforcement framework to avoid undue influence.

Incorporating compliance enforcement mechanisms into new reforms and initiatives as part of the land package can help ensure their sustainability and success. It is essential for civil service organizations to have robust systems in place to monitor, assess, and enforce compliance with relevant policies, laws, and regulations to achieve their objectives and maintain public trust.

Because of the lack of transparency, citizens need to accept more responsibility in holding the civil service accountable for its effectiveness and efficiencies in serving the population, but it has not. Accountability and responsibility play a reciprocal role in the government's effective and efficient delivery of services; however, the lack of trust in government has weakened this important role. Cooperation between government, civil society and business community must be in balance, but it is not.

Summary and Conclusions:

Before presenting the overall scores as summary and conclusion to this chapter, the comparisons to other indexes must be shared.

⁸⁴ DashboardRegeerprogramma

Social Progress Comparison

Social progress is the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential. Key to this social progress is the capacity of state, in all five areas of its capacities, to provide the laws, policies and processes to meet these basic needs. The most important aspects of social progress are not present as Curacao does not provide for its people’s most essential needs. The building blocks in place for individuals and communities to enhance and sustain wellbeing are not provided through policy, procedure and programming. And lastly, there is not opportunity for all individuals to reach their full potential.

State Resilience Index Comparison

Again, in this chapter, the importance of the relationship between resilience and fragility must be stated. In the State Resilience Index, the capacity the country has for managing these pressures in each sector is examined. These pressures are critical to cohesion and resilience. When looking at the three capacity areas of the State Capacity: responsibility, legitimacy, and representativeness, the pressures have not been managed.

In the table below, the actual language of the indicators and key characteristic of the FSI are summarized and the overall score for the capacity area and for the subsets of the competencies that make up the capacities of state are sited. In the text of the evaluators, there may be degrees of compliance within the Likert scaling or key characteristics, but the data would indicate that the scores fall within the range of the agreed-upon Likert number or grade.

Capacity Area	Overall Score	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
Leadership	<p>2</p> <p>Descriptor: Not all characteristics are present to sustain a score of 3. There is a clear erosion of leadership. Elections are considered flawed but acceptable. There may be some corruption, but it is either limited in scope or is dealt with adequately by the legal system. Power is maintained largely through providing services to the citizens but there may be some evidence of patronage networks and political opposition is weak. Individual leaders may be considered corrupt, illegitimate, or incompetent by the population, but the system is respected. A system of checks and balances does not operate and needs greater oversight and stronger enforcement mechanisms. (note several aspects received a lower rating)</p>	<p>D</p> <p>Descriptor: The leadership is not effective and does not look after society. Even if there are elections, stability and tenure may be based on oppression, patronage and/or nepotism. Corruption is a major issue.</p>	<p>D</p> <p>Descriptor: The leadership has little respect or trust from the population. It is perceived as highly corrupt.</p>	<p>E</p> <p>Descriptor: The leadership is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or services only its group(s).</p>
Military	<p>5</p> <p>The military is under strong civilian and legal control and can defend the country against external threats. It also can undertake international missions</p>	<p>A</p> <p>There is a strong civilian and legal control of the military. It can defend the</p>	<p>A</p> <p>The military is highly respected by the population and not politicized.</p>	<p>A</p> <p>The military is highly representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group(s).</p>

	as appropriate and is respected by foreign militaries. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare and are investigated and prosecuted appropriately under a system of law. (based on NL Military protection)	country as well as undertake international missions. Positions are merit based. Issues regarding corruption or abuses occur rarely and are handled appropriately.	It is perceived as being able to protect the country and undertake international missions as appropriate.	
Police	1 The police protect the citizens to some degree in some areas, but there are also concerns regarding greater need for training, neutrality, and professionalism. There are reports of sporadic human rights abuses, but they generally are considered to respect human rights. There may be incidences of excessive use of force.	D Civilian control is weak and sporadic, but some systems are in place. Training, uniforms, pay, and weapons are not adequate. Corruption is a major problem and human rights abuses are reported with regularity.	D The police are not trusted by the population. There are still officers that protect citizens and uphold the law. The system and individuals in it are perceived as corrupt or biased or ineffective.	C The police are composed primarily of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).
Judiciary	3 The judicial system has established procedures and experienced judicial personnel, although the system needs strengthening. It is considered somewhat ineffective and sometimes perceived to lack independence. The rights to a speedy trial, fair legal representation, and access to evidence are generally protected. Punishment is commensurate with the crimes. Cases of corruption and nepotism are sporadic.	C The judicial system may not be considered to be completely independent or effective. It may lack resources or there may be excessive political interference. Corruption is sporadic.	C The rule of law is somewhat established within the country. Individuals within the judicial system may be perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or biased but the system is in place.	C The judicial system is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s)
Civil Service	1 The civil service is largely ineffective and lacks proper management, skills, and resources. Corruption (in the forms of conflict of interest, nepotism and cronyism) is a major problem. Hiring and product delivery are not very representative of the country's population, and the needs of the citizens are often ignored or go unaddressed. The population cannot depend upon the civil service to serve it appropriately.	E The civil service is perceived and, by outputs, is ineffective and incompetent due to the lack of management, skills, and funding. Position is based on oppression, identity, political affiliation, and or nepotism. Corruption is endemic.	E The civil service no respect from the population. It is perceived as highly corrupt and politically influenced.	E The civil service is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its group(s) and favors nepotism and cronyism in its representative service.
	0-5(5 high)	A-E (A superior)	A-E	A-E

These indicators are intended to be used as guidance tools for institutional reform and country strengthening with the goal being a strong, resilient governance system. Close examination of the areas of weakness can provide specifics related to growth targets in the governance structure, its processes, policies, and people development.

These results become a part of the larger more comprehensive Fragile States Index (FSI) analyses which measures many more aspects of resilience by way of cohesion, economics, politics, and social and cross-cutting indicators.


Dashboards

A ranking alone, in the end, is meaningless; it is the underlying scores, and as far as they can be determined, the specific root causes, and drivers of instability that must be recognized and addressed.

In the Country Report, the assessment results aim to point to the root causes which are further explained in the Recommendations and Conclusions section of the document. The conclusions have been arrived at from the qualitative and quantitative data available when measured against the FSI indicators. The concern expressed in the 2020 FSI report regarding the lack of data must again be emphasized. However, of further concern is the diminished availability of local data. In addition to the evidence that the country has not addressed specific root causes and drivers of instability, the lack of data requires the researchers to give low scores across some of the indicators. Below are various infographic representations of these overarching conclusions that provide a baseline for annual comparisons. A detailed list of recommendations to address the root causes and drivers of instability can be found in the complete research report.


Country Dashboard:

The Country Data Dashboard gives an overview of this country’s ranking and scores across the FSI Cohesion, Political, Economic, and Social and Cross Cutting indicators.




There was a possible total of 120 points indicating the most fragile state. Curaçao’s score was 96, a loss of 5 points. Curaçao’s rank within the 179 countries measured in 2024 was 17: the most resilient rank was 179, the most fragile rank was 1. The dashboard shows the scores in each of the indicator areas and some global and regional results. Countries that were ranked 15th, 16th, and 17th respectively were Nigeria, Libya and Guinea.

The Effects On Resilience Iceberg shows the distribution of the vulnerabilities across the four indicator areas and the even distribution of weaknesses across these indicators resulting in the conclusion that all areas have an almost equal distribution of the specific root causes and drivers of instability.



The FSI Capacity of State rubric reveals the grade given the professionalism, the legitimacy, and representation of the five areas of the state capacity supplement. The overall scores indicate that the weakest areas are the police and the civil service followed by leadership. The details in the complete report divulge specific root causes and drivers of instability contributing to the country's fragility.

Strength of Capacities of State Effect on Resilience



Fragile States Index Country Rankings 2024

For Longitudinal Comparison

South American Neighboring Countries			Caribbean/ CARICOM			Country: Same Ranking as Curaçao		Small Island Nations			Longitudinal Comparison	
	2024	2023		2024	2023			2024	2023		2024	2023
Columbia	63	59	Antigua & Barbuda	127		Guinea	Cuba	112	117	Barbados	140	140
Venezuela	30	29	Bahamas	135	134	Libya	Fiji	94	82	Finland	178	177
			Barbados	140	140	Nigeria	Ireland	172	171	Haiti	9	10
			Dom. Rep.	108	110		Maldives	107	106	Iceland	177	178
			Grenada	127	127		Malta	158	158	Malta	158	158
			Guyana	111	109		Mauritius	151	154	Netherlands	170	169
			Haiti	9	10		Samoa	101	101	Singapore	165	165
			Jamaica	109	108		Seychelles	130	128			
			Suriname	113	116		Singapore	165	165			
			Trin/Tobago	125	130							

The above table of selected country rankings and the below table of those countries charted across quartiles are presented to provide a range of countries to make direct comparisons to Curaçao results. The below table expresses the spread, or dispersion, of these countries across the range of all countries from lowest to highest levels of resilience. It expresses the most vulnerable in the lowest quartile and the least fragile in the highest quartile. It gives another view of the comparisons that can be made, not just against the criteria but with other countries.

Selected Country Rankings Charted Across Quartiles 2024 (scores were rounded up where necessary for comparison)

Bottom Quartile -25% FSI Rank: 0-44			Lower Middle Quartile 25-49% FSI Rank: 45-89			Upper Middle Quartile 50-74% FSI Rank: 90-134			Top Quartile 75-100% FSI Rank: 135-179		
	2024	2023		2024	2023		2024	2023		2024	2023
Hiati ↓	9	10	Brazil	10		Fiji ↑	96	82	Barbados ⇄	140	140
Curacao ↓	17	28	Columbia ↑	63	59	Samoa ↓	101	104	Mauritius ↓	151	154
Congo ↑	29	28				Dom. Rep. ↑	108	100	Malta ⇄	158	158
Venezuela ↑	30	29				Jamaica ↑	109	108	Singapore ⇄	165	165
Iraq ↑	31	28				Guyana ↑	111	109	Ireland ↑	172	171
						Cuba ↓	112	117	Iceland ↓	177	178
						Suriname ↓	113	116	Finland ↑	178	177
						Trin/Tobago ↓	125	130	Norway ↑	179	176
						Grenada ⇄	127	127			
						Antigua & Barbuda	127				
						Seychelles ↑	130	128			
						Bahamas ↑	135	134			

Compared to the results of 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, the countries that were identified and compared with Curaçao and whose results also fell in 2024 rankings were Samoa and Brazil. Fiji was a country that moved to a higher quartile from the lower middle to the upper middle quartile in 2022 and remained there in 2023. Antigua and Barbuda also rose to the upper middle quartile.

Countries with scores of 10 and below are considered “failed states”. Those between 10-20 are considered on “High Alert”. Those countries that remain in the lowest quartile are those that have remained most fragile across all areas of the index. This means that, as a country, they have not been able to identify or/and address, nor do they have the national will or capacity to address the root causes of their fragility.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

Introduction:

Although the intent of the Fragile States Index is to measure fragility of a society, it inversely measures Resilience. For we know that the capacity of a system, enterprise, or person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changing circumstances is Resilience. Resilient Societies design, redesign organizations, institutions, and systems to better absorb disruption, operate under a wide variety of conditions, and shift more fluently from one circumstance to the next.

Crucial factors for future societies such as sustainable environment and social planning design will not be able to offer adequate tools to deal with upcoming challenges without improving knowledge of resilience in a networked and interconnected multi-level governance approach on local, regional, national, international, and global levels. To best identify how to become more resilient, countries must first look at their fragility and identify areas of weakness to improve.

Countries with weak or corrupt institutions not only lack the capacity, resources, and political will to combat organized crime, but sometimes have a vested interest in allowing its presence. They allow criminal groups to control territory, establish criminal infrastructure and operate with impunity. According to each FSI report, this continues to be Curaçao's greatest threat to resilience as it affects economic growth, political/democratic principles, social cohesion and cross cutting aspects of society. For instance, as stated in the InSight Crime report, *Latin America Organized Crime Study for the Kingdom of the Netherlands*, transnational organized crime can operate with such success due to the low state resilience and resistance to its operations and influence in many countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Resilience can be built in many ways. Legislative frameworks such as penal codes and anti-money laundering frameworks, for example, provide the tools required to tackle organized crime. Institutional strength determines the capacity of security and judicial institutions to combat organized crime, particularly the establishment of specialized units like anti-narcotics police and dedicated organized crime prosecutors. At the top, in a democratic government, there should be transparent leadership, promoting a healthy civil society and a private sector that takes an aggressive stance against criminality and corruption. The greatest deterrent to transnational organized crime and the drug trade is high national resilience.

Further, Institutional strengthening is at the core of setting a strong foundation on which a more resilient nation can be built. To differentiate between those institutions important for building state capacity and nation-building is essential to addressing the fragile state findings. Building state capacity includes cross sectoral attributes including integrity, democracy, public finance, data management, civil service, and media. Nation building, or forging “a common sense of nationhood”, aims at the unification of the people within the state, first by providing the basic social and economic needs to its people and then constructing and structuring a national identity using the capacities of the state.

The Fragile States Index addresses both capacities of state and nation-building. To be sure that this is recognized, two areas of the FSI that look at the nation building can be recognized: Cohesion and Social and Cross-cutting Indicators. These indicators highlight aspects of nation building.

There are three main reasons *why* nation-building is addressed:

First, **a viable state needs a national identity as a framework that holds people and communities together despite the many differences.** It would be risky to build exclusively on the capacities of the state as the foundation to keep people together. If economic or political power is the sole mechanism to make the state function and legitimate, the state with power (authority) and capacities will fail on its legitimacy and is very likely to remain fragile or to relapse into fragility. A viable state can never depend on power relations and power-sharing agreements alone. The resilient nation-state requires a framework that is solid. Nation-building, a shared identity, and a sense of belonging that surpass all sorts of boundaries, is the necessary complementary framework to hold people together in a sustainable relationship.

Secondly, **a well-organized and just state will not guarantee that a community flourishes**. Besides well-organized institutions that provide justice, the sense of belonging by individuals based on an emotional commitment is necessary. Respect for rights and equity is the basis for a deeper, emotional relationship that binds people together. Love for the nation is a complementary element for a just society. Especially in fragile states, where crises (chronic or acute) occur frequently, a commitment deeper than that of the contractual relation between people and the state is necessary. Building a state requires people who feel responsible for the development of the nation-state even if they cannot pinpoint their immediate self-interest. Solidarity and sacrifice are necessary ingredients of the process of building a viable nation-state.

Thirdly, the reality of fragility in a globalizing context prompts the need to invest in nation-building. In today's world, **nation-building is a necessary process for fragile states to become self-confident and to create autonomous space and power for people to position themselves in this globalizing world (Growth/Abundance Mindset)**. Building an inclusive culture of being proud, either because of the history, the culture, the language, or the social systems of society, is necessary for the people to take a self-confident position in the globalizing world. (Social Cohesion). With an internalized negative self-image, fragile states will remain at the lower end of the supply chain: the providers of cheap labor and raw materials for the globalized economy. Nation-building makes nation-states able to be a countervailing power to strong and powerful nation-states and to global corporations.

It goes without saying that becoming resilient, or less fragile, is a complex process. State building and institutional strengthening must operate in parallel. The core elements implicated in nation-building (identity, togetherness, loyalty, belonging, love) are more elusive, less concrete, and much more difficult to grasp than those of building state capacity. The process of nation-building cannot be designed in a 'fixing-the-nation' approach and implemented by external technical support and knowledge. Instead, they must be addressed in tandem by measuring social cohesion characteristics using recognized indicators for inclusion, equality, legitimacy, participation, recognition and belonging.


To further substantiate the FSI findings, the researchers have used triangulation with two other international multi-variable indexes that validate and further refine the understanding of resilience societies and people. These annual indexes, as described in the Preface are the State Resilience Index and the Social Progress Index. These comparisons show that all three multi-variable indexes lead to the same conclusions about the fragility of the state. The recommendation section explanation and table, these index scores have been added.

Organizational Structure of Recommendations/Interventions

In this section of the document, recommendations will be offered based on the assessment of each of the five areas of the FSI: *Cohesion, Economy, Politics, Social and Cross-Cutting, and, finally, Capacities of State*. These recommendations address all aspects of resilience, state fragility, institutional strength, including nation building.

Further, the recommendations have been reviewed according to the several prioritization systems. First, the recommendations are considered according to change management best practice guidelines that lead to real change: Looking for outcomes rather than outputs. It goes without saying that the recommendations will be aligned to the overarching aspects of "change processes". The result of this research should be to identify those outputs and outcomes that will have the greatest impact on creating a more resilient social cohesiveness in society. Those drivers should include transformative actions related to the needs for change in such things as technology, internal processes in the community, social and economic structures, and institutional restructuring.


Recommendations/interventions will be those that are related to *outcomes that will have the greatest impact*. Using a change process model, the external factors, assumptions, and risks are measured against the impact of outputs and outcomes.



From Macro to Micro to organize complex relationships among recommendations:

The recommendations/interventions have been categorized according to Macro, Meso or Micro levels of research and across the macro, meso and micro levels of the state’s political-administrative environment and states structures. Recognizing that **Macro-level** analysis is used to look at societies at large, **Meso-level** analysis focuses the study of groups, communities, and institutions and **Micro-level** analysis exams matters related to one-to-one interactions between individuals, it was determined that most of the recommendations herein are those at the **macro and meso levels**.

The recommendations, if adopted, will lead to the necessary capacity and institutional strength to support



the many recommendations that have already been named in other reports over the decades; for example, the IMF, Cft, TAC, LFDP, SONA, USONA, Growth Accord, Growth Strategy, and Mutual Arrangement 2023, to name most prominent ones. The most recent IMF, Cft, and Mutual Arrangement 2023 reports must be analyzed to determine if the laws and the institutional strength present is sufficient to support the sustainability of the recommendations of those reports.

Priority and Severity Leveling of Recommendations

In addition to the ordering of the recommendations herein from Macro to Micro, two other organizing matrices have been employed. After each recommendation was identified on the above-mentioned scale, each was also ranked according to priority and impact aligned with the following definitions. The Priority Level lays a foundation related to the timing that should be taken into consideration in addressing the vulnerability intervention. The **Priority Level** also informs the prioritization of resources to address over/under allocations and limitations. It can also inform budget building so that priority is given to the most urgent recommendations. (4 Urgent, 3 High, 2 Medium, 1 Low). The **Severity Level** is used as a classification of violations of best practice/resilience practices. The level is based on relative seriousness of each violation and the significance of the effect of the violation on the overall resilience/fragility factors of the FSI. (4 Critical, 3 Significant, 2 Minor, 0 None).

In scoring the recommendations, there are no low or absence of scores given as all the recommendations have some high degree of both priority and severity. Some are deemed Critical to the democracy and Urgent in terms of timing, needing immediate attention. In addition to the above-mentioned scoring frameworks, the recommendations have been prioritized against each other and in relationship to each other. By using these three measurements, much more meaning can be given to the recommendations.

Defining Categories of Recommendations:

The recommendations are represented in several ways: First as a listing of recommendations either general or prioritized as defined below, and then in a table that shows them by themes of resilience, areas of the FSI, subareas of assessment the FSI, intervention/recommendation, level of impact, level of priority, and level of severity, those showing the interrelatedness of the recommendations.

General:

Recommendations that address overall systemic reforms that when implemented across all sectors will strengthen the capacities of state and the community to create a foundation for resilient behaviors.

There are 51 *General* recommendations made because of the findings. A majority of these recommendations were first made in the 2020 FSI research. Because of the interrelatedness of the recommendations, to isolate a few would diminish the impact and could become misleading as to the importance of each recommendation to each other and the whole. Deep discussions as to those that are most important, urgent and critical led us to the conclusion that most important to stress is that for the country to move toward resilience, urgent and critical attention must be given to *all* best practice recommendations to build the necessary foundation to support a long term agile, flexible, and resilient democracy.

Again, it must be reinforced that these recommendations have been organized by themes of resilience and the areas, and subareas, of the FSI that are impacted. In most cases, there are more than one area of impact noted per recommendation/intervention. Due to the need to improve the desired standing in the global community, several of the institutional recommendations have been placed in the general recommendations section because of the urgency needed and the severity of the weakness. Some of the prioritized institutional recommendations are foundational and, without them, the other prioritized institutional recommendations cannot be realized. For these reasons, these recommendations appear in the general recommendations list.

In the Appendices of this document, the prioritized Meso and Micro level recommendations/interventions are also elaborated in the table using the same prioritization criteria. These recommendations address weaknesses at lower capacity levels within institutions.

General Recommendations/Interventions:

Unless otherwise noted, the following recommendations were made in the Baseline FSI Report of 2020. Unfortunately, few if any of these recommendations have been acted upon successfully. Therefore, they remain in this report and will continue to be listed until they are addressed. Any additional recommendations/interventions will be added with the year added as well.

To strengthen democracy, create prosperity and realize human potential, which will be conducive to a more resilient society, attention should be given to the following themes of Resilience. The recommendations have been organized as follows:

Relevant intervention: The recommended interventions are correlated to the above mentioned FSI indicators and the Social Progress Indicators.

Individual FSI indicators influenced by the recommendation: The FSI and SRI focus on five categories of indicators which are interdependent on each other and have specific sub-indicators that inform the rankings for the five categories of fragility and/or resilience.

FSI Assessment area according to sub-indicators: Here are indicated the specific 12 FSI indicators and 3 SPI indicators that are used to focus data collection, findings and recommendations.

Cluster for Level of Impact, Priority level, and Severity Level with Trend Indicators. The Social Progress Index framework focuses on three distinct (though related) questions:

1. Does a country provide for its people's most essential needs?
2. Are the building blocks in place for individuals and communities to enhance and sustain wellbeing?
3. Is there opportunity for all individuals to reach their full potential?

Effect on Social Progress Index: Here the positive or negative impact on the three aspects of social progress are indicated.

The Pillars of the State Resilience Index are also noted in the language of the recommendations and interventions: **Inclusion, Social Cohesion, State Capacity, Individual Capabilities, Environment and Ecology, Economy, and Civic Space.** All of these affect the entire population and require a national strategy.



Recommendations/Interventions Table

These are recommendations and interventions at the MACRO level updated annually since 2020

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index		
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)		
						↗ Improved ⇨ No change ↘ More severe or urgent							
									Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity		
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Revision of Law and Constitutional Amendments Create, revise, synchronize or eliminate the following laws: Staatsregeling Curacao, Regelgeving voor Good Governance, Onderstandsregeling Arbeidsregeling 2000, Landsverordening Beëndiging, Arbeidsovereenkomsten (Lei di Retiru), Lei di Bion, Vestigingsregeling, Vergunningsregeling, Wet Economische delicten- Administratieve boetes, Algemeen verbindend verklaring (AVV), Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (CAO), Wet Arbeid en Zorg (WAZO), Werkloosheidswet, Arbeidsmarktwet, Landsverordening Secundaire Beroepsopleiding, Concept landsverordening beroepspraktijkvorming, Landsverordening Werkend lerend, Law on National Savings Plan, Regeling Maatschappelijke Zorg, Lv. Arbeid door Vreemdeling, Lv. Toelating en Uitzetting, Stageregeling, Landsverordening Instelling, Arbeidsburo (Arbeidsvoorzieningenwet), Social Security Laws (4): medical care, dismissal without cause, old age pension, accident insurance	Cohesion Political Economic Social and Cross Cutting Capacity of State	Refugees and IDPs State Legitimacy Human Flight and Brain Drain Uneven Economic Development Economic Decline External Interventions Leadership	Macro	Urgent	↗	Critical	⇨	Yes, revision of old age pension age/payments	Pos.	Neg.	Neg.

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Revision of Law and Constitutional Amendments Develop and Adopt a Resilience Policy with an operative framework that has as its foundation the understanding of interdependent systems operating at different scales	Cohesion Political Economic Social and Cross Cutting Capacity of State	Refugees and IDPs State Legitimacy Human Flight and Brain Drain Uneven Economic Development Economic Decline External Interventions Leadership	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Effective Electoral Processes and Procedures Evaluate in more depth and include/strengthen legislation to address issues such as: political party registration, access of political parties to funding and to the media, campaign financing, election results and relations of political parties with other sectors of society	Political Capacity of State	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No A new election cycle is upcoming in 2025, and no revision has taken place	Neg.	Neg.		
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Determine via data gathering those areas of open governance that must be addressed to restore trust from civil society: Measure and report status of governance legitimacy	Political Capacity of State	State Legitimacy Leadership Civil Service	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.		Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Adopt a Data Policy for the Country that includes data/information frameworks for sharing real time and accurate data across all Ministries, State-Owned Enterprises in a transparent and timely manner, internally and with the public, and that is an integral part of decision-making, and which includes interactive interfaces with society to promote a country digital highway for social and economic development	Political Capacity of State	State Legitimacy Leadership Civil Service	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	Yes, attempt but not supported by policy, policy proposed, workgroup created	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Appoint through legislation an independent entity with coordination, oversight, and dissemination of information before elections on the “state of the nation’ in all its aspects in order for the electorate to be well-informed	Political Capacity of State	State Legitimacy Leadership Civil Service	Meso	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Media and Communications Create, implement, and support strong independent institutions such as an investigative press and watchdog organizations	Political Capacity of State Cohesion	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership, Demographic Pressures, Refugee and IDP's	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No Attention given by local Human Rights Defence Organization to push changes but not achieved, but recognized by government (SER)		Neg.		




Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
				Group Grievances										
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Fight against Corruption Implement the National Integrity System designed at the request of Government 2020	Political Capacity of State Cohesion	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership, Civil Service, Group Grievances	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Fight against Corruption Promote policies, processes and mechanisms that protect the public interest, the use of disclosure of assets mechanisms for public officials in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest and incompatibilities (including their continuous monitoring), as well as other measures that increase transparency	Political Capacity of State Cohesion	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership, Civil Service, Group Grievances	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index		
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)		
							Improved No change More severe or urgent				Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Fight against Corruption Reform tax treaties related to financial services industry to comply with new tax treaties and global competition to reduce “Capital flight”	Political Capacity of State Cohesion	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership, Civil Service, Group Grievances	Macro	Medium	⇒	Critical	⇒	No Will know for sure after mid-term 2024 evaluation by AFTF	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Fight against Corruption Sign and ratify conventions against corruption, and introduce an integrity policy framework	Political Capacity of State Cohesion	State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Leadership, Civil Service, Group Grievances	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.		
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Empowering society Reinstate stakeholder tripartite dialogue platform and processes to ensure broad, representative stakeholder participation in major economic decisions for the country to meet the needs of the broader society	Cohesion Economy Capacity of State	Demographic Pressures, Refugee and IDPs, Group Grievances Human Flight and Brain	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
				Drain, Leadership										
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Strengthen national institutions with the responsibility to guarantee protection, consider introduction of sanctions by the national agency charged with the auditing and oversight of public accounts	Political Economic Capacity of State	State Legitimacy, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Economic Decline, Leadership	Meso	High	⇔	Significant	⇔	No			Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Strengthen national promotion and respect of human rights, and access to and freedom of information, with the aim of developing best practices to improve the administration of information held by governments on individuals and facilitating citizen access to that information	Political Economic Capacity of State	State Legitimacy, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Economic Decline, Leadership	Meso	Urgent	⇔	Critical	⇔	Yes, discussion of and partial implementation of digital project in ministries			Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Transparency and Good Governance Create and implement programs to facilitate public participation and transparency, using information and communications technologies where applicable, in decision-making processes and in the delivery of government services, and to publish information within time limits established by national legislation.	Political Economic Capacity of State	State Legitimacy, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Economic Decline, Leadership	Meso	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Follow IMF recommendations related to Financial statements including rationalization of human resources, compensation systems, adhering to regulations in subsidies and transfers to public entities, analyzing government assets and improving the procurement procedures	State Capacity	Leadership	Meso	High	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Commitment by political leadership to bi- or multilateral agreements or interventions against theory of constraints (TOC)	State Capacity Cohesion	Leadership, Judicial, Civil Society, Security Apparatus	Meso	High	⇒	Significant	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Strengthen Civil Society Organizations that Monitor Full Transparency: Access to information about government operations and key data such as security statistics.	Cohesion	Security Apparatus	Meso	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Strengthen the institutions responsible for nation-building and address annual reporting of group grievances and interventions/progress toward stronger social cohesion	Cohesion	Group Grievance	Meso	Urgent	↗	Critical	↗	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Strengthen programs in schools and businesses to address scapegoating and group-based hostilities	Cohesion	Group Grievance	Meso	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Improve institutional strength at the local level, and financial discipline so that these initiatives that have created economic dependency on the Kingdom as documented in annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports, College Financieel Toezicht, can be reduced.	Social and Cross Cutting Capacity of State	External Interventions Leadership	Meso	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Public Financial Management Reforms including stronger internal controls and procedures, handling of fiscal risks and transparency, and debt analyses, adhering to regulations in subsidies and transfers to public entities, inventory, and valuation of government assets, improving procurement procedures	Social and Cross Cutting Capacity of State	External Interventions Leadership	Macro	Urgent		Critical		No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Combating the Drug Problem Adopt laws and policies for border security that reduce the use of the sea and air for regional and global drug trade and money laundering	Capacity of State Politics Cohesion Economics	Leadership, Judiciary, State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No		Neg.		

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							 Improved  No change  More severe or urgent							
				Grievance, Uneven Economic Development										
Making Democracy Work Better	2020	Prevention of Violence Encourage national institutions to work together and coordinate in order to implement integrated programs that include initiatives for conflict resolution, where appropriate, for sustained prevention, permanent attention, public education, and treatment relevant to cases of violence against persons, families, and communities, strengthening institutional capacities in these areas	Cohesion Capacity of State	Demographic Pressures Leadership Judiciary	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Civil Society Strengthening	2021	Adopt Educational Model that promotes 21 Century Skills, Formation and Mindset	Cohesion Economic Social and Cross-cutting	Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	Yes Acknowledgement of 21 Century Skills, but no change in school curriculum for consistent implementation in all schools	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
				Development, Factionalized Elites										
Civil Society Strengthening	2021	Seek to establish public and private funding instruments aimed at building the capacity of civil society organizations in order to highlight the work and contributions of these organizations and to promote accountability	Cohesion Economic Social and Cross-cutting	Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Factionalized Elites	Macro	Urgent	⇔	Critical	⇔	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Economic integration Reevaluate and adopt an acceptable global monetary system that can stimulate the economic growth of the country	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Macro	High	⇔	Significant	⇔	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index		
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing
							↗ Improved ⇄ No change ↘ More severe or urgent						
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Economic integration Consider the possibility of creating a common economic market between all islands of the Dutch Caribbean	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Macro	High	⇄	Significant	⇄	No			Neg.
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Economic growth and income distribution Adopt an economic policy that promotes diversification (internal and external) that contributes to increased exports and reduces imports	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Macro	High	⇄	Significant	⇄	No			Neg.
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Economic growth and income distribution Support economic policy by including a public private partnership strategy to combat an abnormal inflationary situation, where the buying power of the lower income population is affected negatively. A subsidy lowering the import tax and/or sales tax within the indirect tax structure could be implemented, targeting a specific group of products. In addition, the commercial sector could match the government subsidy with 0-3% margin on this same product group. The combined effort can stabilize the buying power for the lowest income groups.	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Macro	High	⇄	Significant	⇄	No			Neg.

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index		
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)		
							Improved No change More severe or urgent				Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Economic growth and income distribution Review all socio-economic institutions with the objective to affirm that greater attention must be given to increasing economic growth and reducing poverty in a mutually reinforcing way, and that this priority must include economic and social sector policies that effectively achieve poverty reduction and greater investment in people, with improved access to basic education and health services	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	Yes, SER attention to minimum wage, Onderstand and AOV	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Trade, Investment, and Stability	2020	Population Adopt a population policy that recognizes that one of our fundamental problems is the lack of synchronization regarding the population size warranted to support our level of national services and benefits. A population policy and strategy that spells out the actions necessary to increase the size of the population is imperative. Formalization of the informal circuit, stemming brain drain from migration and incentive programs for students to return to work should be part of that population policy.	Economics	Human Flight and Brain Drain,	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Factor Markets: (Labor, Products, Capital, Entrepreneurship) and Employment	2020	Revision of all Laws related to Factor Market: Labor Market, Product Market, Financial Markets, Innovation and Entrepreneurship	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No Some aspects of labor market are being examined, but no changes have been executed in policy as of yet.	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Factor Markets: (Labor, Products, Capital, Entrepreneurship) and Employment	2020	Introduce Policy on Development Finance Institutions' role in promoting economic diversification and sustainability	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Factor Markets: (Labor, Products, Capital, Entrepreneurship) and Employment	2020	Strengthen the capacity of the Minister of Labor to develop and implement effective labor and labor market policies; collaborate with employers and labor organizations (see NLDP) to develop and generate information on labor markets; participate in dialogue, tripartite consultations, and dispute resolution strategies; and adopt ongoing strategies and programs as a core element for professional development in the labor market	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Macro	Urgent	⇒	Critical	⇒	No Capacity is a serious issue across ministries and is subject to evaluation in the Landpacket	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)			
											Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity	
							↗ Improved ⇄ No change ↘ More severe or urgent							
Growth With Equity	2020	Enabling Economic Environment Align, revise, and synchronize the following policies via a long-term sustainable labor force development process: Population, Migration, Integration, Remigration, Economic, Industry, Education, Finance, Human Resource, Capital Management, Income, Housing, Health and Nutrition, Persons with Disabilities	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Macro	Urgent	⇄	Critical	⇄	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Growth With Equity	2020	Enabling Economic Environment Design and implement, legislation, policies and regulations that reduce startup costs, support the creation of new financial products for lower-income groups and youth, and that create conditions that encourage commercial banks and other appropriate financial institutions to broaden their client base to include more micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises and strengthen the capacities of micro, small- and medium-sized enterprise development agencies	Economic	Economic Decline	Macro	Urgent	⇄	Critical	⇄	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Growth With Equity	2020	Enabling Economic Environment Promote, improved market access for disadvantaged entrepreneurs, particularly women, youth, persons with disabilities and remote populations, by developing programs that generate local employment and provide training, retraining and life-long learning, particularly in new technologies, and affordable services in business management, product development, financing, production and quality control, marketing and the legal aspects of business; by establishing outreach programs to inform low-income and poor populations, particularly in remote areas, of opportunities for market and technology access and by providing assistance, monitoring, mentoring, advisory and other support services to enable these groups to take advantage of such opportunities	Social and Cross-Cuttingting	Factionalized Elites	Macro	High	⇔	Significant	⇔	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Growth With Equity	2020	Enabling Economic Environment Support efforts to strengthen agricultural enterprises, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises and promote, where appropriate, a favorable environment for agri-business; encourage, in a complementary manner, the training of small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs as well as the modernization of training institutions in this field	Social and Cross-Cuttingting Economic	Factionalized Elites Economic decline	Meso	High	⇔	Significant	⇔	Yes Some Awareness workshops held Private Initiatives	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index		
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing
							↗ Improved ⇨ No change ↘ More severe or urgent						
Migration	2020	Implement <i>Migration Policy</i> that complies with OSCE commitments (listed in FSI Social and Cross Cutting Section)	Social and Cross-cutting Economics Cohesion Capacity of State	Factionalized Elites Human Flight and Brain Drain Demographic Pressures Leadership	Macro	Urgent	⇨	Critical	⇨	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Migration	2020	Promote the discussion of the migration phenomenon at the regional level with due regard for its multi-dimensional nature and regional differences and, in so doing, consider the inclusion of the topic of migration in discussions on trade and economic integration	Social and Cross-cutting Economics Cohesion Capacity of State	Factionalized Elites Human Flight and Brain Drain Demographic Pressures Leadership	Macro	High	⇨	Significant	⇨	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Migration	2020	Support programs of cooperation in immigration procedures for cross-border labor markets and the migration of workers, both in countries of origin and destination, to enhance economic growth in full cognizance of the role that cooperation in education and training can play in mitigating any adverse consequences of the movement of human capital less developed states	Social and Cross-cutting Economics Cohesion Capacity of State	Factionalized Elites Human Flight and Brain Drain Demographic Pressures Leadership	Macro	High	⇨	Critical	⇨	No	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
Migration	2020	Strive to ensure that migrants have access to basic social services, consistent with the legal framework	Social and Cross-cutting Economics Cohesion	Factionalized Elites Human Flight and Brain Drain	Macro	Urgent	⇨	Critical	⇨	No Attempts made by Gov't to change	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
			Capacity of State	Demographic Pressures Leadership										
Migration	2020	Create and harmonize statistical information systems and foster the sharing of information and best practices using new information and communications technologies, with the aim of promoting the modernization of migration management	Social and Cross-cutting Economics Cohesion Capacity of State	Factionalized Elites Human Flight and Brain Drain Demographic Pressures Leadership	Macro	Urgent	⇔	Critical	⇔	Yes, New Census info available	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.	
Environmental Foundation for Sustainable Development	2020	Environment and Climate Ratify the Paris Accord, and honor court decisions related to climate change, and environmental hazards	Economic Political Capacity of State	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Leadership, Civil Service	Macro	Urgent	⇔	Critical	⇔	No		Neg.		
Environmental Foundation for Sustainable Development	2020	Environment and Climate Adopt, implement, and enforce legislation, regulations, standards, and policies that provide for high levels of environmental protection, placing particular emphasis on achieving cleaner air, and strengthening capacities for integrated water resources management and for waste management	Economic Political Capacity of State	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Leadership, Civil Service	Macro	Urgent		Critical	⇔	Yes, awareness campaign by NGOs, Gov campaign of deteriorating infrastructure, implementation of sustainable energy plan		Neg.		

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Trend since 2023	Severity Level	Trend since 2023	Outputs Noted	Effect on Social Progress Index			
											Positive (Pos.) or Negative (Neg.)	Basic needs	Wellbeing	Opportunity
							Improved No change More severe or urgent							
Environmental Foundation for Sustainable Development	2020	Environment and Climate Recognize the vulnerabilities of our country being a SIDS and low-lying coastal state, and the need to support the conduct of vulnerability assessments, the development and implementation of adaptation strategies, capacity building and technology transfer	Economic Political Capacity of State	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Leadership, Civil Service	Macro	High	⇨	Critical	⇨	No		Neg.	Neg.	
Environmental Foundation for Sustainable Development	2020	Environment and Climate Promote policies, practices, incentives, and investment in support of sustainable forest and ocean management	Economic Political Capacity of State	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Leadership, Civil Service	Macro	Urgent		Critical	⇨	No		Neg.	Neg.	
Environmental Foundation for Sustainable Development	2020	Environment and Climate Commit to advancing environmental stewardship in the area of energy by advancing policies, practices, transference of and access to technologies, that are economically efficient and take into account the environmental impacts of sustainable energy development and use	Economic Political Capacity of State	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Leadership, Civil Service	Macro	Urgent	⇨	Critical	⇨	No No-still trying to justify reopening of refinery		Neg.	Neg.	

References

The stamp of good research is attention to detail at all levels of research. Attention to the bibliography focuses attention on the whole research procedure. It aids scientific thought and analysis and makes for better research reporting.

These references provide evidence to support the assertions and claims in this annual research product. By citing local and international reports as well as from experts in field, the institute shows its dominance in this research field.

The institute has taken great care to collect the best available international and local data to support the work of comparing and documenting in order to draw its conclusions.

Specific References:

adviescollegeplussdialooggroepplusslavernijverledenplusketenenplussvanplushetplussverledenplus1plusjuliplus2021plusdef(10).pdf

Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, Advies 107: Fundamentele rechten in het Koninkrijk

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Rapport “Is een duurzame exploitatie van het nieuwe ziekehuis gewaarborgd?”, 2021

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Jaarverslag 2021 (page 17). June, 2022

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, jaarverslag 2022, (page 19-20) juni 2023

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Rapport “Effectiviteit van het beheer en onderhoud van het openbaar wegennet, datum 20 maart 2024

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Rapport Jaarrekening 2022 Land Curaçao, datum 7 mei 2024

Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao, Brief van de minister van Financiën “Reactie Ministerie van Financiën op het definitief rapport Jaarrekening Land 2022 door ARC” en onze reactie daarop, nummer 032-24, 23 mei 2024

Amigoe, artikel “Martinus eist antwoord van Staten”, pagina 5, 18 september 2023

Amnesty International The Netherlands, www.amnesty.nl/actueel/venezolanen-bescherming-curacao

Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3589372018.ENGLISH.PDF>, and April 2022 update

Amnesty international, Curacao – Little improvement on the protection of Venezuelans (Feb 7, 2023)

Antilliaans Dagblad, “Notariaat is vastgelopen”, 18 August 2022

<https://antilliaansdagblad.com/nieuws-menu/27707-pnp-ministers-weigeren-betaalpas-25-000-usd>

Antwoorden Kamervragen over officieren van Justitie die in de fout zijn gegaan, 14.01.2020

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/outlawing-police-quotas>

Aqualectra.com, Manage Interruptions, 2023

CBCS ECONOMISCHE ONTWIKKELINGEN IN 2021 EN VOORUITZICHTEN VOOR 2022

Central Bank of Curacao and St. Maarten, 4th Quarter Estimates, GDP by sector, 2022

Cft Budget Amendment and Execution Reports, Curaçao, 2019-2021

Cft Report (2021) cft.cw

Cft Report, (2022) cft.cw

Cft Report, (2023) cft.cw

Cft Report, (2024), cft.cw

Code Corporate Governance, artikelen 4,2 en 4.3

College Financieel Toezicht, brief aan Min Fin, datum 2 mei 2024

CSIS (Center for Strategic International Studies) 2023 report on drug trafficking in the Dutch kingdom

Council of Europe anti-torture Committee (CPT) report on 2022 visit (June 23, 2023)

Curaçao Climate Change Policy Assessment, 2019

Curaçao and Sint Maarten-Findings of an IMF Virtual Visit-20210318 NA page 5 point 11

Curaçao Bureau of Statistics, population tables, 2018

Curaçao Chronicle, "Electoral Council files complaint due to uncertainty about donations", September 21, 2022

Curaçao Chronicle, "KEM wants clarification about financing law violators", February 23, 2022

Curaçao Island Packet, January to March 2024

Curaçao Labor Force Survey 2021-2023 projection

<https://nu.cw/2023/06/09/onvrede-over-creditcard-voor-ministers/>)

Curaçao Tourism Board Stayover Report 2021, 2022

DashboardRegeerprogramma(VISUAL). Numbers

De Staat van het onderwijs op Curaçao, Onderwijsverslag 2020-2021, Ministerie van Onderwijs, Wetenschap, Cultuur en Sport

Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report 2024, Daniel J. Edelman Holdings, Inc, Chicago, Illinois.

Electorale Raad, Jaarverslag 2023, juni 2024

Ester Standford-Xosel, 'Reparations are not about money', June 30, 2023,

<https://www.oneworld.nl/mensenrechten/jurist-over-slavernij-excuses-herstelbetalingen-gaan-niet-over-geld/>

Fragile States Index Report 2023 Curaçao, Think To DO Institute, October, 2023

Fundashon Akshon Sivil, Publicatie "Naar een effectieve corruptiebestrijding", 2024

Fundashon pa Konsumido, Small claims court: Un konsepto di lei na benefisio di konsumidonan (Jul 24, 2023)

Fragile States Index Curacao Country Report, 2020, Think To DO Institute, Curaçao.

Gerecht in eerste aanleg, vonnis in kort geding, zaak nummer CUR 202002249, zaak Elhage

Hof of Justice Annual Report 2021

Hof of Justice Annual Report 2022

Hof of Justice Annual Report 2023

Hof van Justitie, Uitspraak rechtszaak op basis van rapport Willems, EJ80219-H273/16, EJ80236-H276/16 en EJ80219-H354/16, datum uitspraak 13 juni 2017

Human Rights Watch, 2020 report on Venezuelan-Netherlands Refugee Relations

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/outlawing-police-quotas>

<http://www.transparency.org/en/gbc/global/global-corruption-barometer-2017>

IMF Curaçao and St. Maarten, Third Quarter Report, 2021

IMF Curaçao and Sint Maarten Report, Second, Third and Fourth Quarters, 2022

IMF Curaçao and Sint Maarten Report, all Quarters, 2023

IMF Country Report No. 22/270 KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—CURAÇAO AND SINT MAARTEN 2022 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DISCUSSIONS— PRESS RELEASE; AND STAFF REPORT

IMF Country Report No. 23/234

Curaçao and Sint Maarten-Findings of an IMF Virtual Visit-20210318 NA page 5 point 11

InSight Crime, The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe, February 2021

InSight Crime Analysis, Expansion of Cocaine Traffic to Europe, 2022

Issue Brief: Raising Minimum Wage 2022, Think To DO Institute, Curaçao, October 1, 2022

IUH, letter from the Supervisory Board to The Executive Board, Subject: Eindresultaat forensisch onderzoek en bevindingen inzake CEO de heer D. Jonis

Jaarverstag 2021, Openbaar Ministerie Curaçao

Jaarverstag 2022, Openbaar Ministerie Curaçao

Kingdom Act Caribbean Body for Reform and Development (COHO), 2021

Kingdom Act Caribbean Body for Reform and Development (COHO), 2022

Kingdom of the Netherlands-Curaçao: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission, Kingdom of the Netherlands, June 25, 2024

Konseho Supremo Elektoral, www.kse.cw

Latin American Trust: The Key to Social Cohesion and Growth in Latin American and Caribbean Report, Interamerican Development Bank, 2024.

Latin America Organized Crime Study for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, InSight Crime, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024

Landspakket Curaçao, Uitvoeringsagenda jul-sep 2023

Landspakket Curaçao, Uitvoeringsagenda jul-sep 2023, Doorlichting (semi-) overheidsbedrijven en entiteiten

Landspakket Curaçao uitvoerings agenda 1 jan – 31 maart 2024

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Koninkrijksrelaties, Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, 19 april 2024, kenmerk 2024-0000206919, page 4-8

Minister van Financiën, Brief Min Fin aan het parlement, Onderwerp: SOAB-rapporten inzake Ontvanger, datum 25 maart 2024, zaaknummer 2024/009551

Ministerie van VVRP, Meerjaren onderhoud en instandhoudingsprogramma Wegen en Afwatering 2023-2029

Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security (Directorate for Migration Policy) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

NULMETING VAN HET CURAÇAOSE ONDERWIJSBESTEL, TUSSENRAPPORTAGE: KNELPUNTEN, KANSEN EN OPLOSSINGSRICHTINGEN, June, 2022

Ombudsman of Curaçao, jaarverslag 2021 (p.5) (p.6)

Ombudsman van Curaçao, jaarverslag 2022, (page 4) (December 2022)

Onderlinge regeling Landspakket Curaçao, hoofdstuk Onderwijs (nov 2020)

Openbare Ministerie, Jaarverslag OM Curaçao (p.16)

Openbare Ministerie Curaçao, Jaarverslag 2022 (page 3)

Plataforma tripartit concept LB 2022

Police Kingdom Act, Article 7 sub-1, <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0028079/2010-10-10>

Procevaluatie en Actiononderzoek versterking aanpak ondermijnende criminaliteit. Tussenrapportage, May, 2021

Public Prosecution Service announcement, <https://curacao.nu/gerrit-schotte-en-om-hebben-akkoord-over-afbetaling-ontnemingszaak/>, August 29, 2022

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de rechtshandhaving (page 5) (mei 2022)

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de rechtshandhaving (page 4) (mei 2023)

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de rechtshandhaving (page 10) (mei 2023)

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de rechtshandhaving (p.11-16) (mei 2022) (p.33) (mei 2022)

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, Rapport “Doorlooptijd Strafzaken”, datum augustus 2023

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, De Staat van de Rechtshandhaving rapport 2023, Mei 2024, page 22

Raad voor de Rechtshandhaving, Rapport “Openbare ordehandhaving”, datum februari 2024

Rapport Nulmeeting Curaçaose Onderwijsbestel (Jun 2022)

RapportageProjectVerbetervoorstellenAmbtelijk20Topstructuur MD topkader en Bestuursdienst, versie 1.03.pdf

Revenue Statistics in Latin America and Caribbean, OECD, 2022

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2022/12/19/toespraak-minister-president-rutte-over-het-slavernijverleden>

RMR, bijlage-3-landspakkettenCASlanden10jul2022.pdf

SBTNO, <https://sbtno.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/overzicht-vacante-functies-bij-Stichtingen-en-NV-26062024.pdf>

Staatsblad koninkrijk der Nederlanden, besluit 116, dd 3 maart 2021, Overdracht van bevoegdheden

Ester Stanford-Xosel, 'Reparations are not a about money', June 30, 2023, <https://www.oneworld.nl/mensenrechten/jurist-over-slavernij-excuses-herstelbetalingen-gaan-niet-over-geld/>

Sociaal Economische Raad Curaçao, Advies inzake de beheersmaatregelen fonds basisverzekering ziektekosten (Julie 2022)

Social Economische Raad, Advies ref no 048/2024 SER, datum 19 juni 2024

Social Progress Index, 2020

Stichting Hende-i-Medio Ambiente (HiMA), “Recht op drinkwater geborgd”, September, 2022

SVB Annual Report 2021

SVB Annual Report 2022

10 Country Comparison, Attitude Survey, Best Education Systems 2020, Think To DO Institute, Curaçao, 2020

The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe, Insight Crime, February 2021

Tijdelijke Werk Organisatie, Landspakket uitvoerings agenda 1ste kwartaal 2024

Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State, June 2022

Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State: Curaçao, 2023

<http://www.transparency.org/en/gbc/global/global-corruption-barometer-2017>, 2023

Travel with Minors Questionnaire, Ministry of Justice, 2023, www.hustisia.cw

United Nations High-level political Forum on Sustainable Development 2022, Kingdom of the Netherlands
Voluntary review (p.74) (p.87) (p.91) (p.92)

US State department, Human trafficking Report Curaçao, www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-reports/curacao

US State Department, Trafficking in persons report – Curaçao in Tier 3

Veiligheid en rechtsorde in het Caribisch Gebied, September 2020

Verdrag inzake samenwerking tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika betreffende toegang tot en gebruik van faciliteiten in de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba voor drugsbestrijding vanuit de lucht; Oranjestad, 2 maart 2000, zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/trb-2000.34/html; Forward Operating Location Agreement five-year renewal, 2015

References Reviewed by Indicators:

Cohesion Indicators

Qualitative Data External Links

Security Apparatus

Corruption Index:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index#:~:text=The%202019%20CPI%2C%20published%20in,transparency%2C%20while%20the%20most%20perceived

Qualitative Data Internal:

<https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=84>

<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf>

<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>

<https://indd.adobe.com/view/0b091ce2-d1b7-4e26-90c8-1a2f3cc0c264>

<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>

Qualitative Data External:

http://Latin_America_Organized_Crime_Study_for_the_Kingdom_of_the_Netherlands_-1pdf

https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=netherlands

<https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-02-blacks-hispanics-caribbean-descent-higher.html>

Qualitative Data internal

<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/176330-1.pdf>

<https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-department-justice>

Factionalized Elites

Qualitative Data Internal and External

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/whc_1985.pdf

Group Grievances

Adviescollege Dialooggroep Slavernijverleden - Ketenen van het verleden, geredigeerd_Geredigeerd, 1 juli 2021

Economic Indicators

Qualitative Data External

<https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/>

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

<https://www.imf.org/en/Data>

<https://data.imf.org/?sk=388DFA60-1D26-4ADE-B505-A05A558D9A42&sid=1479329132316>

<https://www.cepal.org/en>

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/caribbean/overview>

Qualitative Data Internal

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2019/eng/index.htm>

<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/01/pr20128-curacao-and-sint-maarten-imf-executive-board-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation>

<https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/GDD>

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/quart/index.htm>

<https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD>

<https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/series/unemployment>

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/unemployment-jobless-claims-rise-layoffs-2020-07-18/>

<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/da56c295-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/da56c295-en>

Uneven Development

<https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>

Qualitative Data Internal

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_curve

<https://towardsdatascience.com/clearly-explained-gini-coefficient-and-lorenz-curve-fe6f5dcdc07>

<https://ourworldindata.org/global-education>

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Educational_attainment_statistics

<https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/361761468761690314/measuring-education-inequality-gini-coefficients-of-education>

<https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm>

Human Flight and brain drain

Qualitative Data Externa

<https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/type/eclac-ilo-report>

<https://www.iom.int/>

<https://www.iom.int/wmr/>

<https://www.weforum.org/reports/>

Appendices

Appendix 1: Meso and Micro Recommendations

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Making Democracy Work Better Transparency and Good Governance	2020	Consider introduction of sanctions by the national agency charged with the auditing and oversight of public accounts	Political	State legitimacy	Meso	Medium	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Transparency and Good Governance	2020	Strengthen national institutions with the responsibility to guarantee the protection, promotion and respect of human rights, and access to and freedom of information, with the aim of developing best practices to improve the administration of information held by governments on individuals and facilitating citizen access to that information	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Economic Decline	Meso	High	Critical
Making Democracy Work Better Transparency and Good Governance	2020	Create and implement programs to facilitate public participation and transparency, using information and communications technologies where applicable, in decision-making processes and in the delivery of government services, and to publish information within time limits established by national legislation.	Capacity of State	Leadership	Meso	High	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Media and Communications	2020	Encourage cooperation among broadcasters, including cable operators, and broadcast regulatory bodies and governmental organizations, to facilitate the exchange of best industry practices and technologies, to guarantee an even more free, open, and independent media	Politics	State Legitimacy	Meso	Medium	Significant

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Making Democracy Work Better Media and Communications	2020	Ensure the media is free from arbitrary interventions by the state, and specifically, work to remove legal or regulatory impediments to media access by registered political parties including by facilitating, where possible, equitable access during election campaigns to television and radio; (macro) Encourage media self-regulation efforts, including norms of ethical conduct, to address the concerns of civil society with regards to, inter alia, reducing the dissemination of extreme violence and negative stereotyping, contributing in this way to the promotion of changes in attitudes and cultural patterns through the projection of pluralistic, balanced, and non-discriminatory images.	Capacity of State	Leadership	Meso	High	Critical
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Implement policies that strengthen the criminal justice system: where the penal code, the legal system and the staff ensure the efficacy of the justice system and lower impunity rates for organized crime.	Capacity of State	Judicial	Macro	Urgent	Critical
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Introduce strong money laundering framework: bodies that facilitate and detect money laundering and illicit financial flows.	Capacity of State, Cohesion	Leadership, Judicial, Civil Service, Security Apparatus	Macro	Urgent	Critical
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Create, implement, and monitor, and adjust legislative frameworks: laws that strengthen the state's capacity to combat organized crimes	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judicial, Civil Society	Macro	High	Critical
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Promote policies, processes and mechanisms that protect the public interest, the use of disclosure of assets mechanisms for public officials to avoid possible conflicts of interest and incompatibilities (including their continuous monitoring), as well as other measures that increase transparency	Cohesion	Security Apparatus	Macro	High	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Strengthen the participation of civil society in the fight against corruption, by means of promote the organization, training, and linkage of citizens groups in the context of concrete projects which promote transparency and accountability in governance	Cohesion	Security Apparatus	Meso	Medium	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Fight Corruption	2020	Leadership and political will to ensure strong policies against TOC and zero toleration of corruption.	Political, Cohesion	Security Apparatus	Meso	High	Significant

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Making Democracy Work Better Empower Society	2020	Promote and institutionalize mechanisms to facilitate citizen participation in politics	Cohesion	Demographic Pressures	Meso	Medium	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Empower Society	2020	Promote the development, autonomy, and institutional strengthening of government to promote more favorable conditions for the sustainable economic and social development of society	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	High	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Empower Society	2020	Strengthen the institutional capacity of government to allow full and equitable citizen participation in public policies without any discrimination, facilitate access to those services fundamental to improving citizens' quality of life, and strengthen devolution of such at the lowest level possible in society	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	Urgent	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Empower Society	2020	Promote sharing of information, best practices and administrative expertise among government, community associations and the public, by facilitating access to information and communications technologies	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Macro	Medium	Significant
Making Democracy Work Better Empower Society	2020	Promote sharing of information, best practices and administrative expertise among government, community associations and the public, by facilitating access to information and communications technologies	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	Medium	Significant
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Develop open and transparent measure of the following services and report outcomes on an annual basis: Education, Health Services, water, sanitation, infrastructure, telephony, internet access, energy reliability and transportation	Political	Public Service	Meso	High	Critical
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Institute reliable databases for all human rights areas, reviewed and certified by independent audit entity	Political	Rule of Law, Human Rights	Meso	High	Significant

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Provide data to have Curacao removed from the human rights violators list internationally	Social and Cross Cutting	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Meso	High	Significant
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Establish a program for the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants, including migrant workers and their families	Social and Cross Cutting	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Meso	Medium	Minor
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Commit to combatting illegal trafficking networks, including developing preventative campaigns on the dangers and risks faced by migrants, particularly women and children who often can be victims of such trafficking, with a view to eradicating this crime	Social and Cross Cutting	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Meso	Medium	Critical
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	2020	Ensure legislation relating to freedom of expression is applied equitably to all, respecting freedom of expression and access to information of all citizens, and that journalists and opinion leaders are free to investigate and publish without fear of reprisals, harassment, or retaliatory actions, including the misuse of anti-defamation laws	Social and Cross Cutting	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Macro	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Access to Justice Support public and private initiatives and programs to educate people about their rights relating to access to justice, and promote measures that ensure prompt, equal and universal access to justice	Political	State legitimacy	Meso	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (alleviating the court workload) to expedite the administration of justice	Cohesion	Demographic Pressures	Meso	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Independence of the Judiciary Insure sustainable financing of its budget	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Combating the Drug Problem Support measures (through a concrete plan) to impede organized crime, money-laundering, the financing of armed groups/terrorism, and other illicit activities resulting from drug arms trafficking	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Macro	High	Critical

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Recognize the extreme and permeative nature of the drug problem, through an unwavering commitment (by means of a specific plan) to fight it in all its manifestations from an integral perspective	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Macro	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Promote cooperation and information exchange on policies and actions concerning drug prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and supply control, and develop educational campaigns to promote public awareness of the risk of drug consumption	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	Medium	Minor
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Prevention of Violence Consider developing cooperation with the media and entertainment industry with a view to avoiding the promotion and dissemination of a culture of violence, thus contributing to a culture of peace	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Macro	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Encourage greater use of community-based policing, to develop increased dialogue and interaction of law enforcement authorities with civil society and local communities	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Meso	Medium	Significant
Justice, Rule of Law, Security of the Individual	2020	Expand opportunities to share experiences, techniques and best practices among government and civil society agencies involved in combating psychological, sexual, or physical violence in the domestic setting and on the job, recognizing that such violence is overwhelmingly directed against women and children	Capacity of State	Leadership, Judiciary	Macro	Medium	Minor
Civil Society Strengthening	2020	Leverage our cultural heritage by creating products and services around this heritage to recognize and heal the wounds of the slave history.	Social and Cross Cutting	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Meso	High	Significant
Civil Society Strengthening	2020	Promote participation of all minority groups in forging a stronger civil society	Social and Cross Cutting	Factionalized Elites	Meso	Medium	Significant
Civil Society Strengthening	2020	Develop educational programs, in conjunction with relevant civil society organizations, academic experts and others, as appropriate, to provide democracy and human rights education and to promote the introduction of books and educational materials that reflect the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity as part of primary and secondary school curricula	Cohesion, Economic	Group Grievances, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development	Meso	Medium	Minor

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Trade, Investment and Stability	2020	Strengthen the private sector participation in decision making regarding identification of new economic sector development, tax reform, labor market reforms, health, and pension plan reform	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	High	Significant
Trade, Investment and Stability	2020	Economic diversification Internal – Present a plan that over time should transform the internal economy to more high added value economic activities External - Trade and Investment	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	Medium	Significant
Trade, Investment and Stability	2020	Speed up the finalization of the export strategy plan. Ensure negotiations for WTO accession is concluded soonest possible	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	Medium	Significant
Trade, Investment and Stability	2020	Corporate Social Responsibility Convene a meeting as early as feasible with representatives from governments, civil society, and the business community, to deepen dialogue on corporate social responsibility, raise awareness of key issues to be determined and discuss ways to promote the development, adoption, and implementation by the business community of principles of good conduct that will advance corporate social and environmental responsibility	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	Medium	Significant
Labor and Employment	2020	Identify and implement labor market reforms to improve mobility and flexibility while preventing abuses	Economic	Economic Decline	Meso	High	Critical
Labor and Employment	2020	Develop new mechanisms to increase the capacity of institutions to effectively implement labor laws and standards, and to foster equality of opportunity with respect to gender, among others, in strategies to promote employment (including flexicurity), training, life-long learning and human resource development programs with the objective of promoting access to more and better employment in the new economy	Economic	Economic Decline	Meso	Medium	Significant
Growth and Equity	2020	Establish programs aimed at promoting the use of computers and the Internet, based on public and private sector partnership, to gain greater access to information technology, to credit and markets and to instruments designed to assist them in all urban and remote areas	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	High	Significant

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Growth and Equity	2020	Revise the EOP (“conservation property”) in a balanced manner honoring climate, environmental policy to attract large investments that can have a significant effect on GDP and employment.	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Meso	High	Significant
Growth and Equity	2020	Support and encourage, the formation of business incubators, associative networks, joint projects, national competitiveness programs, credit unions and complementary agreements among micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises as part of a broader strategy allowing them to share best practices, to improve access to information, credit, and adequate marketing systems and to break prevailing situations of isolation	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Macro	Medium	Significant
Growth and Equity	2020	Promote dialogue involving government ministers, parliamentarians and civil society, the scientific and academic communities, in particular organizations linked to remote areas, with the objective of promoting medium and long-term national strategies toward sustainable improvement in agriculture (leading to improved “food security”) and rural life	Economic	Uneven Economic Development	Macro	Medium	Significant
Environmental Foundation For Sustainable Development	2020	Develop the capacity to forecast, prepare for and mitigate the potential economic and social impacts of natural and man-made hazards; promote vulnerability reduction:	Economic	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Macro	Urgent	Significant
Environmental Foundation For Sustainable Development	2020	Adopt and enforce better building codes and standards; Ensure appropriate land-use practices; inventory and evaluate the vulnerability of critical facilities and infrastructure; estimate climate change variability and sea-level rise and assess their possible impacts; and in pursuit of the above, create the requisite legal framework and establish the cooperative mechanisms to access and share advances in science and technology and their application in the early warning, preparedness for and mitigation of these hazards	Political	Public Service	Meso	High	Significant
Environmental Foundation For Sustainable Development	2020	Promote the exchange of knowledge and experiences regarding the combat against inappropriate practices in the exploitation of natural resources and unsustainable patterns of consumption, including the problems of waste management, which increase the vulnerability of the people to natural disasters	Capacity of State	Leadership, Civil Service	Meso	High	Significant

Themes of Resilience	Year of original recommendation	Intervention	Area of FSI	Assessment Area	Level of Impact	Priority Level	Severity Level
Environmental Foundation For Sustainable Development	2020	Identify and mitigate the consequences, undertake a feasibility study for a catastrophe insurance, and mechanisms to facilitate contingent re-construction financing and the immediate release of funds to resolve urgent needs	Capacity of State	Leadership, Civil Service	Meso	Medium	Significant

Appendix 2: FSI Indicators

To ensure consistent global comparison, the exact indicators, and criteria for measuring each indicator was implemented as prescribed in the International *Fragile States Index* as shown below.

To better understand the scoring, the indicators are designed to guide the researchers as follows:

There is a standardized 10-point Likert Scale that is to be used to score each of the 12 indicator areas. Second, there are specific areas identified that researchers are to examine and seek evidence to support findings for in creating the assessment (those are highlighted in the grey box below the Likert Scale. Lastly, there are examples of *specific pressures* in the indicator areas that may influence the resilience or fragility of a country in the specific indicator area. Those pressures are positioned to the left of the Likert Scales.

1 Demographic Pressures



Demographic Pressures can include:

- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources.
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship, etc.
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites.
- Pressures from high population growth rates or skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups.
- Pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, drought, etc.) creating human suffering and deprivation.
- Pressures stemming from epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, bird flu, SARS, and other contagious diseases.
- Pressures stemming from environmental hazards, infrastructure development that uproots communities, and industrial projects that threaten indigenous populations.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Catastrophic loss of life & injuries or massive threats to livelihood threatening large categories of the population, key population centers, or hundreds of thousands of people
9	Evidence of devastating demographic pressures seriously affecting tens of thousands of people
8	Evidence of large-scale demographic pressures seriously affecting thousands of people
7	Evidence of chronic or serious demographic pressures affecting hundreds of people
6	Evidence of chronic or serious demographic pressures greatly affecting select regions or communities
5	Evidence of chronic or serious demographic pressures moderately affecting select regions or communities
4	Evidence of episodic demographic pressures slightly affecting select regions or communities
3	Evidence of possible demographic pressures in the medium- or long-term future
2	Insignificant evidence of demographic pressures in the near, medium- or long-term future
1	Meager evidence of demographic pressures in near, medium- or long-term future
0	There are no negative demographic pressures in any region

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disease Control: Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases or pandemics? • Disease Epidemics: Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases of epidemics? • Environment: Do sound environmental policies exist and are the current practices sustainable? • Starvation: Is there a short-term food shortage that needs to be alleviated? • Malnutrition: Are there long-term food shortages affecting health? • Food supply: Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption? • Drought: Is there are high likelihood of droughts or is there currently a drought? • HIV Aids: What is the rate of spread of HIV Aids cases—most recent and projected? • Land competition: Does land competition it and are there laws to arbitrate land disputes? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources: Does resource competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes? • Likelihood of Natural Disasters: Is a natural disaster likely, recurring? • Impact of Natural Disasters: If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan? • Deforestation: Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests? • Water Supply: Is there access to an adequate potable water supply? • Orphan Population: Is there a high orphan population? • Population Density: Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state? • Population Distribution: Is the current and projected distribution reasonable? • Population Growth: Is the population growth rate sustainable? • Infant Mortality: What is the infant mortality rate - actual and projected?
---	---

2 Refugees and Internally-Displaced Persons



The Refugees and IDPs measure focuses upon the forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. This indicator refers to refugees leaving or entering a country.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Millions of refugees or IDPs fleeing or entering the country, or uprooted within the country, due to violence, repression or catastrophic natural disasters
9	Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons are fleeing violence, repression, or natural disasters
8	Tens of thousands of displaced persons are fleeing
7	Hundreds of displaced persons are fleeing
6	Select communities are fleeing
5	Displaced populations stabilized under the care of UNHCR, NGOs or host governments
4	Thousands of displaced persons returning to their homes, absorbed into the host societies or repatriated
3	Hundreds of displaced persons returning to their homes, absorbed into the host societies, or repatriated
2	Insignificant number of displaced persons exist, absorbed into the host societies, or repatriated
1	Small numbers of displaced persons exist, and they are fully absorbed into the host societies
0	There are no refugees or IDPs

- **Number of IDPs:** How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- **Increase in IDPs:** Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- **Impact of IDPs:** Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?
- **Influx of Refugees:** Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- **Impact of Refugees:** Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- **Increase in Refugee Camps:** Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- **Violence against Refugees:** Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- **Safety of Refugee Camps:** Are conditions safe in refugee camps?
- **Relief Efforts:** Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- **Relocation & Settlement:** Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?

3 Group Grievance



Group Grievance can include:

- History of aggrieved communal groups citing injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries.
- Pattern of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups.
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression.
- Institutionalized political exclusion.
- Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.
- Groups aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Group grievance is extremely deep, generates organized acts of violent retribution by vigilantes and militias due to perceived injustices, institutionalized discrimination or political exclusion, or a consistent pattern of mass atrocities committed with impunity. Results in ethnic cleansing, militant extremism or genocidal bloodletting
9	Group grievance is extremely deep and generates systematic acts of violent retribution combined with frequent spontaneous outbursts of group-based violence
8	Group grievance is deep and generates a pattern of spontaneous group-based violence with emergence of "self-defense" ethnic nationalist groups or protection gangs policing neighborhoods
7	Group grievance is not being addressed and is growing with sporadic outbursts of group-based violence often triggered by provocation events or activities, including the media that inspires scapegoating, mob violence and group-based hostilities
6	Mechanisms for settling group grievances are emerging; reconciliation is growing, and measures are being taken to rectify injustices
5	Group grievances are present but are receding or being addressed on a tentative basis
4	Group grievances are diminishing as mechanisms for addressing them are being institutionalized
3	Group grievances are being replaced by cross-communal activities with growing societal integration
2	Aggrieved groups are more diverse, settle differences through legal channels, civil society advocacy, public expression and a free press with little or no violence
1	Society is no longer divided into ethnic or communal divisions with sharp differences and individual rights and grievances are addressed through the legal and political system, civil society and free expression and advocacy
0	There is and has never been group grievance

- **Compensation for Victims:** Are victims of past atrocities compensated or is their a plan to compensate them?
- **Truth & Reconciliation:** Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one planned, needed?
- **Distribution of Resources:** Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?
- **Group Hatred or Tolerance:** Are there feelings of or reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- **Group Oppression:** Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- **Reintegration:** Have groups been reintegrated, if applicable?
- **History:** Is there a history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- **Intergroup Relations:** How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- **Vigilante Justice:** Are there reports of vigilante justice?
- **War Criminals:** Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted? Do the public feel they are properly punished?
- **Mass Violence:** Are the reports of mass violence and/or killings? Are there reports of violence that is racially motivated?
- **Reconstruction:** Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- **Religious Persecution or Tolerance:** Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of violence that is religiously motivated?
- **Amnesty:** Has amnesty been granted?

Economic Indicators:

4  **Human Flight and Brain Drain**



The Human Flight and Brain Drain measure can include:

- “Brain drain” of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression.
- Voluntary emigration of “the middle class”, particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, businesspeople, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration.
- Growth of exile communities and Diasporas.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Professional and middle class do not exist because brain drain has been chronic and sustained
9	Professional and middle class are extremely small because brain drain has been chronic and sustained
8	Professional and middle class have been greatly reduced because brain drain has been chronic and sustained
7	Brain drain is increasing and has been for years but the size of middle and professional class hasn't been greatly reduced
6	Brain drain is becoming more severe and has been occurring for years
5	Brain drain is increasing in severity
4	Brain drain is beginning to develop
3	Concerns regarding potentially loss of professional and middle class are starting to emerge
2	Brain drain is almost completely balanced with brain gain
1	Brain drain is balanced with brain gain
0	Country attracts people from other countries - so it actually enjoys a brain gain

- **Brain Drain:** Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- **Remittances:** Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

- **Political Drain or Return:** Are politicians leaving the country?
- **Professional Flight:** Are professionals leaving the country?
- **Return of Middle Class:** Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

5 Uneven Economic Development



Uneven Economic Development can include:

- Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education and economic status.
- Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, educational levels, etc.
- Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Uneven economic development is so severe along group lines that associated violence or deep group grievance results
9	Uneven economic development is severe along group lines and associated violence or group grievance is increasing
8	Uneven economic development is severe along group lines and associated violence is sporadic or group grievance on the rise
7	Uneven economic development is somewhat severe along group lines and associated violence or displays of group grievance is sporadic
6	Uneven economic development is somewhat severe along group lines but associated violence is rare and/or group grievance is low
5	Uneven economic development exists along group lines but associated violence is nonexistent and group grievance low or nonexistent
4	Uneven economic development exists but not clearly along group lines and associated violence and/or group grievance non-existent
3	There is only a little uneven economic development and it is not clearly along group lines
2	Uneven economic development is decreasing
1	Uneven economic development is slight
0	There is no uneven economic development

- **Discriminatory Economics:** Is the economic system discriminatory?
- **Economic Equality - Gap:** Is there a large economic gap?
- **Economic Justice:** Does economic justice exist?
- **Free Education:** Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- **Equal Education:** Is the education provided relatively equal?
- **Fair Housing:** Is there a housing system for the poor?
- **Existence of Ghettos or Slums:** Do ghettos and slums exist?

- **Hiring Practices:** Are hiring practices generally fair - legally and the perception of others?
- **Job Training:** Do programs for job training exist?
- **Job Training:** Use Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?
- **Social System:** Do equal rights exist in the society?
- **Equal Rights Legislation:** Are there laws protecting equal rights?

6 Economic Decline



Economic Decline can include:

- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, etc.
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment.
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency.
- Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs.
- Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight.
- Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace.
- Perceived group inequalities.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	A weakened economy is in a sharp decline with highest inflation and lowest GDP and affecting every level
9	A strong economy is in a sharp decline with highest inflation and lowest GDP and affecting every level
8	A weak economy exists and has existed for a long time but is not in a particularly sharp decline at the moment
7	A strong economy is in a sharp decline with high inflation and low GDP and affecting every level
6	The economy is weak but is neither showing major signs of decline or improvement
5	The economy has been strong but is starting a severe decline
4	The economy has been strong but is on a slight decline
3	The economy has been strong but is starting to show signs of concern
2	The economy is strong but not showing any particular signs of getting stronger
1	The economy is strong and getting stronger
0	The economy is and has been strong and is on a major increase affecting every level

- **Government Debt:** What is the government debt?
- **Interest Rates:** How are the interest rates - actual and projected?
- **Inflation Rate:** How is the inflation rate - actual and projected?
- **Consumer Confidence:** How do people view the economy?
- **National Economy:** How do experts view the economy?
- **Productivity:** What is the productivity?
- **GDP:** What is the GDP - actual and projected?
- **Unemployment:** How is the unemployment - current and rate of unemployment?
- **Economic Focus:** Does one product make up the majority of the economy?
- **Business Climate for FDI:** Is the business climate attractive to FDI?
- **Business Climate for Entrepreneurship:** Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Political Indicators:

7  **State Legitimacy**



State Legitimacy can include:

- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites.
- Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, revealed by scandals, investigative journalism, criminal prosecution or civil action.
- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or flawed elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies.
- Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	The government on all levels is considered completely illegitimate, and violent opposition exists. Corruption is endemic
9	High-level government is considered completely illegitimate and criminal, and violent national opposition exists
8	Government is considered highly illegitimate and criminal, and violent regional opposition exists
7	Government is considered illegitimate and criminal, and opposition exists on some level but is not violent
6	Corruption is a major issue but not endemic. Some levels of government may be working on addressing it
5	Corruption is a major issue but strong policies and programs have been put into place and are having some success
4	Corruption in government is sporadic and there are some questions regarding legitimacy of some actors within government
3	Corruption in government is sporadic and oversight mechanisms should be made stronger
2	Corruption in government is rare but oversight mechanisms should be stronger
1	Corruption in government is rare and proper oversight mechanisms exist
0	There is no corruption in government, there are strong oversight mechanisms and the legitimacy of the government is never questioned

- **Armed Insurgents:** Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- **Suicide Bombers:** Have there been suicide bombings and how likely are they?
- **Corruption of Federal Officials:** Is there evidence of corruption on the part of federal officials?
- **Accusation of Corruption of Officials:** Are federal and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?
- **Perception of Elections:** Are elections perceived to be free and fair?
- **Monitoring of Elections:** Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?
- **Confidence in Government:** Does the government have the confidence of the people?
- **Makeup of Government:** Is the government representative of the population?
- **Most recent Leadership Transition:** Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- **History of Leadership Transitions:** What is the longer term history of transition of power?
- **Political Rights:** Do political rights for all parties exist?
- **Political Assassinations:** Are there reports of politically motivated attacks and assassinations?
- **Riots & Uprisings:** Have riots occurred?
- **Peaceful Demonstrations:** Have peaceful demonstrations occurred?

8 Public Services



The Public Services measure refers to the lack of, or disappearance of, basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation, etc. Further, the state apparatus may narrow to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, the diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, etc.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Public services do not exist in rural areas or urban areas
9	Public services don't exist in rural areas and are deteriorating rapidly in urban areas
8	Public services are weak or non-existent in rural areas but are deteriorating in major urban areas
7	Public services are weak or non-existent in rural areas but are adequate in major urban areas
6	Public services are weak or non-existent in rural areas but are adequate in all urban areas
5	Public services are weak in rural areas and adequate in all urban areas
4	Public services are weak in rural areas and more than adequate in all urban areas
3	Public services are adequate in rural areas and more than adequate in all urban areas
2	Public services are good in both rural and urban areas with some areas receiving noticeably less than others
1	Public services are good in both rural and urban areas with some areas receiving less than others
0	Public services are superb equally in both rural and urban areas

- **Access to Housing:** Do the poor have access to adequate housing?
- **Housing Costs:** Are housing costs in line with the general economy?
- **Education Enrollment:** What is the level of school enrollment? Different for boys and girls?
- **Literacy Rates:** What are the literacy rates? Different for boys and girls?
- **Fuel Supply:** Is there an adequate supply of fuel?
- **Access to Medicine:** Do people have adequate access to medicines?
- **Number of Clinics or Hospitals:** Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for the population?
- **Number of Physicians:** Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- **Infant Mortality:** What is the infant mortality rate - actual and projected?
- **Potable Water:** Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- **Public Services Equality:** Is there equal access to public services?
- **Public Services General:** What are the general conditions of public services?
- **Roads:** Are roads adequate and safe?
- **Sanitation:** Is sanitation system adequate?
- **Airports:** Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- **Railroads:** Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?

9 Human Rights and Rule of Law



Human Rights and Rule of Law can include:

- Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.
- Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians.
- Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices.
- Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents).

Score Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment

10	Human rights are systematically and violently abused at all levels and no civil society or open media exists
9	Human rights are systematically and violently abused and almost no civil society or open media exists
8	Human rights are violently abused and very little civil society or open media exists
7	Human rights are regularly abused and very little civil society or open media exists
6	Human rights are sporadically abused and only weak civil society and independent media exist
5	Human rights are arbitrary but a civil society and independent media are allowed to exist
4	Human rights are arbitrary but civil society and independent media are strong
3	Human rights are legally protected and generally well respected but periodic violations occur. Civil society and independent media are strong
2	Human rights are legally protected and generally well respected. Civil society and independent media are thriving
1	Human rights are applied equally to all on all levels with full legal protection and civil society and independent media are thriving
0	Human rights abuses never occur, legal systems protect all rights, and civil society and independent media are thriving

- **Child Labor:** Are there child labor laws or reports of child labor?
- **Civil Rights:** Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- **Rights:** Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- **Legal System:** If rights are not protected, is there a legal system in which that can be addressed?
- **Access to Information:** Is there equal access to information?
- **Freedoms of Movement:** Is there freedom of movement?
- **Arbitrary Arrests:** Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- **Illegal Detention:** Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention? Are these state-sponsored?
- **Prison Conditions:** How are the prison conditions?

- **Power Sharing:** Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?
- **Fair Trials:** Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- **Religion:** Does religious freedom exist? Does religious extremism exist?
- **Forced Relocation:** Are groups forced to relocate? If relocation occurs, is there a system ensuring proper compensation?
- **Right to Life:** Is the right to life protected for all citizens?
- **Torture:** Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- **Freedom of Speech:** Are there laws protecting freedom of speech?
- **Existence of Independent Media:** Does it exist? Do its reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- **Systemic Violation of Rights:** Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or entity therein?

10 Security Apparatus



The Security Apparatus indicator can include:

- Emergence of elite or praetorian guards loyal to a leader, that operate with impunity and by-pass the chain of command of regular armed forces.
- Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition.
- Emergence of an “army within an army,” secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces that serve the interests of a political clique or leader.
- Armed resistance to the governing authority, violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	Monopoly on the use of violence by the state is compromised by widespread proliferation of private militias or praetorian guards loyal to a dictatorial regime, creating a “state within a state,” “no-go zones”, or an “army within an army”
9	Private militias are challenging the state or key security forces are personally loyal to the dictator bypassing the regular armed forces
8	Security in some parts of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state which uses violent force to maintain control or state forces vie for control with praetorian guards
7	Security in a some parts of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state that rules without excessive use of force or praetorian guard has some independent influence
6	Security in a small portion of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state which uses sporadic violence or praetorian guard
5	Security in a small portion of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state but remains dominant
4	The government is beginning to lose control over security in small sections of the country
3	Security is in the hands of government but cases of the use of violent force are reported
2	Security is under government control with strong civilian oversight and rare cases of violent force are reported
1	Security is under government control with civilian oversight. It does not use violence to maintain domestic control
0	There are little or no security forces and government does not use violence to maintain control

- **Arms Proliferation:** Is there a high availability of weapons?
- **DDR Program:** If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?
- **Use of Force:** Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- **Guerillas:** Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?
- **Militias:** Do private militias exist against the state?
- **Military:** Is the military under civilian control?
- **Paramilitary:** Is there paramilitary activity?
- **Accusations of Police Brutality:** Are there accusations of police brutality?
- **Professionalization of Police:** Are the police considered to be professional?
- **Political Violence:** Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- **Private Forces:** Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- **Government Response to Security Threats:** Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

11 Factionalized Elites



Factionalized Elites can include:

- Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines.
- Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith").
- Absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	No political class or national leader exists that is acceptable to the majority of the population; leaders are divided into factionalized parties; warlordism or militia-backed factional leaders or an extremely repressive autocrat or dictatorial party takes over through force, preventing the formation of stable, legitimate and effective governance
9	Weak and fractious political class and divided national leadership, with frequent breakdowns in government, high turnover of political elites, and political structures that are not deeply rooted or present in much of the society
8	Weak and fractious political class try to overcome the deep divisions with the ruling elites but with no lasting success and experiencing frequent collapse of governing coalitions and alliances
7	Weak and fractious political class has some minor successes in forming coalitions, reaching consensus on constitutional structures, and setting up governing programs
6	Fragile political alliances and coalitions making modest progress in generating government programs, and Establishing Constitutional foundations
5	Political parties and elites begin to stabilize with identifiable programs, political constituencies, rules of political conduct, growing respect for constitutional rule
4	Political elites rotate with regularity and political succession is smooth. Political polarization, confrontation and rivalry may be high but is managed through constitutional mechanisms
3	Space between political elites is narrowing, mostly based on issues rather than group-based identity. Constitutional guidelines respected for settling political differences
2	Bipartisan agreement on most issues, with a highly functioning constitutional system managing issue based differences in healthy and open debates
1	Popular and effective national leadership, with rival political interests articulated and represented through free political expression in a legitimate constitutional structure supported by the people
0	There are no factions in the political leadership

- **Fragmentation:** Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- **National Identity:** Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- **Leadership:** Is leadership fairly elected?
- **Political Reconciliation:** Is there a political reconciliation process?
- **Concentration of Wealth:** Is wealth concentrated in the hands of a few?
- **Growing Middle Class:** Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- **Control of Resources:** Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- **Resources Distribution:** Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through its tax system and taxes
- **Law:** Are the laws democratic or extreme?
- **Representation in Judicial System:** Is the system representative of the population?
- **Representation in Military:** Is the military representative of the population?
- **Extremist Rhetoric:** Does hate radio and media exist?
- **Stereotyping:** Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- **Cross Cultural Respect:** Does cross-cultural respect exist?

12 External Intervention



External Intervention can include:

- Military or paramilitary engagement, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or the resolution of conflict.
- Economic intervention by outside powers, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency.
- Humanitarian or strategic military intervention into an internal conflict or for regime change.

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
10	An external actor is responsible for all or most government functions - i.e. the existence of a UN Mission
9	An external actor is responsible for many government functions and not at the behest of the government or there are externally and strongly supported militia or rebel activities or extreme dependency on outside economic support
8	An external actor is responsible for many government functions at the behest of the government or there are externally supported militia or rebel activities or very dependency on outside economic support
7	An external actor(s) is providing major assistance for many government functions at the behest of the government or there are some externally supported militia or rebel activities or some dependency on outside economic support
6	The country is dependent on some assistance from external actors but it is requested
5	External actors provide assistance to the country both economically, politically and institutionally
4	External actors affect the economy and also have an impact on the internal politics of the country
3	Most of the impact from external actors is economic and positive but is critical to the country
2	Most of the impact from external actors is economic and positive but is important to the country
1	Only economic external actors impact the country and do so positively
0	No external actor has any impact on the country - even economically

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covert Intervention: Are covert operations taking place? • Economic Intervention or Aid: Is the country receiving economic aid? • Dependency on Aid: Is the country dependent on economic aid? • External Support for Factions: Is there external support for factions opposed to the government? • Military Attacks Across Borders: Are military attacks from other countries occurring? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of Foreign Troops: Are foreign troops present? • Military Assistance: Is there external military assistance? • Military Training: Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states? • Peacekeeping: Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground? • Training of Police: Is there external support for police training?
--	---



Leadership (Executive & Legislative)



Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
0	There is no executive or legislative branch leadership in the country.
1	Elections, if they take place at all, are controlled or rigged . Power is maintained by fear and violence often through personal or one-party rule or by a dominant ethnic, religious, or ideological group. Leaders are considered corrupt, illegitimate or incompetent by a majority of the population and the international community. A system of checks and balances is non-existent. Free press does not exist.
2	There are elections but they are considered by many to be rigged. Power is maintained through patronage networks and oppression of political opponents. Leaders are considered corrupt, illegitimate or incompetent by much of the population and the international community, and nepotism is frequent. The system of checks and balances is weak or often ignored. The press is weak and largely controlled by the government.
3	Elections are considered flawed but acceptable. There may be some corruption but it is either limited in scope or is dealt with adequately by the legal system. Power is maintained largely through providing services to the citizens but there may be some evidence of patronage networks and political opposition is weak. Individual leaders may be considered corrupt, illegitimate or incompetent by the population but the system as a whole is respected. A system of checks and balances operates but needs greater oversight and stronger enforcement mechanisms.
4	Elections are widely considered to be free and fair. Evidence of corruption arises periodically but offenders are dealt with properly through legal channels. Power is maintained largely through providing services to citizens. Political opposition and the free press is strong. Individual leaders may be considered corrupt, illegitimate or incompetent by parts of the population but the system as a whole is respected. A system of checks and balances operates and is improving its oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
5	Elections are considered to be free and fair, have good voter turnout, and represent the will of the people. Evidence of corruption is rare and offenders are dealt with harshly - including their legal removal from office. Power is maintained through providing services to the citizens, and government actions are transparent. Political opposition and the free press is vibrant and debates are open. The government is widely respected internally and by the international community. The system of checks and balances has strong mechanisms and wide oversight.

Leadership (Executive & Legislative)

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment		
	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
A	The leadership is responsive, effective, and respected by the majority of the population and the international community. Non-elected positions are merit based. Corruption is rare and dealt with appropriately.	The leadership is very well respected and highly trusted by the population. The political system and individuals within it are not perceived as being generally corrupt.	The leadership is highly representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group. There are frequent rotations, term limits, and open access to all groups
B	The leadership is considered responsive and effective by a majority of the population. Non-elected positions are merit based. Corruption is sporadic but dealt with appropriately.	The leadership is respected and trusted by the population. It is not perceived as being generally corrupt.	The leadership is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s), serving others as well.
C	The leadership is responsive to the general public but may not be considered to be effective (may lack resources). Corruption is sporadic.	The leadership has some respect and trust from the population. It is perceived as only slightly corrupt.	The leadership is primarily comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its own group(s).
D	The leadership is not effective and does not look after society as a whole. Even if there are elections, stability and tenure may be based on oppression, patronage and/or nepotism. Corruption is a major issue.	The leadership has little respect or trust from the population. It is perceived as highly corrupt.	The leadership is fairly representative of the population and does not favor one group. Access to leadership positions is open to all.
E	Stability and tenure in public office are based on oppression, patronage and/or nepotism. Corruption is endemic.	The leadership does not have the respect or trust of the population. It is perceived as completely corrupt and self serving.	The leadership is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or serves only its group(s).

ii Military



Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
0	The country does not have a military.
1	The military is not under civilian or legal control. It may operate with impunity and may act as an arm of the state to put down internal political opposition. It commits frequent human rights abuses including torture and nonjudicial killings. Corruption is systemic and the military is dominated by one ethnic group.
2	The military is not under adequately strong civilian or proper legal control. It may not have the capacity to defend the country and there may be incidences in which it is called upon to put down political opposition. Corruption and human rights abuses are a major problem. Domination by one primary group in society is a concern.
3	The military is under civilian and legal control, but it may not be able to defend the country against external threats because of a lack of resources, training, political constraints, or social domination by one group. Corruption and human rights abuses are sporadic.
4	The military is under civilian and legal control and can defend the country against external threats. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare and are investigated and dealt with appropriately under a system of law.
5	The military is under strong civilian and legal control and can defend the country against external threats. It also can undertake international missions as appropriate and is respected by foreign militaries. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare and are investigated and prosecuted appropriately under a system of law.

Military

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment		
	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
A	There is strong civilian and legal control of the military. It can defend the country as well as undertake international missions as appropriate. Positions are merit based. Issues regarding corruption or abuses occur rarely and are handled appropriately.	The military is highly respected by the population and not politicized. It is perceived as being able to protect the country and undertake international missions as appropriate.	The military is highly representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group(s).
B	There is adequate civilian or legal control of the military. It can defend the country and may take part in international missions. Issues regarding corruption, human rights abuses, and lack of equipment or proper training occur rarely.	The military is generally respected by the population. It is perceived to be able to protect the country and is not perceived as being corrupt or generally politicized.	The military is fairly representative of the population and does not largely favor one group(s).
C	There is some civilian or legal control of the military. It can defend the country for the most part, but improvements need to be made. Issues regarding corruption, human rights abuses, and lack of equipment or training occur sporadically.	The military has some respect from the population. It is perceived as only slightly corrupt or not able to defend the country completely and not overly politicized.	The military is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).
D	There is no civilian or legal control of the military. It is sometimes used to put down internal political opposition. Corruption and lack of materials and proper training are major problems. Human rights abuses are frequent.	The military has little respect from the population. It is perceived as highly corrupt, politicized, or unwilling and unable to protect the country.	The military is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its group(s).
E	There is no civilian or legal control of the military. It is sometimes used to put down internal political opposition. Corruption is endemic. Human rights abuses are common.	The military does not have the respect of the population or the international community. It is perceived as completely corrupt, politicized, or ineffective.	The military is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or serves only its group(s).

iii Police



Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
0	There are no police.
1	The police operate with impunity or are used by the state to suppress internal political opposition and independent media. They commit systemic human rights abuses. They are widely recognized as using torture.
2	The police do not protect the citizens because they are understaffed, under funded, poorly equipped, poorly trained, politicized or corrupt. They may be used by the state to suppress internal political opposition and are reported to commit human rights abuses regularly and use excessive force.
3	The police protect the citizens to some degree in some areas, but there are also concerns regarding greater need for training, neutrality, and professionalism. There are reports of sporadic human rights abuses but as a whole they generally are considered to respect human rights. There may be incidences of excessive use of force.
4	The police can and do largely protect citizens, but improvements to the system could be made. Reports of human rights abuses are sporadic and the system is considered to respect human rights. Incidences of the use of excessive force or other misconduct are investigated and dealt with properly, including dismissals from the force and prosecution of unlawful behavior. They are well trained, well armed, well funded, and generally well respected.
5	The police can and do protect the citizens. Reports of human rights abuses are rare and the system is considered to respect human rights. Incidences of use of excessive force or other misconduct are investigated and dealt with properly including dismissals from the force and protection of offenders. They are well trained, well armed, well funded, and trusted by the population.

Police

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment		
	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
A	Civilian control and oversight of police is strong. Training, uniforms, pay and weapons are at high standards. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare, and the system as a whole is seen as legitimate.	The police protect and serve the citizens effectively and they are trusted by the population. Reports of corruption are rare, but the law investigates and punishes offenders appropriately.	The police are well representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group.
B	Civilian control and oversight of police is adequate. Training, uniforms, pay and weapons are adequate. Corruption and human rights abuses are rare, and the system as a whole is seen as legitimate.	The police protect the citizens and uphold the law. Individuals may be perceived as biased, corrupt or ineffective, but offenders are dealt with appropriately. The system as a whole is seen as legitimate.	The police are fairly representative of the population and does not largely favor one group(s).
C	Civilian control and oversight of police is moderate. Training, uniforms, pay and weapons are generally adequate but may not be consistent. Corruption is a problem and human rights abuses are reported sporadically.	The police do their best to protect citizens and uphold the law but improvements need to be made. The system may be perceived as slightly corrupt, biased or ineffective.	The police are composed primarily of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).
D	Civilian control is weak and sporadic but some systems are in place. Training, uniforms, pay and weapons are not adequate. Corruption is a major problem and human rights abuses are reported with regularity.	The police can not or will not protect citizens or uphold the law. The system is perceived as corrupt, ineffective or biased.	The police are comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its own group(s).
E	There is no proper system for control of police abuses. Training, uniforms, pay and weapons are not adequate. Corruption is endemic and human rights abuses occur regularly.	The police are feared instead of trusted by the population. The system and individuals in it are perceived as completely corrupt or biased.	The police are comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or serves only its group(s).

iv Judicial




Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
0	There is no judicial system.
1	The judicial system lacks established procedures and experienced judicial personnel. It is widely considered ineffective, under control of the government or is otherwise not independent. Corruption and nepotism are common. Often judicial disputes are resolved by non-state sanctioned "courts" based on traditional customs or religious law. No rule of law in the country.
2	The judicial system operates in an ad-hoc and uneven manner for lack of established procedures and experienced judicial personnel. It is considered frequently ineffective, often under control of the government, corrupt or otherwise not independent or fair. Corruption and nepotism are frequent. The rule of law is weakly or arbitrarily applied.
3	The judicial system has established procedures and experienced judicial personnel, although the system is in need of strengthening. It is considered somewhat ineffective and sometimes perceived to lack independence. The rights to a speedy trial, fair legal representation, and access to evidence are generally protected. Punishment is commensurate with the crimes. Cases of corruption and nepotism are sporadic.
4	The judicial system has well established procedures and an adequate number of experienced judicial personnel. It is widely considered to be effective and independent. Rights to a speedy trial, fair legal representation, and access to evidence are protected. Punishment is commensurate with the crimes. Cases of corruption and nepotism arise sporadically but are dealt with adequately.
5	The judiciary is an independent branch of government. The system is effective and considered fair by majority of the population. The rights to a speedy trial, fair legal representation, and access to evidence are protected. Punishment is commensurate with the crimes. Evidence of discrimination or corruption is rare and offenders dealt with harshly - including their removal from office through legal means.

Judicial

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment		
	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
A	The judicial system is completely independent and highly effective. The judicial process is adequately resourced and appointments are based on merit. Corruption is rare but dealt with appropriately.	The rule of law is fully upheld. Reports of corruption are rare and offenders are dealt with appropriately.	The judicial system is very representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group.
B	The judicial system is considered to be independent and effective although improvements could be made. Corruption is sporadic but dealt with appropriately.	The rule of law is well established within the country. Reports of corruption are sporadic and the system as a whole is seen as legitimate.	The judicial system is fairly representative of the population and does not favor one group.
C	The judicial system may not be considered to be completely independent or effective. It may lack resources or there may be excessive political interference. Corruption is sporadic.	The rule of law is somewhat established within the country. Individuals within the judicial system may be perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or biased but the system as a whole is in place.	The judicial system is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).
D	The judicial system is not independent or effective. Appointments may be based on political loyalty, identity or political affiliation. Corruption is a major issue.	The rule of law is not established within the country. The judicial system is perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or biased.	The judicial system is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its group.
E	Courts are completely under the control of the government. Appointments are based on political loyalty, identity or political affiliation. Corruption is endemic.	The rule of law does not exist within the country. The judicial system is perceived as completely corrupt and/or ineffective.	The judicial system is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or serves only its group(s).

v Civil Service



Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment
0	There is no civil service.
1	The civil service is completely ineffective due to lack of management, skills, and resources. Corruption is endemic. Hiring and product delivery are not representative of the country's population, and large amounts of the population's needs are ignored.
2	The civil service is largely ineffective and lacks proper management, skills and resources. Corruption is a major problem. Hiring and product delivery are not very representative of the country's population, and the needs of the citizens are often ignored or go unaddressed. The population can not depend upon the civil service to serve it appropriately.
3	The civil service is somewhat effective (often mostly in urban areas) but improvements in hiring practices, resource allocation and service delivery to rural areas could be improved. Hiring and product delivery are somewhat representative of the country's population, but the population can not depend solely on the civil service for public goods and services.
4	The civil service is effective and hiring practices, resource allocation, and service delivery are appropriate, representative and professional. For the most part, the population can depend on the civil service for public goods and services, although there may be bureaucratic logjams and occasional dysfunctionalities.
5	The civil service is extremely effective, responsive, and professional. The population can depend on the civil service for public goods and services. Hiring and product delivery are representative of the country's population.

Civil Service

Score	Description — Key Characteristics of the Subject Environment		
	Professional	Legitimate	Representative
A	The civil service is highly effective and has strong level of skills, management, and funding. Positions are merit based. Corruption is rare and dealt with appropriately.	The civil service is highly respected by the population. The system and the individuals within it are not perceived as being corrupt or politically influenced.	The civil service is highly representative of the population and does not discriminate against any group(s).
B	The civil service is effective and level of skills, management, and funding is adequate. Corruption is sporadic but dealt with appropriately. The system is largely merit-based, but moderately politicized.	The civil service is respected by the population. It is not perceived as being corrupt or politically influenced.	The civil service is fairly representative of the population and does not largely favor one group(s).
C	The civil service is mostly effective and has moderate level of skills, management, and funding. Corruption is sporadic. System is somewhat merit-based but also politicized.	The civil service has some respect from the population. It is perceived as only slightly corrupt and politically influenced.	The civil service is primarily composed of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) but only slightly favors its own group(s).
D	The civil service is largely ineffective, highly politicized, and suffers from low level of skills, management, and funding. Corruption is a major problem.	The civil service has little respect from the population. It is perceived as highly corrupt and politically influenced.	The civil service is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and favors the needs of its group(s).
E	The civil service is completely ineffective and incompetent due to lack of management, skills, and funding. Position is based on oppression, identity, political affiliation, and/or nepotism. Corruption is endemic.	The civil service does not have the respect of the population. It is perceived as completely corrupt or biased.	The civil service is comprised of one ethnic or otherwise related group(s) and/or serves only its group(s).

Appendix 3: State Resilience Indicators (SRI)

State Resilience PILLARS

Inclusion

When people are socially, economically, or politically included, they have less exposure to risk and vulnerability, are represented in decision making, and have access to public resources to mitigate and respond to crisis and disasters.

Social Cohesion

In addition to inclusion, a sense of solidarity is key to a resilient society. Kinship ties, sociocentrism, as well as social and political capital can create opportunities for generosity and collaboration, which is necessary to overcome a major crisis.

State Capacity

When the government has effective systems, and the trust and confidence of the population to act in the interest of the public good, then it has the flexibility to persuade and mobilize collective action when faced with crisis.

Individual Capabilities

When the average person has a stock of education, health, income, and food security, then when a crisis hits they will not be immediately rendered destitute and reliant on social protection services or external intervention to survive.

Environment and Ecology

Stable, regenerative ecosystems, water access, and clean energy are vital to health and livelihoods, as the world faces increasingly frequent and intense threats from climate change and extreme weather events.

Economy

Diverse and innovative economies with access to capital are less vulnerable to price shocks and supply-chain disruptions, and they recover more quickly after a disaster. For longer term economic resilience, infrastructure and high-quality economic management are necessary to compete in a changing global economy.

Civic Space

A healthy public square enables robust consultation, debate, dialogue, and consensus building so that the needs and grievances of individuals and communities can be addressed constructively. When faced with crisis, countries that have a stable social contract will generate accountability for leaders and buy-in by the general population to a national strategy.

SUB-PILLARS

The following table shows the inputs in each pillar and their definitions. The sub-pillar level is the most granular level to which public users can disaggregate the State Resilience Index.

Appendix 4: Social Progress Indicators (SPI)



**SOCIAL
PROGRESS
IMPERATIVE**

For more information about the work of the Think To DO Institute, contact us at contact@thinktodoinstitute.com or visit the website www.thinktodoinstitute.com
